Real Convergence in the European Union by Schmidt, Christian
Real Convergence in the 
European Union
S C H R I F T E N  Z U R  W I R T S C H A F T S T H E O R I E  U N D 
W I R T S C H A F T S P O L I T I K
Christian Schmidt
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
Over the next couple of years, the European Union will face a difficult stage, being 
confronted with the eventual transition to a monetary union. In the beginning 
of 1997, it is less clear than ever, if and when the European Monetary Union will 
eventually be realized, which countries will join in this process, and which countries 
will benefit from monetary union or are likely to loose out. Using econometric 
methods, the work attempts to assess the real economic effects of the European 
Monetary Union. In a first step, differences in labor and goods market adjustment 
processes between the fifteen member states of the European Union, the United 
States and Canada are studied in order to evaluate the short-term prospects of 
monetary union.Turning to the long-run effects, within a second step, convergence 
of living standards is assessed.
Christian Schmidt studied Economics at the University of Freiburg and at Wayne 
State University in Detroit. After participating in the Advanced Studies Program in 
International Economic Policy Research at the Kiel Institute of World Economics 
he began his work on this dissertation as a participant of the Europa-Kolleg in 
Hamburg in 1993.
S C H R I F T E N  Z U R  W I R T S C H A F T S T H E O R I E  U N D 
W I R T S C H A F T S P O L I T I K
Christian Schmidt
Real Convergence in the European Union
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
Real Convergence in the European Union 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6










Frankfurt am Main • Berlin • Bern • New York• Paris • Wien 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6




in the European Union 
An Empirical Analysis 
PETER LANG 
Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
Open Access: The online version of this publication is published 
on www.peterlang.com and www.econstor.eu under the interna-
tional Creative Commons License CC-BY 4.0. Learn more on 
how you can use and share this work: http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0.
This book is available Open Access thanks to the kind support 
of ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft.
ISBN 978-3-631-75005-6 (eBook)
Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme 
Schmidt, Christian: 
Real convergence in the European Union : an empirical 
analysis/ Christian Schmidt. - Frankfurt am Main ; Berlin ; 
Bern ; New York ; Paris ; Wien : Lang, 1997 
(Schriften zur Wirtschaftstheorie und Wirtschaftspolitik ; 
Bd. 8) 
=S' 
Zugl.: Hamburg, Univ. der Bundeswehr, Diss., 1997 
ISBN 3-631-32122-8 
Gedruckt mit Unterstiitzung der Universitat 





© Peter Lang GmbH 
Europaischer Verlag der Wissenschaften 
Frankfurt am Main 1997 
All rights reserved. 
All parts of this publication are protected by copyright. Any 
utilisation outside the strict limits of the copyright law, without 
the pennission of the publisher, is forbidden and liable to 
prosecution. This applies in particular to reproductions, 
translations, microfilming, and storage and processing in 
electronic retrieval systems. 
Printed in Gennany 1 2 3 4 5 7 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6




I want to thank Professors Thomas Straubhaar and Rolf Hasse for their 
supervision of the dissertation. To both of them, as well as to Professor Goetz 
Uebe, I am indebted for helpful comments. In addition, I am grateful to my 
colleages at the Europa-Kolleg and the Universitat der Bundeswehr Hamburg for 
stimulating discussions. Financial support by the German research community 
(Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) and the Universitat der Bundeswehr 
Hamburg was greatly appreciated. Special thanks to Louise Tracey for reviewing 
the English language in the dissertation. Last, but not least, thanks to Silvia 
Marengo for her persistent support and encouragement during difficult periods 
and to my parents for helping me to get on the way. 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
7 
l. Introduction ............ .... ... ..... .. ... ................. ... ................. ... .... .. .... ............... .. ... .. 9 
2.The transition to European Monetary Union 
2. 1. Introduction .............. .. .... ........ .. .... .. .. ....... ..... ...... .... ...... ...... ..... .... ....... .. .. 15 
2.2. The design of the transition process towards European Monetary Union . 16 
2.3. A critical assessment of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria ..... . 20 
2.3.1. Monetary convergence .. ... .. ......... ..... ......... ........................................ 20 
2.3.2 Fiscal convergence .. ....... .. .... .. ... ........ .......... ..... .. .... .......... .. ... ... ....... ... 27 
2.4. Convergence criteria and economic theory .. ......... ... ..... .. ... ... .... ... ...... ...... 35 
2.5. Reconsidering the transition process ........ ... .... .. ...... .. ...... ... ... ...... ....... ... .. 39 
2.6. Concluding remarks ....... ... .................. ... ... ........ ..... ...... ........ .............. .. ... 47 
Endnotes ... ... .... ........ ......... ... ........ .. ... .. .... .. ........ ........... .. ......... .... ............... 50 
3. Optimum currency areas: one or many in Europe? .. .... ... ............ ... .. ... .... ....... 53 
3. 1. Introduction ............................................. .......... ... ..... ............. ... ... ...... .... 5 3 
3.2. Review of empirical evidence on optimum currency areas ... ............. ..... . 54 
3.3 A stylized model ....... .... .. ... ... ... ... .. .... .. ... ....... .. .... ........ .... ...... ............. ...... 57 
3.4. Statistical analysis ...... .... ............. ....... .... ... ... ..... ..... ..... ........... .. .. ............. 60 
3.4.1. Stochastic properties ofoutput and unemployment .... ............... ... ... .. 60 
3.4.1.1. Unit root tests .... ..... ..... ..... ... .... ........ .. ..... .. ... ... ........... ..... ..... .... ... ... 61 
3.4.1.2. Granger-causality tests .......................................... ....... ..... .......... ... 62 
3.4.1.3. Tests for cointegration ...... ....... .. ...... .. ..... .............. ............. ............ 63 
3.4.2. Structural VAR analysis ............... ... .. .... ... ................... .. .... ........ ....... 66 
3.4.2.1. Methodology ...... .. ..... ..... .. ... .......... ............ ..... ... ..... ... .... ... ... ........... 66 
3.4.2.2. Impulse response functions .. ... ..... ...... ... .... .... ... ... ... ... ... ..... ... .... .. ... . 67 
3. 5. Economic interpretation .... .... .... ........ .... ....... ......................... .... .. .... .... .... 78 
3.5.l. Demand and supply shocks .... ..... ............... .......... ..... .. .... ... .. ....... ... ... 78 
3.5.2. Symmetry and asymmetry of shocks in Europe and North-America .. 80 
3.6. Concluding remarks ............ ............ ...... ... .... ...... .... ...... .. ...... .... .......... ..... 81 
Endnotes ... ..................... ... ............ ......... .. ... ... ... .. ................ .................... ... 82 
4. Technology, convergence and growth in the European Union .. ... ... ................ 85 
4.1. Introduction ...... ... .............. ..... ..... ........ ...... .... .. .... ............... ........ .... ..... .. . 85 
4.2. Theoretical background .. ......................... .... ...... .......... .. .. .......... ....... ... .. .. 88 
4.2.1. Catching-up and falling behind ...... .... .... ... ... ...... ........ .... .... ... ...... .. .... 89 Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
8 
4.2.2. The neoclassical approach ................................................................ 90 
4.2.3. Endogenous growth .......................................................................... 92 
4.3. Convergence concepts ............................................................................. 93 
4.3.1. Definitions of convergence ............................................................... 94 
4.3.2. Empirical concepts ofconvergence ................................................... 95 
4.4. Review of the empirical literature ........................................................... 97 
4.4.1. Catching up and falling behind ......................................................... 97 
4.4.2. Conditional convergence ................................................................. 100 
4.4.3. Stochastic and local convergence .................................................... 104 
4.4.4. Income distribution dynamics ......................................................... 106 
4.4.5. Growth and convergence across Europe .......................................... 107 
4.5. On stability of growth and convergence in the European Union ............ 110 
4.5.1. Stylized facts .................................................................................. 110 
4.5.2. The stability ofrelative output ........................................................ 112 
4.5.3. a-convergence ................................................................................ 113 
4. 5 .4. Income distribution dynamics ......................................................... 116 
4.6. A stylized growth model ....................................................................... 120 
4.7. Econometric analysis ............................................................................ 124 
4.7.1. Model specification ........................................................................ 124 
4.7.2. Econometric methodology .............................................................. 126 
4.7.3. Estimation results ........................................................................... 127 
4. 7.4. Economic interpretation .................................................................. 132 
4.8. Concluding remarks .............................................................................. 135 
Appendix to Chapter 4 ............................................................................. 13 7 
1. Derivation of convergence equation ................................... ................... 13 7 
2. Dynamic stability .................................................................................. 141 
Endnotes .................................................................................................. 142 
5. Conclusions and policy implications ............................................................ 145 
5. 1. Conclusions .......................................................................................... 146 
5.2. Implications for European monetary integration .................................... 148 
References ...................................................................................................... 153 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6




Over the next couple of years, the European Union (EU) will face a difficult 
stage, being confronted with the eventual transition to monetary union. In the 
beginning of 1997, it is less clear than ever, if and when European Monetary 
Union (EMU) will eventually be realized and which countries will join in this 
process. For example, countries such as Germany and England may meet the 
necessary requirements, but may choose not to join. In contrast, some countries 
who may possibly wish to enter EMU, may not be allowed to do so. 
The actual consequences of the union, if it goes ahead, are currently difficult 
to predict. It is far from clear whether all member states will benefit from the 
adoption of a single currency and, if not, which member states will do so and 
which ones are likely to loose out. Indeed, the member states of the European 
Union are structurally still quite different; for example, unemployment rates 
ranged from 4.4 per cent in Austria to 24.2 per cent in Spain in 1994. One reason 
for this dispersion in unemployment rates is that the EU countries have different 
wage formation mechanisms and characteristics. Under these conditions, if 
countries face a common demand or supply shock, different wage and price 
developments will result. However, a monetary union requires nominal conver-
gence. As a result, divergence in unemployment rates, and therefore real eco-
nomic divergence, may be unavoidable. Yet if the monetary union consists of 
countries that are structurally very different, this may threaten overall macro-
economic stability. Such a situation will imply transfers from low-unemployment 
(high growth) countries to high unemployment (low growth) countries. If this is 
of a permanent character, the willingness of the low unemployment (high 
growth) countries to remain within the union will be affected. In addition, an 
EMU consisting of very different member states may experience conflict about 
the purpose of monetary union. Countries with a high unemployment rate will 
argue for a more expansionary policy than countries with a lower one. However, 
in the union there can only be one single monetary policy with a single rate of 
inflation. These conflicts may then lead to a relatively higher rate of inflation 
within the union. The real effects of monetary union will largely depend on the 
degree of structural convergence prior to its introduction. If economies become 
structurally less different over time, the effects of the adoption of a single 
currency will be less severe. 
In view of these issues, this dissertation attempts to assess empirically the 
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esses and, secondly, on long-run growth and convergence as indicators of real 
convergence. These indicators were chosen because they seemed to be the logical 
measures for convergence of real economic activity. In addition, most academic 
and political discussion concentrates on cyclical congruency and the long-run 
convergence of living standards. As well as providing empirical evidence on real 
convergence, with regard to the difficulties associated with the transition to 
monetary union, this work also aims to contribute to the process of European 
monetary integration by providing proposals for reform. 
The starting point for this critique is a review of the recent monetary integra-
tion process in Europe. At the end of the 1980s new political initiatives to re-
launch EMU among the member states of the EU gained momentum, 
culminating in the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty by the member states at 
the beginning of the 1990s and related to this, the plan to adopt a single currency 
in Europe by the end of the century. The Treaty has set out a path towards EMU 
following three stages, with transition to the next stage dependent on some degree 
of convergence being achieved in the previous stage. Economic convergence is 
thus considered a precondition for further moves towards economic and 
monetary integration. Before transition to the third and fmal stage, progress made 
in terms of economic convergence will be reassessed. Each country will be 
assessed individually before it is decided whether or not they can proceed into the 
union. The Protocol referred to in Article 109f of the Treaty sets out four criteria 
for transition to the third stage relating to inflation performance, budget positions, 
exchange rate stability and interest-rate convergence. The formulation of the con-
vergence criteria and the gradual approach towards monetary union has been dis-
cussed both in acadamic and political circles. Chapter Two will critically assess 
the transition process as determined in the Maastricht Treaty. This aims to estab-
lish the economic policy background of the subsequent empirical analyses and to 
provide an analysis of the transition to monetary union. 
In Chapter Three, the dynamics of the labor and goods market adjustment 
processes in Europe are analyzed. This analysis relates to the issue of whether the 
adoption of a common currency in Europe makes good economic sense. The eco-
nomic background for this examination is derived from the theory of optimum 
currency areas. This theory compares the economic costs of flexible and fixed 
exchange rate systems. The main cost factor in a system of fixed exchange rates 
is the inability to adjust exchange rates in response to unanticipated disturbances. 
Based on this theory, it is possible to evaluate the economic costs and benefits of 
EMU by analyzing the dynamic adjustment processes of the economies in re-
sponse to disturbances. In doing this, the dynamic interactions of output and un-
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employment in the fifteen EU-countries are compared with Canada and the 
United States. Considering the possibility of a possible multi-speed monetary 
union there is aiso included a comparison of the symmetry of shocks across dif-
ferent regions within Europe. 
Chapter Four reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on growth and 
convergence and provides an econometric analysis on convergence in the EU-
countries. Disparities between income per capita across regions and countries 
have been a matter of concern for the European Community (EC) since its 
inception. The objective of reducing disparities across regions in the EC has 
already been established in the preamble of the Treaty of Rome. In addition, in 
the Single European Act of 1987, the Community was given an explicit ability to 
undertake regional policies aimed at reducing disparities. The issue of growth 
and convergence is particularly interesting and relevant within the context of 
European integration for two reasons. First, regional convergence or divergence 
influences the usefulness of regional economic policies which attempt to equalize 
the distribution of income and second, European monetary integration might 
contribute to convergence - or divergence - itself by increasing factor mobility or 
trade between participating countries. There are fears that a fully-fledged EMU 
will widen the existing regional inequalities in per capita income within the 
European Union. Therefore, an empirical analysis of growth and convergence is 
central to the real economic convergence debate. 
Three modem theories of economic growth are reviewed and their 
implications for economic convergence summarized. Theories of technological 
catch-up argue that an inefficient use of technology may lead to a process of con-
vergence, depending on the degree of economic development within an economy. 
Neoclassical growth theories predict convergence due to decreasing returns to 
reproducible factors. Finally, new growth theories maintain that economic growth 
may be influenced by factors such as market size, economies of scale and institu-
tional structure, so differences in living standards would possibly persist. 
The subsequent statistical analysis consists of two parts; a descriptive 
statistical section and an econometric inductive one. Two main goals are 
associated with this. Firstly, the stability of the convergence process across time 
and across countries is analyzed. Existing empirical analyses tend to suggest that 
the process has not been stable, and this chapter attempts to confirm this view. 
Secondly, there is an analysis of why differences in growth and convergence 
processes in the European Union over time and across countries persists. 
Chapter Five provides the main conclusions of this study and derives 
implications for the European monetary integration process. 1n summary, the 
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empirical evidence suggests that structural differences across European countries 
exist and are likely to persist in the foreseeable future. Such structural differences 
may enhance political pressure, particularly in low-income, high-unemployment 
countries, to increase public spending which would contribute to higher public 
deficits and may involve a non-sustainable financial position within these 
countries. A non-sustainable financial position tends to be associated with 
negative external effects on other member states. The European Central Bank 
(ECB) may be forced to monetize the budget deficits, which would imply a 
higher inflation rate and an associated welfare loss for the other countries 
involved, or the defaulting government may ask for a net transfer from those 
governments which are solvent. These kinds of pressure on the ECB will be 
intensified in the presence of persistent differences in real economic activity. 
To achieve a successful and stable monetary union in the presence of struc-
tural differences it appears particularly important to strengthen the institutional 
framework to make it less vulnerable to political pressure, and which will make 
policies in the union more credible, and to improve market transparency and in-
formation flows. Based on these arguments, the following policy proposals are 
formulated: 
I. Broad interpretation of convergence criteria 
An important issue in the transition to monetary union is how the conver-
gence criteria determined in the Maastricht Treaty are to be applied. In principle, 
each country should be able to join monetary union as soon as it wants to do so. 
Each country may evaluate the costs and benefits of joining the union and decide 
if it is in its national interest to participate. However, the "necessary precondi-
tions" as established in Art. 109j need to be taken into consideration. 
II. Monetary policy coordination among the nonparticipants 
The gradual transition approach will probably lead to a multi-speed monetary 
union. If this is the case, the possibility of splitting the European Union apart 
should be taken into account. As suggested in Chapter Three, a solution may be 
to create currency blocks in Europe. Those countries not eligible to enter the third 
stage initially might gain from forming a seperate monetary union (or unions). 
The efficiency gains obtained from these currency blocks would enable the 
lagging countries to catch-up those already in the third stage of monetary union. 
III. Institutional strengthening 
To strengthen the institutional framework of the EU the implementation of 
incentive contracts is proposed. Incentive contracts are arrangements by which 
the central banker is penalized for inflation. Several formulations of the incentive 
contracts for the executive board of the ECB may be thought of. Firstly, the in-
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comes of the members of the executive board of the ECB might be made contin-
gent on the state of the economy, thereby influencing the incentives the executive 
board faces in choosing the rate of inflation. Secondly, targeting rules might be 
enforced by making the ECB's budget depend on adherence to the rules. Thirdly, 
a stronger measure defining procedures for the removal of the executive board of 
the ECB should it fail to maintain price stability could be introduced. Whatever 
actual form the incentive contract took it would make the future ECB more ac-
countable. At the same time, it would be costly for the governors of the ECB to 
succumb to national political pressures and would thereby contribute to securing 
price stability within the future union. The contract should include an inflation 
targeting procedure, similar to those already followed sucessfully by many central 
banks. 
IV. Public debt management 
A way to make policies more tenable is to enforce a time-consistent public 
debt management scheme. One way to do this is to require the use of short-ma-
turity bonds in highly indebted countries. Short maturities reduce the govern-
ment's incentive to produce surprise inflation and therefore would contribute to 
solving the time-consistency problems of fiscal policies in the EU. 
An alternative, or complementary, way is to use inflation-indexed bonds -
bonds whose interest payments and principal are tied to inflation. Index-linked 
bonds influence governments' incentives and so tend to make monetary policies 
more credible. In short, with nominal public debt, governments have an induce-
ment to inflate debts away at the bond holders' expense. If payments of interest 
and principal increase with rising price levels, governments will be less tempted 
to implement inflationary policies. Index-linked bonds provide an additional 
benefit in that they can help governments to estimate financial markets' expecta-
tions of inflation. This is useful for monetary policymaking, as a rise in the ex-
pected inflation rate may be a sign that policy should be tightened directly. In this 
way the administration of monetary policies could be improved. Moreover, it 
would help in the prediction of long-term interest rates, as they contain inflation 
rate expectations and this would therefore contribute to the evaluation of risk 
more precisely. 
Inflation-indexed bonds would both help markets to evaluate risk by provid-
ing estimates of inflationary expectations, and contribute to make monetary poli-
cies more credible by changing governments' incentives. In the future one might 
require the member states of the monetary union to issue inflation-indexed bonds. 
To obtain a self-balancing mechanism, highly indebted countries may be required 
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to issue a larger share of their outstanding government bonds in the form of infla-
tion-indexed bonds than the low-debt countries. 
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2.The transition to European Monetary Union 
2.1. Introduction 
At the end of the 1980s new political initiatives to relaunch Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU) among the member states of the European Union (EU) 
gained momentum. These initiatives culminated in the ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty by the member states in the beginning of the 1990s. The Treaty 
formalizes three stages for moving towards monetary wiion. Before transition to 
the third, final stage, progress made in terms of economic convergence will be 
reassessed. Each country will be assessed individually before it is decided 
whether or not it can go forward to monetary union 1• The Protocol referred to in 
Article 109f of the Treaty sets out four criteria for transition to the third stage 
relating to inflation performance, budget positions, exchange rate stability and 
long-term interest-rate convergence, which need to be fulfilled before entry into 
the third stage. Nominal convergence, i.e. convergence of prices, is, thus, 
considered a precondition for further moves towards economic and monetary 
integration. 
Taking into accowit solely of nominal macroeconomic convergence may, 
however, be insufficient. If a similar evolution of real economic activity across 
member countries of the third stage is not achieved, there is a threat of 
pronounced regional differences in unemployment, incomes and growth. 
Pronounced international income disparities would imply the danger of social 
and political tension and, correspondingly, of macroeconomic instability. The 
congruent behavior of real economic activity will, thus, be an important factor for 
monetary union in Europe. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty itself determines in 
its Article 2 economic and social cohesion, and thus real economic convergence, 
as a policy goal of the Community. Thus, while not a strict technical necessity, 
real economic convergence would be economically and politically helpful for the 
working of monetary union. 
In this chapter, I contrast nominal convergence, as foreseen in the Maastricht 
Treaty, and real economic convergence. The formulation of the convergence 
criteria and the gradual approach towards monetary union has been discussed 
both in acadamic and political circles. I therefore critically review the transition 
process and provide a review of several reform proposals noted in the literature. 
The chapter thereby aims to lay out the economic policy background of the sub-
sequent empirical analyses. 
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the design of the 
transition process to monetary union as layed out in the Maastricht Treaty. In 
Section 3, the rationale of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria is dis-
cussed. In Section 4 characteristics of participants in a monetary union suggested 
by economic theory are put in contrast to the existing barriers formulated in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The theory of optimum currency areas is used to show that 
convergence of real economic activity will be an important issue for monetary 
union. Section 5 discusses several reform proposals noted in the literature, while 
Section 6 summarizes and concludes the chapter. 
2.2. The design of the transition process towards European Monetary 
Union 
The Maastricht Treaty designs a gradual movement towards towards monetary 
union in three stages23 . In the first stage, which began in July 1990, the member 
states of the European Monetary System (EMS) abolished all remaining capital 
controls4. The second stage started on 1 January 1994. A new institution, the 
European Monetary Institute (EMI), was created, which is supposed to 
strengthen monetary co-operation between national central banks. The third 
stage, the introduction of a single currency, will take place in the beginning of 
1999, at the latest. 
The European Council solidified the conditions for the transition process 
towards a single currency in Madrid in December 1995. The quality and 
timetable follows largely the proposal made by the EMl in November 1996. First, 
the choice of the participants of EMU will be made by the heads of state and/or 
government as early as possible in 1998. The decision will be based upon reports 
prepared by the EMl and the Commission and will rely on macroeconomic data 
for the year 1997. Second, as soon as the starting date for stage three has been 
determined, and no later than July 1998, the executive board of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) will be appointed by "common accord" of the EU 
governments participating in stage three, on the recommendation of the Council, 
and after consulting the European Parliament and the Governing council of the 
ECB5• The ECB will be established once the executive board has been appointed 
and will exercise its powers from the first day of stage three (Art. l 091). The EMl 
will at the same time be liquidated, as the ECB takes over its functions. 
The convergence criteria affect the decision making making process through 
their influence on the reports made by the EMl and the Commission. The 
Council has repeatedly emphasized that the convergence criteria will be applied 
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strictly. Article 109j of the Maastricht Treaty contains four convergence criteria, 
which are explained in a protocol to the treaty: 
l. Achieving a high degree of price stability, which the protocol interprets as 
meaning that: ... an average rate of inflation, observed over a period of one year 
before the examination, that does not exceed by more than 1 ½ percentage points 
that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in terms of price 
stability. Inflation shall be measured by means of the consumer price index (CPI) 
on a comparable basis .... 
2. Achieving a sustainable financial position, which the protocol interprets as 
meaning that: ... at the time of the examination the Member State is not subject of 
a Council decision ... that an excessive deficit exists. 
3. Maintaining the country's exchange rate within the normal EMS band, 
which the protocol interprets as meaning that: ... the Member State has respected 
the normal fluctuation margins ... without severe tensions for at least the last two 
years before the examination. In particular, the Member State shall not have de-
valued its currency's bilateral central rate against any other Member State's 
currency on its own initiative for the same period. 
Fig. 2.1.: The timetable 
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4. Achieving a long-term interest rate indicative of durable convergence and 
of the country's participation in the EMS, which the protocol interprets as 
meaning that: ... over a period of one year before the examination a Member State 
has an average nominal long-term interest rate that does not exceed by more than 
2 percentage points that of, at most, the three best performing Member States in 
terms of price stability6. 
The decisions on entry into monetary union will take into account of the re-
ports prepared by the Commission and the EMI, and the opinion of the European 
Parliament. The Commission and the EMI will base their recommendations on 
the fulfilling of the convergence criteria of Article 109j and on the fiscal 
"excessive deficits" criterion layed down in Article 104c for each individual 
country. It is important to note that the Council cannot stop the integration 
process. The Council has only to decide which countries are ready to enter the 
third stage and grant the authority of Art. 109k. All of the Council's decisions 
will be taken with qualified majority voting. No country will have the 
opportunity to exercise a veto. Thus, the Maastricht Treaty has created a 
transition-automatism to monetary union [see Kortz, 1996a,b]7. There is a way to 
postpone monetary union, as noted by Kenen (1992) and Thygesen (1993a), by 
deciding before 1998 to start stage three after January 1, 1999. It is not possible, 
however, to abandon or to stop the monetary integration process89. 
It has been criticized that the formulation is rather slender and that there 
remains plenty of room for political interpretation [see, e.g., EMI, 1995; Hasse, 
1995a; Schmidt and Straubhaar, 1995a,b]. Two examples may help to make the 
point: with respect to price stability, the formulation does not clarify whether the 
wording "at most, the three best performing member states" does not leave scope 
for judging price stability in relation to the performance of the two countries with 
the most stable prices or even to just the Member State with the best record in the 
past. There are also differences of opinion as to whether the I½ percentage 
points are to be added to the average of the ( one, two or three) reference 
countries or only to the inflation rate of the "worst" of them. Finally, the wording 
raises the question as to how "sustainable" price stability is to be assessed. 
The criterion of exchange rate stability means that a member state must have 
"respected the normal fluctuation margins provided for by the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions for at least 
two years before the examination". After the widening of fluctuation margins 
from 2. 2 per cent to 15 per cent on 2nd August 1993 as a result of 
"unprecedented exchange market pressures", the question arises as to which 
fluctuation margins are to be used as the reference point for measuring diver-
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gence10. The application of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria will thus 
remain subject to discretion and a matter of contemporary politics. The discretion 
does only refer to the decision on the eventual "ins" and "outs", and not to the 
decision of whether entering the third stage or not. 
Table 2.1: Convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty (1997) 
Budget Public debt Consumer Long-tenn Membership 
deficit (in % (in % of Price Index interest rate in EMS 
of GDP) GDP) (in%) 
Maastricht Crite- -3.0 60.0 3.1 7.9 
rion 
Austria -3.0 73 1.8 5.1 yes 
Belgium -2.9 127 1.9 6.2 yes 
Denmark -0.4 70 2.5 6.7 yes 
Finland -1.7 60 1.7 5.3 no1l 
France -3.2 57 1.3 6.4 yes 
Gennany -3.4 63 1.5 6.1 yes 
Greece -5.7 105 7.2 no 
Ireland -I.I 76 2.0 6.9 yes 
Italy -3.7 123 2.5 7.7 no1l 
Luxembourg 0.0 7 1.8 yes 
Netherlands -2.3 76 2.1 6.1 yes 
Portugal -2.9 68 2.6 yes 
Spain -3.7 69 2.9 7.7 yes 
Sweden -2.5 79 2.1 7.1 no 
United Kingdom -3.7 57 2.5 7.4 no 
7 'Finland and Italv ioined the EMS in the end of 1996. 
Source: OECD (1996). 
In sum, economic convergence within the EMS member states is a 
precondition for further moves to economic and monetary integration. A long 
transition period is deemed as necessary to achieve convergence, since, it is 
argued, confidence in the permanence of EMU might be impaired if the 
economies of the participating countries would not converge sufficiently before 
their exchange rates were locked 11 . 
Presently, most forecasts conclude that the interest rate and the inflation rate 
criterion will be fulfilled by virtually all EU-member states (see Table I). Only 
Greece is expected to exceed the inflation criterion. Five countries will not fulfill 
the exchange rate criterion, as it requires the participation in the EMS for two 
years in advance of the decision on participants in the union, thus since the 
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beginning of 1996. With respect to the budgetary criteria, member states have 
made large advances within recent years. The criteria will, however, most 
probably not be reached in 1997 by a large number of countries. 
2.3. A critical assessment of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria 
The Treaty has established, as has been pointed out in the previous section, the 
need for a high degree of prior economic convergence as a precondition for the 
entry of each member state into EMU12. In this section, the economic rationale 
for the formulation of the convergence criteria is analyzed, focusing first on the 
monetary convergence criteria, i.e. those referring to exchange rates, interest rates 
and inflation rates and turning, thereafter, to the fiscal convergence criteria13. 
2.3.1. Monetary convergence 
The monetary convergence criteria are economically closely related. Several 
economic explanations have been stated in the literature. Begg et.al. (1991) sug-
gest that the exchange rate criterion is the most important one, because the 
success of the EU countries in avoiding realignments during the run-up to stage 
three would be an adequate test of their ability to bear the costs of reducing 
mflation in stage three itself. Langfeldt (1992) similarly stresses the need to re-
duce the risk of realignments during stage two so as to confer credibility on the 
locking of exchange rates at the outset of stage three and thus protect the 
monetary union from exchange rate crises before it has moved to using the ECU 
as its single currency. However, the potential of self-fulfilling expectations and 
speculative attacks being unrelated to economic fundamentals is ignored. 
Expectations of a devaluation can actually lead to a devaluation by leading to 
capital outflows that exhaust a country's foreign reserves14• In particular, 
expectations of a final realignment before the entry into the third stage will pose a 
threat to exchange rate stability which will be most probably independent from 
convergent macroeconomic fundamentals [De Grauwe, I 994b]. Moreover, if 
financial markets come to believe that a country will belong to the group of 
"outs", they may require a premium for higher inflation rates or future 
devaluations. In contrast, if markets expect that the country will enter the third 
stage, they might require a lower rate of return. Divergent interest rates are to be 
expected in either case. For payoffs of investors to remairi equalized, the 
exchange rate needs to move. Central banks have to mtervene in order to keep the 
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exchange rate unchanged, thereby foreign reserves will be exhausted and 
speculative attacks will occur. 
Lesch (1993) refers to monetary theories of exchange rates as economic 
foundation for the exchange rate and inflation rate criteria. Monetary exchange 
rate theories maintain that the nominal exchange rate is determined in the long-
run by price differences across countries15. A country with a relatively greater 
loss of purchasing power is subject to devaluation pressure; a country with a 
relatively smaller loss of purchasing power in contrast is subject to revaluation 
pressure. Central here is the purchasing power parity (PPP) relation, according to 
which, in the long-run, domestic and foreign price levels are related by the 
nominal exchange rate. 
(2. I) p, = p, * -e, 
where Pt and Pt* denote the domestic and foreign price levels, respectively, 
and ei refers to the nominal exchange rate. By differencing equation (I) we 
obtain the relative PPP condition 
Figure 2.2.: 
Inflation rate performance 










~ Or--- -------- ---',._.,::_ __ ~ 
1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 1989 1993 
lime 
Germany France Italy Ireland Spain 
••--ae• • •O,. • .-..- ••O •• 
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators, Paris. 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
22 
(2.2) tJ,,e, = l'lp, - l'lp, • 
From equation (2), exchange rate movements are determined by inflation rate 
differentials. It follows essentially from these kind of models that convergent 
inflation rates are necessary for stable exchange rates in the long-run. At the 
same time, inflation cannot be influenced by the exchange rate. One extreme 
view that results from this argumentation, the so-called "coronation theory" 16, is 
that it would be necessary to wait for a full convergence of inflation before it is 
advisable to go to monetary union by irrevocably fixing exchange rates [Gros and 
Thygesen, 1992 pp. 473) 17. 
Empirically, differences of inflation rates between EU economies have been 
reduced during the 1980's, as can be seen from Figure 2. France, Denmark, 
Ireland, in particular, but also Italy and Spain have reduced their inflation rates. 
The figure seems to suggest, however, that inflation rate convergence is 
associated with the existence of a fixed exchange rate system. Inflation rates 
during the 1960's have been low and similar within the Bretton-W oods exchange 
rate system. After the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system in 1973, levels of 
inflation rates have been rising in the l 970's until the EMS was introduced in 
1979. If such a a systematic relation indeed was to hold, as has been argued by 
Giovannini ( 1989), inflation rate divergence after the collapse of the EMS is to 
be expected. 
Let's turn to the economic foundation of the interest rate criterion. Issing 
(1992) interpretes the long-term interest rate criterion as an additional, reassuring 
indicator for convergence of price stability and budgetary discipline18. This 
argument is problematic, however, as has been pointed out by Lesch (1993), be-
cause it is unclear which inflation rate is expected by market participants. The 
average long-term interest rate incorporates the expected inflation rate. In the 
year before the adoption of a common currency the expected inflation rate will 
not depend on national monetary policies, but rather will be associated with the 
expected monetary policies of the future ECB. The actual inflation rate, in 
contrast, is more reflected in the short-term interest rate level. In other words, the 
long-term interest rate mirrors the credibility of the future ECB while the short-
term interest rate reflects the credibility of the current national central bank. 
Economies with more than average inflation rates gain from imported credibility, 
which is however only the result of the supranationalisation of their monetary 
policies. The imported credibility reduces the level of long-term interest rates. 
Long-term interest rates may, according to this line of argumentation, converge 
more than justified by economic fundamentals. Convergence depends then 
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mainly on how market participants evaluate the probability of the economy to 
enter into the third stage. 
The sources of differences between nominal interest rates at home and 
abroad can, in order to obtain a more systematic view on the international 
relation of interest rates, be summarized by the following equation: 
(2.3) i, = i, * +E,(11.e, +1) +Risk,+ Dom,+ Bar, 
where i and i* are, respectively, nominal interest rates in home and foreign 
currency denominated assets of a given maturity; Et(Aet+k) reflects future 
expected exchang rate changes; Riskt constitutes the part of the differential due 
to the uncertainty in returns from investing in a foreign asset and to the risk of 
changes in the exchange rate over the period of the investment; Domt is the 
portion of the differential that is due to differences in the characteristics of the 
assets besides maturity, such as liquidity or tax treatment. Bart represents the part 
of the differential that is due to government policies and institutional 
imperfections ( capital controls) that effectively impede financial flows across 
national jurisdictions. DoIDt and Bart are country-specific risks reflecting factors 
that may lead to imperfect substitutability between bonds denominated in 
different currencies. 
If Riskt, Domt and Bart are zero, or, in other words, if bonds that differ only 
in their currencies of denomination are perfect substitutes, equation (3) represents 
the classic uncovered interest parity condition. Uncovered interest parity states 
that the nominal interest differential between similar bonds denominated in 
different currencies must equal the expected change of the exchange rate over the 
holding period [e.g. Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984). Equation (3) also shows that 
even when exchange rates are credibly fixed, so that Et(Aet+k)=O, interest rates 
can still differ across countries, due to country-specific risks like tax differences 
or default risk. It follows that nominal interest rate differentials may be of no 
greater use as precondition for monetary union. Observable long-term interest 
rate differentials reflect a number of different expectations, from default risk to 
debt maturity differences, which are not necessarily related to monetary 
integration. 
In Figures 3 a) and b) short-term and long-term interest rate differentials of 
selected EU economies relative to Germany for the period 1979 to 1994 are dis-
played. The interest rate criterion of the Maastricht Treaty requires convergence 
only of long-tenn nominal interest rates. A positive value indicates a higher 
interest rate in the foreign country than in Gennany. Most countries' interest 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
24 
rates, both short-tenn and long-tenn, have been higher than the ones in Gennany. 
Differentials of both rates have been reduced in recent years. While during the 
EMS crises, differentials, in particular, of short-tenn interest rates have 
increased, they have been reduced thereafter again. Long-tenn interest rates have 
converged in recent years, largely because of the elimination of capital controls in 
Europe in relation to the entry into the first stage of monetary union. 
It is noteworthy that interest rates in Gennany have been almost consistently 
below other economies' interest rates in Europe. This reflects the high reputation 
and credibility of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which is based on a long tradition of 
a relatively stringent and conservative monetary policy and on its political and 
economic independence 19. One motivation for the other countries to participate in 
the EMS, that has been mentioned frequently in the literature, is to import the 
credibility of the Bundesbank and to use a system of fixed exchange rates as an 
institutional constraint for their own monetary authorities. 
Figure 2.3. : 
Interest rate differentials 
relative to Germany 
a) Short-tenn differentials b) Long-tenn differentials 
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The general idea of this argument is that authorities that have the discretion 
to alter the nominal exchange rate, will tend to abuse their power, introducing an 
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inflationary bias into the economy [e.g. Edwards, 1992]. Under plausible 
conditions, such as the existence of labor market rigidities that preclude the 
economy from reaching full employment, it will be optimal for the authorities to 
surprise the private sector through unexpected devaluations.By engineering these 
unexpected devaluations the government expects to induce a reduction in real 
wages and, thus, an increase in employment and a boost in output. In 
equilibrium, with rational private agents who take this information into account 
in forming their inflation expectations, the public will anticipate the devaluation 
surprises and hence render them ineffective. As a consequence, the inflation rates 
will be relatively high in the long-run, without a positive effect on employment. 
A key policy implication of this literature is that a way to gain credibility is by 
"tying the hands" of the authorities2°. A fixed exchange rate system may serve as 
such an institutional constraint that limits the scope for activist policies of 
monetary authorities. The adoption of a fixed exchange rate constrains 
governments ability to surprise the private sector through unexpected 
devaluations. Promises of monetary discipline become credible and private sector 
decisions do not elicit successive rounds of inflationary actions. Countries with a 
history of relatively high inflation, and correspondingly relatively low monetary 
reputation, thus entered the EMS in order to limit the scope for unexpected 
devaluations of their own monetary authorities. 
A similar line of reasoning has been applied to analyze the economic 
rationale for the convergence criteria [De Grauwe, 1994a]. When the member 
states of the European Union, which are characterized by different reputations 
concerning inflation, decide to form a fixed exchange rate system, like EMU, the 
high-inflation countries import the credibility of the low-inflation countries and 
thereby most likely benefit from the reputation of the low-inflation countries. The 
low-inflation countries do not benefit from participation in the union and may, in 
contrast, be infected by the bad reputation of the high inflation countries. 
Thereby, the low-inflation countries may experience a welfare loss. Since the 
low-inflation countries may loose when they join the union, they seek to impose 
conditions for the participants of the union in order to avoid the welfare loss. 
Thus, the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty are formulated, due to the 
interests of the low-inflation countries, in order to provide evidence that the high-
inflation countries care about a low inflation rate in the same way as the low-
inflation countries do and, in particular, as Germany does. This they do by 
bringing the inflation down to a common level. During this disinflationary 
process, a temporary increase in unemployment, due to a movement along the 
short-term Phillips curve, will be inevitable. This self-imposed suffering is added 
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evidence for the low-inflation countries that economies like Italy are serious 
about fighting inflation. Once the proof is given, these economies can be left into 
monetary union. To use the Maastricht Treaty as such an institutional constraint 
on the political authorities and the fulfilling of the convergence criteria as evi-
dence for future preferences of the authorities in high inflation countries would, 
however, if this was a motivation for the formulation of the convergence criteria, 
have been a misleading approach. The reason is that nothing in the formulation 
of the criteria can rule out strategic behavior of future member states [De 
Grauwe, 1995]. Countries may act opportunistically, i.e. they may pursue 
disinflationary policies today so as to gain access later. Once they are in the 
union, they may reveal their true preferences. The executive board of the ECB 
will be chosen by "common accord" of the EU governments participating in stage 
three. Thus, the board of governors may, as representatives of the participating 
countries, be subject to political influence21 . They will be able to influence 
monetary policy and to put the "hard-nosed" representatives in a minority 
position. In addition, even if the present governments of the candidate member 
countries are serious about inflation and submit themselves to the disinflationary 
process, they do not commit future national representatives in the ECB to the 
same monetary policy stance. Governments change, and so do preferences with 
respect to inflation. The fact that, for example, Italy has reduced its inflation rate 
in recent years so as to be accepted in the monetary union, will not bind the 
Italian representative in the ECB in the future to follow the same low inflation 
policies. At that time the policies of the present Italian representatives will have 
become irrelevant. The only relevant constraint after the entry into the third stage 
will be the fact that the ECB is politically independent and that its statutes 
commit the ECB to a stable monetary policy. 
2.3.2 Fiscal convergence 
The monetary convergence criteria are supplemented in the Maastricht Treaty by 
restrictions on public debt and public deficits. According to the Treaty, member 
states shall regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern 
(Article 103) and must coordinate them to achieve the community's objectives. 
Governments cannot, however, be penalized for failing to coordinate their poli-
cies. In contrast, if a non-sustainable fmancial position in the sense of Article 
109j is found by the Commission, a complicated procedure is set in motion 
which may lead to serious consequences for the member states. Article 104c 
determines this procedure in response to excessive deficits. If a member state is 
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in a non-sustainable financial position, which is given when it exceeds the 
reference values provided in the Protocol on the excessive deficits procedure -
60% of its GDP for the government debt and 3% of its GDP for the public deficit 
- the Commission prepares a report for the Council. The Council decides on the 
matter and may make corresponding recommendations to the member state 
which are aimed to bring the situation to an end "within a given period". If the 
member state does not respond appropriately to the recommendations of the 
Council, they may be made public. Eventually, if the member state still fails to 
put an end to the situation, the Council may apply one or more of four measures: 
(i) The member state may be required to publish additional information before 
issuing bonds and securities. (ii) The European Investment Bank may be advised 
by the Council to reconsider its lending policy towards this member state. (iii) 
The member state may be required to make a non-interest- bearing deposit until 
the excessive deficit has been corrected. (iv) The Council may impose "fines of 
an appropriate size" on the member state. It follows that, "in the long-run", the 
violation of the excessive deficit criterion may lead to quite drastic consequences 
for the economies. If a country fails to avoid an excessive deficit, due to Article 
l 09j, it will also not be allowed to enter into the third stage. In contrast to the 
monetary convergence criteria stated in Article 109j, which will be redundant, 
the fiscal criteria will be of importance even after entry into the third stage. While 
the fact that they are binding for member states, even after the adoption of a 
common currency is, in principle, an advantage, there remain several problems 
associated with the fiscal criteria22. Indeed, the fiscal criteria have been subject to 
substantial critique by economists [ see Giovannini and Spaventa, 1991; 
Buiter, 1992; Goodhart, 1992; Hasse, 1992; Buiter et.al., 1993; De Grauwe, 
1994]. 
A look at the public debt rates of the present EU member states shows that 
most countries will have great difficulties to fulfill the criterion. In I 990, at the 
time of the beginning of stage one of monetary union, six countries had debt 
ratios that exceeded the reference value. By 1993 this number had risen to I 0 
countries and in 1995 only four countries (France, Germany, Luxembourg, 
United Kingdom) were below the public debt reference value. Thus, the public 
debt situation has deteriorated in recent years. Indeed, for some countries the 
fiscal criteria are out of reach for the foreseeable future. 
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Take the relation between government deficits and government debt. 
(2.4) M, = g,-t, + (i-x- a)b, - , 
where ht is the debt to GDP ratio and Abt is the change in public debt relative 
to GDP, thus the public deficit (relative to GDP). gt is the primary government 
spending as a percentage of GDP; t is the tax rate; i is the nominal interest rate; x 
is the rate of growth of real GDP and 1t is the rate of inflation. (gt-tt) is then the 
primary deficit rate in the economy. If we combine the primary deficit rate with 
the interest payments on previously accumulated debt, we may rewrite equation 
(4) as in 
(2.5) M, = def,-(x + a)bt - , 
where def1 = kt1+ib1• 1• Equations (4) and (5) give a dynamic relation 
between public debts and public deficits. To stabilize the government debt at 
60% of GDP, the budget deficit must be brought to 3% of GDP if and only if the 
growth rate of nominal GDP is 5% [Buiter, 1992]23 . Based on these values, 
Figure 2.5 displays the simulated adjustment process for EU economies. 
It will take long for the highly indebted countries to fulfill the fiscal criteria. 
For those countries with a current public debt that exceeds 100% of GDP, for ex-
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ample, it will take more than 40 years to reach the reference value, provided that 
the annual deficit does remain at 3% of GDP24. It is ex post somewhat surprising 
that such harsh fiscal criteria were accepted by the member states' governments. 
It may partly be explained by the fact that initially, in the end of the l 980's, the 
fiscal situation in most of the European countries was far better than now. 
Figure 2.5.: 
Public debt adjustment process in 
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Apart from the unrealistic determination of the fiscal criteria, an immediately 
obvious point for critique in the formulation of the convergence criteria refers to 
the arbitrary numerology [ e.g. Buiter, 1992]. These numbers are not on reason, 
they could just as well have been values like 10 or 4625. The arbitrary nature of 
the criteria is, however, to a large degree inherent in the methodology of 
imposing any numerically specified barriers of entry in advance of monetary 
union26. 
The problem of creative accounting, that is, for example, the invention of 
new fiscal programmes so that necessary expenditures can be placed "off budget" 
and therefore "put off ratio", is not tackled [Hughes Hallett and Scott, 1992]. 
Indeed, by using the nominal gross debt of the general government, in contrast to 
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the net non-monetary liabilities of the consolidated general government and 
central bank, the criteria encourage creative accounting [Buiter et.al., 1993). It is 
thus likely to be a relevant issue in the transition process. The public debt in 
Germany, for example, amounted to 50,2% of GDP in 1994 and jumped to 
58,6% in 1995. The reason for this extraordinarily strong increase in the amount 
of public debt is not, or only to a minor extent, deficit spending by the German 
government in this year, but rather the belated change in the fiscal accounting 
system related to German unification. Bovenberg et.al. (1991) emphasize that 
different fmancing of government pension obligations to its employees affect its 
long-run financial position. In the Netherlands, for example, supplementary civil 
service pensions are essentially funded, while in Germany and France public-
sector pensions are essentially unfunded. While these differences may be taken 
into account of statistically, they induce potential for accounting transfers. 
Moreover, the criteria do not make any allowances for cyclical factors or for 
growth of foreign assets27. Growth rates of real GDP, for example, will continue 
to differ across countries in Europe. Convergence of living standards requires 
that poor countries grow faster than rich ones. Countries with a higher growth 
rate can indeed support a higher deficit-GDP ratio without solvency problems 
(see equation 2.5). 
These points of critique refer largely to the particular formulation of the 
criteria. They could have been taken into account by policymakers relatively 
easily. In addition, however, there are several fundamental issues associated with 
imposing fiscal restrictions in advance of an introduction of a single currency, to 
which I turn next. The emphasis thus turns more to the economic rationale of fis-
cal restrictions in advance of monetary union per se. Two reasons have been 
noted for imposing fiscal restrictions in advance of EMU. One refers to an inter-
national extemality associated with a country's public deficit, the other applies to 
the consequences of non-sustainable fiscal policies for the member states in a 
monetary union. 
Fiscal policies within one country may exhibit negative externalities for the 
other economies [e.g. Bovenberg et.al., 1991). The mechanisms involved may be 
described as follows. An expansionary fiscal policy in the domestic country, 
which is, with unchanged government revenues, associated with higher budget 
deficits, has two effects. On the one hand, in the short-run, it leads to an increase 
in aggregate demand and to higher output growth in the country. On the other 
hand, it implies a higher demand for capital and, with the supply of capital fixed, 
a higher rate of return on capital. A higher interest rate depresses investment 
demand and affects aggregate demand negatively. The higher public deficit will 
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force the government to raise taxes in the future, both to service the new debt 
created by the budget deficit and to cover the increase in interest payments on the 
existing stock of debt. This increase in taxes will reduce the future capital stock 
and future output growth, as far as taxes are distortionary. An increased interest 
rate in the domestic country will, with integrated capital markets, additionally 
affect the interest rate in foreign countries. Thereby foreign countries will have to 
bear part of the costs associated with the public deficit in the domestic country. 
In other words, there is a negative effect for the foreign countries in relation with 
a higher public deficit in the domestic country. 
How likely to be relevant are these kind of externalities? De Grauwe (1989, 
1994a) argues that they will be of relatively little importance. He points out that 
an increased demand for capital will in general be satisfied by the international 
supply of capital and will possibly not lead to a rise in interest rates at all. This 
view is based on the fact that world capital markets are becoming increasingly 
integrated and efficient, so that interest rates are becoming more and more 
equalized everywhere and no single country maintains the ability to affect them. 
Kenen (1995), however, argues that this argument applies only to small 
economies and that public debt in relatively large economies like Germany or 
Italy would probably affect the union's interest rate. The second argument for an 
international surveillance of national fiscal policies is associated with the 
solvency problem of sovereign debtors. A debtor is said to be solvent if his obli-
gations are not larger than the present value of the revenue stream available to 
service them. This implies the solvency condition that the growth in nominal 
GDP, which determines the extra revenue stream available for servicing, must be 
at least as great as interest payments (see equation 2.5). A solvency problem of a 
member state of the EU, and in particular a default of a member state, it is 
argued, may involve international spillover effects. In general, if a government 
fiscal programme is not solvent, its options are either to raise taxes I cut 
expenditures to remain within the limits, to finance the deficits by money 
creation, or by transferring the responsibility for the debt to other governments or 
the central bank. The government may then be obliged to turn increasingly to the 
union's capital markets, driving the interest rate upward [Hughes Hallett and 
Scott, 1992]. In addition, it is feared that the new ECB may be forced to 
monetize the budget deficits, which would imply a higher inflation rate and an 
associated welfare loss for the other countries, or that the defaulting government 
may ask for a net transfer from the solvent governments. Moreover, a national 
debt default may have adverse systemic effects on the EU-wide financial system 
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or its key components, the banking system and the payments system. A financial 
panic and liquidity crisis could be the result [Buiter et.al., 1993]28• 
The Maastricht Treaty intends to deal with the potential consequences of 
national default by including a "no bail-out" principle. Article 104b states that: 
"The Community shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central 
governments, regional, local or other authorities, other bodies governed by law, 
or public undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual 
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State 
shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other authorities, other bodies governed by public law or public 
undertakings of another Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial 
guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project". That is, if a member 
government fails to service its debt, the defaulting country will bear the conse-
quences of such a fiscal crisis itself. The Treaty thus attempts to prevent the 
negative consequences of one country's default through a binding precommitment 
of the member states to carry the sole responsibility for the own debt themselves. 
The effectiveness of the no bail-out clause depends on whether it needs to be 
enforced, and whether it can be enforced. The need for enforcement of the rule is 
contested [ see e.g. Scheide and Trapp, 1991]. If the Italian authorities, for 
example, were to continue issuing large amounts of debt, they would have to pay 
a growing sovereign risk premium on the Italian interest rate. Eventually, the 
Italian authorities would be unable to sell debt in any currency at any rate of 
interest. The risk premium is country-specific and is paid solely by the Italian 
government without affecting other countries. Thus, with markets pricing risk 
accurately, the default of a member state would not involve negative international 
spillover effects. While the ability of markets to evaluate risk accurately is con-
tested, financial innovations and financial integration may contribute to 
increasingly accurate risk evaluations in the future29. The ability to enforce the no 
bail-out clause may be restricted by political pressure. The defaulting government 
may ask the ECB to acquire debt or solely to adjust its monetary policy to the 
need for low interest rates. While the enforcement of the no bail-out clause 
depends ultimately on the political will to do it, the Treaty has made clear that to 
achieve a sustainable financial position is within the responsibility of national 
governments and of their own citizens. In addition, the political pressure to 
organize a bail out is not necessarily higher when indebted countries default 
while they are members of the union than while they are not. When, for example, 
Italy is not allowed in the union, one can expect that a default will also put a lot 
of pressure on the other EU members to bail out the Italian government [De 
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Grauwe, 1996]. The effectiveness of the no-bail out clause is thus likely to be 
relatively low. 
De Grauwe (1996) refonnulates the time inconsistency problem of low-
inflation policies in EMU due to government debt3°. The problem stems from the 
fact that an unanticipated component of inflation affects the nominal budget 
constraint, i.e. inflation that is higher than expected lowers the nominal debt 
burden. Fully anticipated inflation, in contrast, does not lower the debt burden. It 
follows that there is a trade-off between the tax rate and the inflation rate, i.e. an 
unexpected increase in inflation allows the government to reduce taxes while 
keeping the solvency constraint intact. This trade-off, however, holds only if 
inflation is unanticipated. In equilibrium, with rational private agents who take 
this infonnation into account in fonning their inflation expectations, the public 
will anticipate the inflation surprises and hence render them ineffective. As a 
consequence, the inflation rates will be relatively high in the long-run, without a 
positive effect on the debt burden. He emphasizes that the convergence require-
ments may lead to higher than necessary economic adjustment costs. The reason 
is that if a disinflationary strategy is not fully credible, an observed decline in 
inflation is not matched by a decline in the expected inflation. The debt burden is 
thereby increased. The authorities must therefore increase taxes just to prevent 
the debt to GDP ratio from increasing. Thus, the convergence requirement makes 
debt reduction more difficult when, as in the case of Italy, a credible anti-
inflationary policy is difficult to follow. He concludes that the Maastricht conver-
gence requirements increase the costs of the debt reduction. 
While there are pros and cons, the economic case for the convergence criteria 
seems rather weak. The main arguments against the monetary convergence 
criteria may be summarized as follows. Exchange rate volatility is not the right 
indicator for economic convergence, since exchange rate movements may not be 
associated with macroeconomic fundamentals. In advance of monetary union 
financial volatility is to be expected, which may imply speculative attacks due to 
self-fulfilling expectations. The long-tenn interest rate criterion does not 
necessarily provide accurate infonnation on convergence, since observable 
interest rates incorporate all sorts of expectations. Interest rates may be distorted 
by markets' expectations on the governments' own actions. With respect to 
inflation rates, the important detenninant of price stability is the independence of 
the European Central Bank. The inflation rate criterion does not provide any 
additional guarantee with respect to price stability in the union. If the case for the 
monetary convergence criteria is weak, the economic rationale for the fiscal 
criteria is even weaker. Countries have to follow sustainable fiscal policies 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
34 
irrespective of the monetary regime [Buiter and K.letzer, 1991]. There is indeed a 
general conviction among economists that ex ante limitations on debts and 
deficits are not an appropriate way to secure the sustainability of a financial 
system31 • It seems most relevant to strengthen the applicability of the criteria after 
the adoption of a common currency. 
We may conclude, on the one hand, that macroeconomic stability in the 
future monetary union may be achieved although the criteria are not fulfilled. 
Public deficits, for example, in excess of the Maastricht Treaty's reference value 
would not put a threat on the solvency condition of the government and, 
correspondingly, on the stability of the union, as long as the rate of economic 
growth in the country is sufficiently high. 
On the other hand, the fulfillment of the criteria does not guarantee 
macroeconomic stability in the future monetary union. If the ECB decides to 
pursue an inflationary monetary policy, price stability would be endangered 
although all criteria might have been fulfilled in advance. In other words, the 
fulfilling of the convergence criteria is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
macroeconomic stability in the future monetary union in Europe32. 
At the meeting of the European Council in Dublin in December 1996, the 
heads of state have agreed on a stability pact, which is supposed to provide 
additional security with respect to macroeconomic stability within the union. The 
compromise reached between Germany and France does not incorparate fully 
automatic sanctions in response to excessive deficits, as it was proposed by the 
German government. The stability pact does, however, complement the rules 
determined in the Maastricht Treaty by providing additional safeguards that aim 
to secure macroeconomic stability in the union. In case of failure of a member 
country to satisfy the stability criteria, sanctions in form of fines and non-
interest-bearing payments are defined. However, the formulation of the stability 
pact does leave room for interpretation, which renders budgetary policies within 
the union open to political discretion, as has been criticized by Siebert (1997) and 
Vaubel (1997). 
2.4. Convergence criteria and economic theory 
In this section, the nominal convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty are 
contrasted with convergence criteria suggested by economic theory33 . While we 
have seen in the previous section that the economic rationale of the convergence 
criteria is weak, in this section it is analyzed whether they address the 
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areas (OCA) to derive "economic reference criteria", which can be compared to 
the criteria determined in the Maastricht Treaty. A currency area between two or 
more countries means that those countries agree to irrevocably fix their exchange 
rates. Thus, the central point about a currency area is that, when countries pro-
ceed to join one, they give up the possibility of allowing the exchange rate be-
tween their own currency and those of the other members of the union to vary. 
The formation of a currency union implies benefits and costs for the participating 
countries34. The benefits stem mainly from having a single currency to use over a 
wider area. The underlying idea is that money, in general, facilitates transactions 
and thereby increases economic efficiency to a situation of barter. The social 
benefit derived from money is, moreover, enhanced by stability in its value, that 
is, by price stability. The widest possible use of a single money that exhibits such 
stability would minimize transaction costs and maximize its international role. 
The major cost involved in participating in a currency area, or forming a 
monetary union, is foregoing the use of the nominal exchange rate as a tool for 
macroeconomic adjustment. In other words, when participating in a currency 
area, a country relinquishes an instrument of economic policy and loses its ability 
to conduct a national monetary policy. The size of this cost will depend on 
several factors; factors that have been suggested by the OCA theory. The theory 
of optimum currency areas has been developed originally in the 1960's and 
l 970's and compares the economic costs of a fixed exchange rate regime with the 
economic costs of a flexible exchange rate regime. By doing so, it obtains certain 
characteristics, or preconditions, of participants in a monetary union, which will 
be listed with a brief explanation of their rationale below35 • 
(i) Factor mobility 
Countries with a high degree of factor mobility are considered suitable candi-
dates for monetary integration, since factor mobility is a substitute for exchange 
rate flexibility in international adjustment to shocks. If wages and prices are 
sticky, real exchange rate depreciation can only be accomplished through 
nominal exchange rate changes. However, depreciation would be ruled out if the 
two regions were part of a monetary union. Therefore, Mundell ( 1961) argued 
that unless factors of production can freely move between regions, shifts in 
demand facing a region relative to another may lead to unemployment in the 
absence of flexible exchange rates. 
(ii) Wage and price flexibility 
When shocks have asymmetric effects across countries, a movement of the 
real exchange rate is required to restore macroeconomic equilibrium. If wages 
and prices were to adjust instantaneously, they would induce a prompt re-equili-
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brating response of the real exchange rate and there would be no loss from relin-
quishing the nominal exchange rate. Thus, when prices and wages are flexible 
between regions, the transition towards adjustment between regions is less likely 
to be associated with unemployment in one region and inflation in another, 
diminishing the need for exchange-rate adjustment and the introduction of a 
single currency is facilitated. Masson and Taylor (1993) point out that it is 
important to distinguish between two types of wage and price flexibility: real and 
nominal. Changes in a nominal price like the nominal exchange rate are a 
substitute for domestic price or wage changes, and may facilitate real adjustment. 
In the limiting case of perfect real wage rigidity, for instance, due to complete 
indexation of wages, employment and net exports would be unaffected by 
nominal exchange rate changes. In the other limiting case of perfect flexbility of 
real wages, the freedom to modify the nominal exchange rate can be helpful in 
the case of nominal wages being sticky but redundant in the case of nominal 
wages or prices themselves being flexible enough to do the job of altering real 
exchange rates. In other words, the usefulness of changes of the nominal 
exchange rate in response to asymmetric shocks depends on the nature of the 
rigidity. While the nominal exchange rate may be used in a case of a nominal 
rigidity, it is of no help in the case of a real wage rigidity. 
(iii) Fiscal integration 
Budgetary transfer payments between two countries help reduce the negative 
effects of shocks on real economic activity. When a country joins a monetary 
union, fiscal policies become an important stabilization instrument for member 
governments to react in response to asymmetric shocks. Indeed, with monetary 
policy not being feasible in a fixed exchange rate system, fiscal adjustments 
remain the sole macroeconomic policy instrument. Fiscal adjustments need not 
involve discretionary policy, but rather can be the result of the operation of 
automatic stabilizers. A possible complement is a system of fiscal taxes and 
transfers between members of a currency union, thus a form of fiscal federalism. 
Currency areas are therefore optimum if there is also a willingness to undergo 
fiscal integration and hence to centralize a significant part of the national budgets 
to the European leveI36. In addition, if such a centralization of the national 
government budgets in a monetary union is not possible, national fiscal policies 
should be used in a flexible way. The fiscal convergence criteria of the 
Maastricht Treaty do, however, reduce the fiscal flexibility for member 
governments and thereby put an additional limitation on member states 
macroeconomic policies. 
(iv) Openness of the economy 
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Open economies tend to be suited for systems of fixed exchange rates, as 
exchange rate movements have relatively weaker effects on real competitiveness. 
In order to maintain external balance in the face of an asymmetric shock, 
resources in a fully employed economy must be shifted toward production of 
traded goods and away from non-traded goods sectors. The smaller the non-
traded goods sector, the larger the exchange rate change needed to transfer a 
given amount of resources, and the larger the movement in internal prices that 
would result. Open economies thus tend to prefer fixed exchange rate 
arrangements as exchange-rate changes in such economies are not likely to be 
accompanied with significant effects on real competitiveness. This criterion also 
implies that smaller countries are better suited for monetary union than large 
countries. 
(v) The degree of commodity diversification 
If a country produces a wide variety of goods, and shocks occurring either to 
the supply side or as shifts in relative preferences, then the effect of any shock on 
output will be less than the effect on individual sectors. Diversified economies 
are thus regarded as better candidates for monetary union, since a high level of 
diversification offers protection against the effect of shocks specific to particular 
sectors. 
(vi) Similarity of inflation rates 
If inflation rates are similar, a smooth flow of current account transactions 
can be expected. Consequently, monetary unions are optimum if the inflation 
rates in member states are similar. 
(vii) The degree of goods market integration 
Terms-of-trade shocks have a symmetric impact in countries with similar 
production structures, so that the exchange rate is redundant as an adjustment 
instrument. Accordingly, countries with similar production structures are better 
candidates for monetary union. 
( viii) Volatility of real exchange rates 
As the aforementioned characteristics are difficult to quantify, it has been 
suggested that the volatility of real exchange rates should be used as an all-
embracing criterion for admission to a monetary union. The smaller real 
exchange rate fluctuations have been in the past, the better suited a country is for 
membership of a monetary union. 
(ix) Political factors 
Finally, the political desire for monetary integration is emphasized as a decid-
ing factor for the success of monetary union. 
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To summarize, exchange rates can be fixed, and a monetary union is optimal, 
according to the theory of optimum currency areas, if the structure of the 
economies is "similar" and if goods and labor markets react flexibly to real 
economic changes37. If these theoretical characteristics of an optimum currency 
area are compared with the nominal convergence criteria laid down in the 
Maastricht Treaty, a striking discrepancy between economic theory and political 
reality is to be noticed. The Maastricht convergence criteria are nominal criteria, 
whereas the characteristics suggested by economic theory relate to real economic 
activity38. It has therefore been argued that real economic convergence is an 
important prerequisite for EMU [see e.g. Heylen et.al 1995; Schmidt and 
Straubhaar, 1995)39. If real economic convergence does not occur, the argument 
goes, and if economic and monetary union prevents individual regions from 
taking specific economic measures in order to respond effectively to shocks, 
there is a danger of pronounced regional differences in unemployment, incomes 
and growth. In addition, Heylen and Van Poeck (1995) emphasize that an EMU 
encompassing partners with unequal real performance may experience much 
conflict about the stance of monetary policy of the union's central bank. All other 
things being equal, member states with a high unemployment rate will argue for a 
more expansionary policy than countries with a low unemployment rate, which 
will lead to differences in opinion as to the correct way to conduct monetary 
policies. Goodhart (1995) argues that politicians may blame depression on EMU 
and will start to advocate the retreat from monetary union, which will endanger 
the political and economic stability in the EU. Moreover, the Maastricht Treaty 
itself determines real economic convergence as a policy goal of the Community. 
In its Article 2, the Treaty includes economic and social cohesion as a 
fundamental principle the Community seeks to respect. Article 130a states that: 
In order to promote its overall harmonious development, the Community shall 
develop and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic and 
social cohesion. In particular, the Community shall aim at reducing disparities 
between the levels of development of the various regions and the backwardness 
of the least-favoured regions, including rural areas. It follows that real economic 
convergence in the European Union is desirable both for economic and juridical 
reasons. While not a technical necessity, real economic convergence is helpful for 
the working of the monetary union. 
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2.5. Reconsidering the transition process 
The Maastricht Treaty has detennined a transition-automatism that will lead to 
monetary union of at least two countries by the end of the decade. If the 
Maastricht convergence criteria are, however, largely inconsistent, as has been 
argued in the previous sections, and, furthennore, are unlikely to help in 
advancing EMU for all but a few member states, it remains to think about better 
ways to achieve EMU. The proposals made by economists range from imposing 
additional hurdles in advance of European monetary union in order to make the 
existing entry barriers more effective to a de facto abandonment of the Maastricht 
Treaty convergence criteria. In this section, some of the main reform proposals 
are presented40. 
Several suggestions for refonn have argued in favor of alternative, and 
additional, convergence criteria. It is maintained that, because the present 
convergence criteria do not guarantee macroeconomic stability, additional 
indicators need to be used. De Grauwe and Gros (1991) and Gros and Thygesen 
(1992) propose the adoption of an overall "EMU indicator", which takes into 
account of a broader macroeconomic framework. They argue that the inclusion 
of supplementary economic indicators in the Commission and EMI reports, based 
on Art. 109j, is evidence that there will also be efforts to see the main 
convergence criteria in a broader macroeconomic framework. The value of the 
indicator is given by the sum of five variables: inflation (CPI), public sector 
deficit in per cent of GDP, the public debt surplus (in per cent of GDP) needed to 
bring the national debt to GDP ratio to the reference value of the Treaty within 
ten years, the unemployment rate, and the external current account balance in 
per cent of GDP41 . The proposed indicator differs from the fonnal convergence 
criteria of the Treaty in three aspects: first, it uses an absolute standard in all 
respects rather than relative inflation measures, second, by aggregating the 
various indicators extra creditable perfonnance in one respect is allowed to 
compensate for deficient perfonnance in other respects and, third, it incorporates 
explicitly convergence of real economic activity. 
Table 2.2. and Figure 2.6. display the composition of the EMU indicator for 
1994. The figure shows that there is a group of about seven countries with quite 
"good" macroeconomic perfonnance, consisting of Gennany, Austria, Denmark, 
the Netherlands, France, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. Implicitly, 
Luxembourg is to be added, because it is not included in the figure due to its 
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Table 2.2.: EMU indicator (1994) 
Budget Debt CPI Unempl. Current EMUindi-
deficit indicator Rate account cator 
deficit 
Austria 4,20 -l,33 3,00 6,00 l,10 12,97 
Belgium 5,30 5,60 2,40 10,00 -4,80 18,50 
Denmark 4,20 -0,36 2,00 10,20 -2,80 13,24 
Finland 4,60 -l,92 l,lO 18,70 -2,40 20,08 
France 5,70 -3,07 l 70 l l,30 -0,80 14,83 
Germany 2,70 -2,88 3,00 7,30 1,80 11.92 
Greece 13,10 3,41 10,90 10.20 0,80 38,41 
Ireland 2,30 1,27 1,90 17,70 -7,90 15,27 
Italy 970 4 64 3,90 11,80 -1,50 28,54 
Netherlands 3,80 -0.lO 2,80 10,00 -1,80 14,70 
Portugal 7,10 -090 5,30 6,10 1,60 19,20 
Spain 6,80 -1,60 4,70 22,40 1,00 33,30 
Sweden 11,20 0,07 2,20 7,70 -0,40 20.77 
United Kingdom 6 80 -2,89 2 50 9 40 0,40 16,21 
Figure 2.6.: 
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Source: Own calculations. 
large current account surplus, which would make appear it belonging to a 
group of its own. This group is quite homogeneous in terms of the EMU 
indicator, which ranges from 11. 92 for Germany to 16.21 for the United 
Kingdom. 
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This group is followed closely by Belgium and Portugal, with the EMU indi-
cator ranging between 18.5 and 19.2. Belgium has well-known problems with its 
public deficit, although it outperforms most other countries in terms of inflation 
and with its large current account surplus. Finland and Sweden follow closely. 
These two counries, however, are thefirst countries to perform weaker than the 
average value of the EMU indicator, which is 19.8. 
After these groups there is a gap before the rest of the EU economies, Italy, 
Spain and Greece, follow with values for the EMU indicator between 28.5 and 
38.4. The poor position of Italy is due to its poor public deficit and public debt 
performance. The situation is similar for Greece. Spain's poor performance in the 
EMU indicator is mainly due to its high unemployment rate. 
The EMU indicator does provide a different picture of the convergence per-
formance in Europe than the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty. While 
the convergence criteria of the Maastricht Treaty would have been fulfilled by 
only two countries in 1994, Germany and Luxembourg, the EMU indicator 
suggests that a larger group of countries exhibit homogeneous macroeconomic 
performance. Depending on the concrete line to be drawn, a first group of 
countries in the third stage might consist of eight, may be even twelve EU 
countries. 
Recently, in the spring of 1995, the British Government demanded 
"structural convergence", which aims at the inclusion of real convergence 
criteria42. In their view, the fulfilment of real economic criteria should be a 
requirement for progress to further stages of integration in addition to the 
monetary and fiscal convergence criteria explicitly laid down in the Maastricht 
Treaty. The claim for real convergence criteria has been based on Article 109j, 
where it says that "the results of the integration of markets, the situation and the 
development of the balance of payments on current account and an examination 
of the development of unit labor costs and other price indices" be taken into 
account of when assessing progress towards convergence, which leads the British 
Government to consider the Maastricht criteria as "a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition to justify a single currency"43. Or as the governor of the Bank 
of England, Eddie George, for example, suggested in a speech in Paris on 31st 
January that differences in unemployment - whether cyclical or structural -
should be taken into account before deciding whether to push ahead with EMU. 
The British attempt to define real economic convergence criteria did not, 
however, go beyond the additions mentioned above. A far more concrete pro-
posal for real economic criteria was published in March 1995 by the British 
branch of the US investment bank Goldman Sachs. They argue that Article 109j 
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suggests not only that the EU should examine differences in real exchange rates 
from their long term equilibria, along with any balance of payments difficulties 
which this might entail, but also that the phrase "the results of the integration of 
markets" could be construed to include other real factors, such as the unemploy-
ment rate or the rate of growth of GDP. According to this proposal, the following 
four real conditions should be met in addition to the monetary and fiscal criteria 
in order to be able to participate in EMU. 
(i) The current economic growth rate of an economy should not diverge by 
more than± 1.5 percent from its long-run growth rate. The long-run growth rate 
is measured as the average over a 10-year period. This criterion is intended to 
ensure that the economic cycles of member countries are roughly synchronized. 
(ii) A country's unemployment rate should not be more than 2 percentage 
points above the average of the EU. This is intended to ensure both that the 
amount of cyclical slack in different countries is similar and that the rate of 
structural unemployment - the NAIRU - in each country is close to the EU 
average. If the gap between the unemployment rate and the NAIRU is similar in 
each country, and the NAIRUs themselves are close together, we would observe 
that unemployment rates would be close together. 
(iii) The deficit of the current account of the balance of payments should not 
exceed 2 per cent of GDP. This should primarily prevent EMU from causing a 
collapse in the exports of particular economies, because the devaluation option is 
then no longer available. 
(iv) Competitiveness in relation to Germany must not have deteriorated by 
more than 10% since February 1987, the date of the last voluntary realignment. 
This criterion is designed to ensure that only countries, whose real exchange rate 
is close to the long-term equilibrium level, can join EMU. 
Table 3 shows the extent to which the EU countries fulfil the real 
convergence criteria proposed by Goldman and Sachs. The degree of cyclical 
synchronization, as measured by the degree of convergence of real GDP, is quite 
high. A majority of member states would meet the criterion. 
Similarly, with respect to the current account, this would not impose a 
problem for any of the countries, as no one is at present recording a deficit of 
more than 2 per cent of GDP. On competitiveness, those countries which fail the 
suggested criterion (Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden and Finland) all have greater 
competitiveness against Germany than permitted, mainly because of the post-
ERM depreciations of the peripheral currencies in the last couple of years. This 
seems to be, according to Goldman and Sachs, less dangerous for a monetary 
union than the opposite case, even if it were to persist. With respect to unem-
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ployment rate differences, most countries would meet the criterion, although 
there are wide differences in unemployment rates between Gennany (7.3%) and 
several other member states, including France, Italy, and Spain, where 
unemployment rates are well into double digits. 
To take into account of real convergence criteria would not throw up new 
obstacles for EMU. Strict numerology would suggest, as with the convergence 
criteria of the Maastricht Treaty, that only Gennany and Luxembourg would have 
passed all preconditions in 1994. 
Table 2.3: Real convergence criteria 
Real GDP Unemployment Current account Competitiveness 
rate (1994) deficit in % of against Germany 
GDP(l994) (Feb. 1987= 100) 
End of 1994. 




Germany 2.3 7.3 -1.8 --
France 2.4 11.3 0.8 108.3 
Italy 2.4 11.8 1.5 123.9 
United Kingdom 3.9 9.4 -0.4 93.9 
Spain 1.8 22.4 -1.0 109.5 
Netherlands 2.4 10.0 1.8 108.3 
Belgium 2.3 10.0 4.8 103.9 
Denmark 4.6 10.2 2.8 103.1 
Portugal 1.0 6.1 -1.6 --
Greece 1.0 10.2 -0.8 97.7 
Ireland 5.0 17.7 7.9 106.3 
Luxembourg 2.6 3.3 28.6 110.9 
Finland 3.5 18.7 2.4 112.1 
Sweden 2.0 7.7 0.4 113.9 
Austria 2.8 6.0 -1.1 105.5 
1 Long-run growth rate is defined as the average growth rate between 1984 - 1994 
2competitiveness to Germany within 10% range of the level in February 1987 (the date of the 
last "voluntary" realignment). Higher numbers indicate better competitiveness relative to Ger-
many. 
Source: Goldman Sachs (1995) 
In other words, whereas the EMU indicator points to a broader group of 
countries than adherence of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria would 
suggest, the adoption of real convergence criteria would not have much of an 
influence on the eventual participants in EMU.According to the broader 
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interpretation of Goldman Sachs, a core group of countries - Germany, France, 
Luxembourg, Austria and the UK - would qualify on virtually all measures, be 
them real or nominal. 
While the introduction of additional convergence criteria could provide for 
more credibility, it is contested whether they would be in line with Article l 09j of 
the Maastricht Treaty. Although Article l 09j indicates that a broader 
macroeconomic framework will be taken into account, the adoption of specific 
real convergence criteria, as in the proposal by Goldman Sachs, would probably 
involve a revision of the Maastricht Treaty. 
Several proposals aim to strengthen the institutional setting in the European 
Union. The economic rationale comes from the aforementioned issues of time-
inconsistency and credibility44. De Grauwe (1996) suggests to define and enforce 
a procedure for removal of the board of directors of the ECB should it fail to 
maintain price stability. Such a procedure would ensure future price stability, he 
argues, and would make the future ECB more accountable. 
Gros ( 1995) suggests that countries that fail to satisfy the budgetary norms 
would not obtain a voting power on the board of directors of the ECB. Thus, his 
proposal foresees that countries like Italy and Belgium would be accepted into the 
union. However, as long as their budgetary house is not in order, these countries 
would not be allowed to take part in the decision process of the ECB. As a result, 
there should be less fear that heavily indebted countries may push the ECB to 
pursue too expansionary policies. 
Hasse (1995b) makes a similar proposal. He argues that the excessive 
deficits procedure as determined in Article l 04c of the Treaty is not sufficient to 
ensure budgetary discipline in EMU and suggests, as an extension to the 
procedure, a temporary suspension of the voting right of the government 
representative in the Council ofMinisters45. He proposes to extend the catalog of 
sanctions to be applied in the case of an excessive deficit in Article 104c as 
follows: - temporary suspension of the voting rights in the Councit6. 
Kenen (1995) proposes to use the debt criterion to condition the deficit 
criterion, not, as present, to stand beside it. A low debt-country might be made to 
satisfy the present test - a budget deficit not larger than 3 percent of GDP. A 
high-debt country might be made to satisfy a more stringent test - a deficit not 
larger than, say, 2 per cent of GDP. It would not be necessary, he argues, to alter 
the indents in Article 104c, which pertain to the existing deficit criterion, but the 
qualifications concerning the trend in the debt ratio could be dropped47. These 
changes are self-balancing, in that a high-debt country would have to run a 
smaller budget deficit. In addition, he proposes to change the present price-
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stability test, which is in terms of relative inflation convergence, into an absolute 
one: A country's inflation rate must not exceed the smaller of two numbers: the 
one based on the showing of the three best performers and the other fixed at a 
certain percentage per year. Under this test, stage three can not start automatically 
in 1999 unless two or more countries have inflation rates below, say, 2½ percent. 
Thus, this kind of absolute restriction on inflation rate performance would 
contribute a more stringent test on prior nominal convergence. 
De Grauwe (1994b) invokes the principle of free choice and suggests to let 
each country decide whether it wants to join48. The Community would declare 
that the monetary union will start at a specific point in time. Each country would 
then be free to join the union. Such a principle allows Europe, as he argues, to 
surmount the obstacles to EMU. If, for example, Germany would feel that it is 
not in its national interest to join the union and to abolish the mark, it would be 
free to stay out. More generally, member economies may evaluate the costs and 
benefits of their entry into monetary union. Authorities, assuming that they 
maximize a macroeconomic social welfare function, can calculate the risks 
associated with core-periphery tendencies and may then decide, whether it makes 
sense to participate in the union or not. A monetary union based on free decision 
of participants would constitute, per definition, an optimum currency area. No 
government would decide to enter into the third stage if the costs exceed the 
benefits for the country. The principle of free choice is not without problems, 
however, as noted by De Grauwe himself. Incomplete information and myopia 
may distort the decisions of member governments, which may additionally be in-
fluenced by domestic political pressure. Incentives for strategic behavior of po-
litical authorites also exist. High-inflation countries have, because of gains from 
lower inflation and efficiency gains from monetary union, an incentive to join the 
union. In contrast, for low-inflation countries, the participation in such a union 
becomes unattractive. Low-inflation countries will not want to be part of such a 
union if the welfare loss of the additional inflation exceeds the efficiency gains of 
the union. While free choice is an appealing notion, political and juridical aspects 
leave some doubts. Member states of the European Union, except for the United 
Kingdom and Danmark, are, however, in principle, obliged to enter monetary 
union. Straubhaar and Schmidt (1996), therefore, argue that while the principle 
of free choice is economically appealing, it is politically unrealistic. In contrast, 
they propose a broad interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence 
criteria. In principle, they argue, each country should be able to join monetary 
union as soon as it wants. Each country may evaluate, if it is at all in its national 
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interest to participate. However, the "necessary preconditions" according to Art. 
109j need to be taken into consideration. 
Overall, a number of different reform proposals have been stated in the 
literature. One set of proposals suggests to implement additional convergence 
criteria in order to make the convergence requirements more consistent with the 
goal of macroeconomic stability. However, taking explicitly into account of 
additional criteria would probably involve a formal revision of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Another set of proposals is directed towards strengthening monetary and 
fiscal institutions. To solve the aforememtioned time-inconsistency problems of 
monetary and fiscal policies, a strengthening of the ECB, in particular, is 
considered necessary. Finally, a self-selected monetary union is proposed. 
However, for political and juridical reasons, free choice does not seem to be a 
feasible policy option. 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, the transition process towards European monetary union is 
reviewed and the economic policy background of the subsequent empirical 
analyses discussed. The chapter started with a review of the design of the 
transition process as layed out in the Maastricht Treaty. The process is 
characterized by its long transition period and by its restriction on nominal 
macroeconomic indicators as barriers to entry into monetary union. It is 
emphasized that the Maastricht Treaty has created a transition-automatism to 
monetary union. 
The subsequent analysis of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria 
proceeds in two steps. First, the economic rationale of the convergence criteria is 
examined and, second, its restriction on nominal macroeconomic variables as 
barriers to entry is contrasted to characteristics of participants suggested by 
economic theory. 
The main points of critique referring to the economic rationale of the criteria 
can be summarized as follows. Exchange rate volatility may not be the right 
indicator for economic convergence, since exchange rate movements are not 
necessarily determined by macroeconomic fundamentals. In advance of monetary 
union financial volatility is to be expected, which may imply speculative attacks 
due to self-fulfilling expectations. Expectations of a final realignment may lead to 
speculative crises before the final date. The long-term interest rate criterion does 
not necessarily provide accurate information on convergence, since observable 
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distorted by markets' expectations on the governments' own actions. With respect 
to inflation rates, the important determinant of price stability is the independence 
of the European Central Bank. The inflation rate criterion does not provide any 
additional guarantee with respect to price stability in the union. 
The case for the fiscal criteria is similarly weak. Countries have to follow 
sustainable fiscal policies irrespective of the monetary regime. It is generally bad 
economic policy to apply rigid numerical restriction irrespective of the concrete 
situation of an economy. There is indeed a general conviction among economists 
that ex ante limitations on debts and deficits are not an appropriate way to secure 
the sustainability of a financial system. To secure a sustainable financial situation 
within EMU it seems most relevant to further strenghten the applicability of 
fiscal restrictions after the adoption of a common currency. 
To derive "economic reference criteria", I refer to the theory of optimum 
currency areas. This theory implies that exchange rates can be fixed, and a 
monetary union is optimal, if the structure of the economies is "similar" and if 
goods and labor markets react flexibly to real economic changes. Moves towards 
monetary integration should therefore be undertaken if, first, the real economies 
of participating countries react to changes with similar rapidity and flexibility 
and, second, both the geographic and occupational mobility of labor is high. If 
these theoretical characteristics of an optimum currency area are compared with 
the nominal convergence criteria laid down in the Maastricht Treaty, a striking 
discrepancy between economic theory and political reality is to be noticed. The 
Maastricht convergence criteria are nominal criteria, whereas the characteristics 
suggested by economic theory relate to real economic activity. Thus, based on 
economic theory, the most relevant characteristics of participants in a monetary 
union refer to their real economic structure. Apart from being economically 
relevant, real convergence turns out to be desirable for political and juridical 
reasons, as Article 2 of the Maastricht Treaty itself includes social and economic 
cohesion as a fundamental principle the Community seeks to respect. 
We conclude that while the transition process will probably culminate in the 
adoption of a common currency of at least two countries in Europe by the end of 
the century, the convergence strategy will not contribute to secure macro-
economic stability in the future union. On the one hand, the monetary 
convergence criteria refer only to the transition period and their fulfillment is, 
therefore, irrelevant for future price stability. On the other hand, the budgetary 
norms, apart from being economically inconsistent, may be difficult to enforce 
due to political pressure. The concentration on nominal convergence is mistaken, 
because it does not take into account of real economic activity that will be most 
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relevant once the monetary union is achieved. Real economic divergence may 
lead to political pressure particularly in low-income, high-unemployment 
countries to increase public spending, which would contribute to higher public 
deficits and may involve a non-sustainable financial position in these countries. 
A non-sustainable financial position may, in turn, be associated with negative 
external effets on other member states. While the introduction of real 
convergence criteria would probably require a revision of the Maastricht Treaty, 
being therefore a non-feasible policy device, real economic convergence, as for 
its relevance in the monetary union, deserves to be assessed in more detail in 
order to evaluate the prospects of European monetary integration more carefully. 
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1Here, as in the rest of the dissertation, I use the terms "third stage" and "European Monetary 
Union" interchangeably. 
2 This section draws heavily on Kenen (1995). 
3The gradual approach to monetary union has been subject of critique from economists. See, 
e.g., De Grauwe (1994a), Dornbusch (1990). It has been argued that a quick move to 
monetary union would be a major regime change and would thus induce the changes in 
economic behavior required for convergence. On the earlier debate between "monetarists", 
who argue in favor of a kind of shock therapy, and "economists", who support the gradual 
approach, see Giovannini (1990a), Gros and Thygesen (1992). 
"The goals of stage one were [Gros and Thygesen, pp.350]: first, the member states should 
have taken steps towards independence of their central banks. Second, steps to prevent the 
monetary financing of public-sector budget deficits in each member state had to be taken. 
Third, all restrictions on capital movements were supposed to be removed. Fourth, all 
member states should have taken measures which would enable them to take part in the EMS. 
The passage to stage two was originally supposed to require the achievement of these goals. 
5See Monticelli and Vinals (1993) for an analysis of the institutional design of the ECB. 
6The Treaty goes on to say that the reports of the Commission and the EMI shall also examine 
the situation and development of the balances of payments and the development of unit 
labour costs and other price indices. This passage has been used to justify the examination of 
real convergence criteria, as will be discussed in more detail in section four. 
7This, however, implies that a government may be obliged to enter the third stage although it 
possibly evaluates the economic costs to be higher than the economic benefits for its country. 
In such a case, the Maastricht Treaty would impose a kind of irrational behavior on the 
economy and on its citizens. 
8Kenen ( 1995) points out that Germany cannot decide for itself whether to participate in stage 
three. While all decisions affecting the start of stage three will be taken by qualified majority 
voting, one decision thereafter, on the fixing of the values of the national currencies in terms 
ofECU, requires unanimity. The German government may thus be able to keep the monetary 
union from getting under way. Gros and Thygesen (1992, pp.392) note that the member states 
could, in principle, decide to renegotiate the EMU Treaty within the framework of the 
International Governmental Conference in 1996. They argue, however, that going back on the 
EMU Treaty would be a loss of momentum and prestige for European integration hard to 
imagine. 
9Two protocols have been attached to the treaty, for Britain and Denmark, allowing them to 
opt out of stage three. 
10Thygesen (1993b), for example, considers the present, wider bands as "normal" in the sense 
of the Maastricht Treaty. Crowley (1996) argues that the exchange rate criterion has been 
virtually dropped by the EMI. 
11The German Council of Economic Advisers (1995) interprets the convergence criteria as a 
means to secure the functioning of the then newly created monetary system, to provide 
credibility for the European Central Bank, and to establish the Community as a 
"Sta!Jilitatsgemeinschaft", directed towards overall macroeconomic stability 
[Sachversta.ndigenrat, 1995, pp.246]. 
12 For economic analyses of the transition process, see, e.g., Giovannini (1990a,b), Froot and 
Rogoff (1991 ), Mussa (1991 ). 
13The convergence criteria have been widely analyzed by economists. De Grauwe (1994a) 
contains a comprising analysis. Other analyses include Begg et.al. (1991), Fratianni et.al. Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
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(1992), Gros and Thygesen (1992). In German, contributions include Lesch (1993), 
Nicolaysen (1993), Mittendorfer (1994), Ohr (1993,1996), Petschnigg (1993), Hasse (1995b), 
Scharrer ( l 995a,b ). 
14Obstfeld (1986) provides a theoretical model for this kind of mechanism. Eichengreen and 
Wyplosz (1993) apply the model to analyze the EMS 1992-1993 crises. For alternative 
theoretical models of the occurrence of speculative attacks, see, e.g., Krugman ( 1979), Flood 
and Garber (1984), Wyplosz (1986), Lehment (1994). 
15See, e.g., Gartner (1995), Isard (1995) for reviews of monetary exchange rate models. 
16This view was labelled "economist" in the earlier debate on European monetary integration. 
17The Maastricht Treaty refers only to relative convergence of prices, i.e. relative to the three 
best-performing member states in terms of price stability. It has been argued, however, that 
absolute convergence of prices would have been more appropriate, because member states 
may still be threatened by absolutely too high inflation. See, e.g., Bean (1992) and Neumann 
(1992). 
18This was indeed the rationale for including the criterion, as has been argued by Bini-Smaghi 
et.al. ( 1994 ). 
19For formal econometric evidence on credibility and interest rates, see, e.g., Lindberg and 
Soderlind (1992), Rose and Svensson (1993) for empirical evidence, Svensson (1994) for a 
survey on exchange rate based stabilization. 
20The classic references are Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983a,b), and 
Rogoff (1985). For a survey of credibility and monetary policy games, see Blackburn and 
Christensen (1989); for a theoretical analysis of the EMS, see Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). 
See also Wagner (1995). 
21The influence depends on the degree of economic and political independence of the ECB. 
There is a general conviction among economists, as the statute of the ECB resembles the one 
of the Bundesank, that no reason to expect the ECB to be more subject to political influence 
than the Bundesbank exists. See e.g. Fratianni and Von Hagen (1992), Gros and Thygesen 
(1992), Monticelli and Vinals (1993), Vinals (1994). 
22For surveys of the literature on fiscal policy and EMU, see Commission (1990, 1993), 
Wyplosz ( 1991 ), and Van der Ploeg ( 1991 ). For analyses of seigniorage within the context of 
European monetary integration, see Gros (1989, 1992), Klein and Neumann (1990). 
23 The solution of the difference equation (5) is given by 
b1 = [bo- def1 / (x+it)] (1-x-n)l + det; / (x+it) 
The first term on the right-hand side of this equation refers to the out-of-steady state behavior 
while the latter term refers to the steady state behavior of public debt. Public debt is stabilized 
when the latter term equals 0.6. Correspondingly, ifwe subsitute 0.03 for the deficit, we need 
a rate of growth of nominal output of 0.05, thus 5% p.a, in order to achieve long-run 
stabilization of public debt. 
24 See also Pauly (1996) for additional simulation experiments. 
25De Grauwe ( 1994b) suggest that the numbers were chosen so as to fit to the German 
economy, since during the 1980s the steady state debt level implied by Article 104c was 
consistent solely for Germany. 
26Buiter (1992) evaluates the fiscal criteria as follows: "It should be obvious (but 
unfortunately does not appear to be so) that elevating these reference values (or indeed any 
reference values) to international norms or standards is unadultered economic nonsense, and 
dangerous nonsense to boot". 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
51 
27The formulation of the criteria does give room for interpretation though, which may be used 
to take into account of these factors. However, no explicit adherence is made in the Treaty. 
28The systemic effects and the influence on the international financial system could, as noted 
by the authors, be limited through international action that would need to relieve the 
defaulting government of its debt burden. 
29Goldstein and Woglom (1992) provide empirical evidence for lacking ability of municipal 
bonds markets to anticipate the crisis of New York city in the 1970's. Frenkel and Goldstein 
(1991) point out that it is empirically not clear whether governments are sensitive to higher 
borrowing costs. 
30In general, since government debt is denominated in nominal terms, unanticipated inflation 
is a lump-sum tax on debt holders. Therefore, a low-inflation policy is not dynamically 
consistent as long as the government has nominally denominated debt [Calvo, 1978]. 
31See Begg et.al. (1991), Bovenberg et.al. (1991), Kenen (1995), Van der Ploeg (1991), 
Wyplosz (1991). Eichengreen and Von Hagen (1995a,b) argue that only if monetary union 
was accompanied by fiscal centralization, a need for fiscal restrictions as a concomitant of 
EMU would arise. 
32 See, similarly, De Grauwe (1995). 
33 The following chapter contains a literature review and an empirical analysis of optimum 
currency areas in Europe. 
34For surveys on the early literature on optimum currency areas, see Ishiyama (1975) and 
Tower and Willett (1976). More recent surveys are De Grauwe (1994a), Masson and Taylor 
(1993), and Tavlas (1993). 
35See Tavlas (1993) and the references therein. 
36The federalistic structure of Europe in relation with EMU has been subject of intense 
discussion among economists [e.g. Von Rompuy et.al. (1990)]. Empirical studies have tended 
to compare the fiscal structure of the United States with Europe, analyzing the extent to 
which the federalistic systems may be used for stabilization and cohesion purposes. Sachs and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992) found that in the United States the automatic income redistribution 
effects in the US offsets about 40% of regional income variations. Von Hagen (1992), using 
an alternative methodology that allows to separate a cohesion from a stabilization effect, 
obains a stabilization effect of about 9 cents per US$. Bayoumi and Masson (1994) estimate 
the stablization effect to be 31% and the cohesion effect at 22%. Italianer et.al. (1993) obtain 
17% for the stabilzation effect. It follows from these studies that fiscal redistribution effects 
are important in the United States. It is clear that in Europe the potential for these kind of 
fiscal stabilization and cohesion is not given. The EU budget is far too narrow and effectively 
restricted for these purposes. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) provide simulations that 
suggest that for the US, state budgets provided about 14 per cent of the fiscal offset to income 
fluctuations. Von Hagen and Hammond (1995), however, show that stabilizing asymmetric 
shocks around a common trend may amplify the variance of GDP for some member countries. 
They conclude that the EU is indeed better off without a fiscal stabilization system. 
37 The "new" theory of optimum currency areas incorporates modem concepts like rational 
expectations and a long-run Phillips-curve. The evaluation of the costs and benefits thereby 
changes. However, as the basic principle relating to the characteristics of participants remains 
unchanged, I do not go into detail of these additions. For analyses of these approaches, see 
Tavlas (1993), and De Grauwe (1994). 
38The view that real convergence is a prerequisite for a monetary and customs union would 
also follow from the belief that the geographical location of economic activity is subject to 
centripetal forces arising from closer economic integration. Such forces might be due, for 
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example, to the attractiveness of an already highly industrialized center - with an established 
infrastructure and other positive external economies - for the location of economic activity 
[Myrdal, 1957; Perroux, 1959]. More recent work on geography and trade confirms that 
centralization, which would imply economic divergence, is more likely the greater the size of 
available economies of scale and the greater the size of the mobile manufacturing sector. 
Centralization, and real economic divergence, is less likely the greater the size and 
importance of transport costs [e.g. Krugman, 1991; Krugman and Venables, 1995]. For an 
application of these theories to the case of European monetary integration, see Krugman 
(1993). 
39For an opposing view, see Suiter (1995). 
40 Only reform proposals that are related to economic convergence as precondition in the EU 
are reviewed. Therefore, neither the reduction of the "democratic deficit" in advance of 
monetary union, claimed by Williamson (1993) and Eichengreen (1994) nor the choice of the 
band width is taken into account [Ohr, 1996]. 
41 These variables can be added because they are all dimensionless, i.e., they are all ratios or 
rates of change [see Gros and Thygesen, 1992 p.469]. 
42See, for example, the speech by Prime Minister John Major on 3rd February, quoted in: 
Neue Zurcher Zeitung (foreign edition), No.31, of 8th February 1995. 
43Prime Minister John Major in a speech delivered on 3rd February 1995, quoted in Goldman 
Sachs (1995). 
44 In general, time inconsistency problems may be solved by either of four ways [Romer, 
1996]: (i) reputation, (ii) delegation, (iii) punishment equilibria, and (iv) incentive contracts. 
45See also Hasse (1996), where a fiscal cooperation oriented towards budgetary discipline is 
proposed. 
46One drawback of this idea is, however, that it would, arguably, contribute to make the 
actions of the Council less accountable and could thereby lead to reduded political support for 
EMU. See Williamson (1993), who argues that the "democratic deficit" helps to explain the 
decline in political support for EMU. 
47 Italianer (1993) proposes to change the reference values. Article 104c of the treaty instructs 
the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission, to adopt 
'the approprate provisions' to replace the protocol that contains the reference values for 
deficits and debt. He interprets this passage to mean that the Council can change the reference 
values. 
48 Eichengreen and Frieden (1993) similarly view a dash to EMU as the first-best scenario on 
economic grounds. Alesina and Grilli (1993) argue, based on a formal model, that if a self-
selected group of countries form a monetary union, they will have an incentive to exclude 
other countries that are not as strongly committed to price stability. This would lead to 
divisive forces associated with such a multi-speed approach. 
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3. Optimum currency areas: one or many in Europe? 
3.1. Introduction 
A currency area between two or more countries means that those countries agree 
to irrevocably fix their exchange rates. Thus, the central point about a currency 
area is that, when countries proceed to join one, they give up the possibility of 
allowing the exchange rate between their own currency and those of the other 
members of the union to vary. The theory of optimum currency areas analyzes 
the economic costs associated with the adoption of a common currency (see 
Chapter 2).In essence, exchange rates can be fixed, and a monetary union is op-
timum, according to this theory, if the structure of the economies is "similar" and 
if goods and labor markets react flexibly to real economic changes 1• 
The recent empirical literature on optimum currency areas has tended to fo-
cus on the degree of symmetry of shocks [ e.g. Weber, 1990; Bayoumi and Eich-
engreen, 1993; Neumann and Von Hagen, 1994; Jordan, 1994]. The idea is that 
if economies are structurally similar, shocks should be evenly distribued. If this is 
the case, common policies can be used. If shocks are unevenly distributed and 
thus affect member countries differently, in a system of flexible exchange rates, 
the exchange rate can adjust through depreciations or appreciations of the cur-
rencies. In contrast, in a fixed exchange rate system the economies need to adjust 
through alternative mechanisms. I compare the symmetry of the shocks among 
European countries with the symmetry of the shocks affecting the United States 
and Canada, in order to provide additional evidence on the importance of asym-
metric shocks affecting the European economies in a monetary union. In doing 
this, a bivariate analysis of annual output and unemployment rate data from 17 
major industrialized countries over the 1969 to 1994 period is carried out. There 
are compelling reasons for undertaking a joint analysis of output and unemploy-
ment. According to many standard macroeconomic theories, if the unemployment 
rate is above its natural level, then it will be expected to fall as a result of induced 
higher than normal rates of output growth. The unemployment rate should thus 
provide valuable information on the deviation of output from its trend level. The 
use of data from 17 countries allows to examine the robustness of the results and 
to compare differences and common regularities in dynamic behavior across 
countries. 
The cyclical relation between output and unemployment has been studied by 
several authors recently. Blanchard and Quah (1989) have studied the dynamics 
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of output and unemployment for the U.S. assuming that the first disturbance has 
a long-run effect on output while the second does not. They label the one having 
a long-run effect on output a "supply" disturbance and the one having no long-
run effect on output a "demand" disturbance and conclude that demand distur-
bances make a substantial contribution to output fluctuations at short- and me-
dium term horizons. Bonjour and Kugler (1993) apply this approach to output 
and unemployment data for six countries (USA, Germany, UK, France, Japan 
and Switzerland) and conclude that the dynamic effects of demand shocks sup-
port the traditional "Keynesian" view of business cycles. Evans (1989) examines 
U.S. output and unemployment, assumes a recursive structure, in which the un-
employment rate is determined by the growth rate of output, and obtains an im-
portant relative contribution of demand shocks2. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2, the empirical 
literature on optimum currency areas is reviewed. In Section 3 a stochastic 
macroeconomic model is developed that builds the formal background for the 
subsequent statistical analysis, which is contained in Section 4. Section 5 pro-
vides an economic interpretation and Section 6 concludes the chapter. 
3.2. Review of empirical evidence on optimum currency areas 
A number of empirical analyses dealing with aspects of the optimum currency 
area in the EU countries and international labor market flexibility exist, of which 
the main contributions are discussed below. As the purpose is to make the subse-
quent empirical analysis comparable to others, the review is restricted to a non-
critical survey of empirical work on optimum currency areas in Europe. 
Poloz (1990) compares the adjustment of real exchange rates between re-
gions of Canada, as an existing monetary union, with the adjustment in the EU 
countries and finds lower real exchange rate volatility in the EU countries. He 
therefore concludes that a monetary union in Europe would not entail higher 
costs than in Canada. Neumann and Von Hagen (1994) carry out a correspond-
ing analysis for the regions of Germany. They come to the conclusion that a 
monetary union would be possible for a core group of countries (Austria, Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). On the other hand, a 
monetary union comprising all EU countries would entail high costs. A study by 
De Grauwe and Heens (1993) reaches a similar conclusion. Bayoumi and Eich-
engreen (1993) compare the correlation of shocks to aggregate demand and sup-
ply in twelve EU countries and eight regions in the USA. They estimate that 
shocks in the EU countries are less correlated. Accordingly, a monetary union in 
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Europe would entail relatively high economic costs. At the same time, they sur-
mise that a monetary union in a core group of countries would give rise to costs 
comparable to those in the regions of the United States. Bini-Smaghi and Yori 
(l 992) consider that the structure of production in EU countries is more diversi-
fied than in the regions of the USA, so that asymmetrical shocks are less likely to 
occur in Europe than in the USA This finding is confirmed by Cohen and Wy-
plosz (l 989), who show that Germany and France are primarily influenced by 
symmetric permanent shocks. A monetary union between these countries would 
therefore be feasible. Eichengreen (l 992b) examines various indicators for a 
monetary union - real exchange rate variability, labor mobility, relative share 
prices - and compares the European performance with that of the USA and Can-
ada. According to his findings, a monetary union in Europe would entail higher 
costs than in the existing monetary unions in the USA and Canada. De Grauwe 
and Van Haverbecke (1993) compare the adjustment mechanism at the regional 
level with that at the national level in a number of EU countries and find that la-
bor mobility plays an important role at the regional level, whereas at the national 
level adjustment occurs mainly via changes in real exchange rates. They argue 
that a monetary union in Europe would have to be accompanied by increased la-
bor mobility. In the absence of such mobility, a monetary union would be in dan-
ger of triggering polarisation tendencies. Erkel-Rousse and Melitz ( 1995) con-
tribute an interesting aspect to the discussion of asymmetric shocks. They apply a 
structural Vector Auto Regression (VAR) approach to data from six European 
countries (France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, United Kingdom). 
First, they find that the correlation of shocks across countries is indeed very low. 
This finding is in line with the evidence provided, for example, by Bayoumi and 
Eichengreen (1993) and points to the empirical relevance of asymmetric shocks. 
However, in a second step, they analyze the importance of fiscal and monetary 
policies as a measure of response to asymmetric shocks. They find, first, that fis-
cal policies contribute heavily to output performance in all countries except Ger-
many. Second, more interestingly, they find that monetary policies do not con-
tribute significantly to output performance in any country except Germany. This 
latter result indicates that monetary policy in these countries has no value as a 
stabilization device and implies that the adoption of a common currency for those 
countries would impose much lower economic costs than previously believed. 
This piece of work thus points to the fact that the mere existence of asymmetric 
shocks is not a sufficient argument against a currency union, because monetary 
policy may not be a useful tool for response to asymmetric shocks. Funke (1995) 
analyzes the incidence of aggregate demand and supply shocks in EU countries 
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and regions of Germany. He uses a bivariate VAR with prices and output and 
identifies the underlying orthogonal demand and supply shocks using long-run 
restrictions. The results show that the correlation of shocks among EU countries 
is lower than within Germany, which leads him to adopt a skeptical view on the 
prospects of EMU. 
In sum, the available empirical analyses are divided on the question of 
whether the EU countries constitute an optimum currency area. The findings ap-
pear to depend mainly on the reference variable chosen. However, more recent 
analyses tend to suggest that a multi-speed monetary union would be preferable3. 
Regional labor mobility and flexible labor markets are important to the effi-
ciency of a monetary union. In their examination of the mechanism for adjusting 
to changes in the demand for labor, Blanchard and Katz (1992) found that in 51 
regions of the USA adverse regional shocks were mainly offset by the migration 
of labor to other regions. Decressin and Fatas (1995) extend this analysis to 
European regions According to their findings, changes in labor demand in 
Europe are not offset by labor mobility but mainly by an age or gender-specific 
decline in labor participation rates. Eichengreen (1993) examines regional un-
employment in England and Italy and shows that adjustment to changes in rela-
tive prices occurs in much the same way as in the regions of the USA. As regards 
to the usefulness of inter-country labor mobility as a cushioning device for 
shocks in EMU, these and other studies fmd that labor movements across EU 
countries are very limited and significantly smaller than across EU regions4• 
Relatively low mobility of labor is thus a potential handicap for the EU as it pro-
gresses towards monetary union. Whereas European integration might enhance 
this channel over time, the US experience suggests that this is likely to take sev-
eral decades. In addition, evidence provided for the Nordic countries by Fischer 
and Straubhaar ( 1995) seems to suggest that in these countries liberalization of 
labor mobility has led to a decrease in labor movements. 
3.3 A stylized model 
To provide a formal background for the subsequent statistical analysis, in this 
section a simple open economy macroeconomic model is applied, being based on 
Alogoskoufis (1992, l 994). Consider an open economy that produces one inter-
nationally traded commodity. Output is produced by a short-run production 
function of the type 
(3. l) y, = pl,+µ, 
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where y is the logarithm of output, l is the logarithm of employment, and µt 
is a measure of productivity. Capital is assumed fixed, as for the short-run nature 
of the production function.I} is the exponent of labor and is less than unity. Pro-
ductivity follows a random walk with drift. 
(3.2) fJJ=g+µ,-1+1(, 
where g is the average rate of growth of productivity and K1 is an identically 
and independently distributed random shock. Firms determine employment by 
equalizing the marginal product of labor to the real wage. This yields the follow-
ing employment equation: 
(3.3) 
l 
I,= ---(w,- p,- µ,) 
l-P 
where w is the logarithm of the nominal wage and p is the logarithm of the 
price level. The nominal wage is set at the beginning of each period and remains 
fixed for one period [Fischer, 1977]. The objective of wage-setters is to stabilize 
expected employment around a target employment level ,i . Thus, wages in each 
period are set to minimize 
(3.4.) E,-1(/,-n)2 
where E1•1 is the operator of rational expectations, conditional on information 
available up to the end of period t-1 and ,i denotes the target level of employ-
ment. The minimization of(4) is subject to the labor demand function (3). From 
the first-order conditions for a minimwn of (4) subject to (3), the nominal wage 
is given by 
(3.5) w, = E, - 1p, + E, - 1µ, - (1 - p)n 
Using equations (5) and (3), we get the following expression for employ-
ment: 
(3.6) - l It= n + 1 _ p (p, - E, - 1p, + K,) 
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An unanticipated rise in prices reduces the real wage and causes firms to 
employ more labor. Thus aggregate employment rises above its equilibrium rate 
On the other hand, an unanticipated shock to productivity increases the marginal 
product of labor. Thus employment rises above the target level n and output rises 
on account of both the higher employment and the higher productivity. Subtract-
ing the expression for the employment level from the labor force, and using the 
approximation that u ~ n - n, after some manipulations, we get the following ex-
pression for the determination of unemployment: 
(3.7) - 1 u,: u- --(t,.p, - E, - 16p1 + Kl) 1-p 
where ;; = / - n is the "natural" rate of unemployment in the model. Equation 
(7) is the expectations augmented Phillips curve [see, e.g., Franz, 1991]. Unem-
ployment deviates from its equilibrium rate only to the extent that there are unan-
ticipated shocks to inflation or productivity. Anticipated shocks to inflation and 
productivity are reflected in wages and do not affect unemployment. 




y, = m,- p, + µ, 
p,=e,+p*, 
m, = m,-1+ v, 
Equation (8), an expression for aggregate demand, is a reformulation of the 
quantity equation of exchange. Following Blanchard and Quah (1989), the pro-
ductivity shock J..lt is assumed to affect aggregate demand directly, which may be 
due to an adjustment lag in domestic absorption. The economy is assumed to be a 
price-taker. Domestic prices are related to the world price level by a purchasing 
power parity relation, as in equation (11). The money stock is assumed to follow 
a random walk, as described by equation (12). 
To close the model, we need to determine the evolution of the nominal ex-
change rate and the foreign price level, p*. For simplicity, we assume that the 
exchange rate and the foreign price level follow random walks. 
(3.11) 
(3.12) 
e, = e, - 1 + 11, 
p,•=p,-1*+11, 
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where 111 is an identically and independently distributed foreign shock. This 
is in line with empirical analyses indicating that exchange rate movements are 
unpredictable and not directly related to economic fundamentals [Meese and Ro-
goff, 1983]. We assume that the shocks are independent and uncorrelated both 
across time and across types of shocks. 
Equations (1) to (12) completely describe the demand and supply side of the 
economy. By substituting equations (9), ( 11 ), and ( 12) into the Phillips-curve re-
lation, we obtain a reduced form for the rate of unemployment, being determined 
only be random shocks. 
(3.13) Ut = U + '¥(2171 + Kt) 1 with 'P=---
1- /3 
According to equation (13), the unemployment rate is affected by unantici-
pated demand shocks and supply (productivity) shocks. As for the stationarity of 
the unemployment rate, shocks cause deviations from its long-run equilibrium 
rate only temporarily. Correspondingly, by using equations (8) to (12), we obtain 
an expression for output growth in terms of random shocks. 
(3.14) ~y,= V,+217,+Kt 
Output growth is determined by both domestic (money supply) and foreign 
demand (price) shocks, and by productivity shocks. As output is nonstationary, 
shocks do have a permanent effect on the level of output and a transitory effect 
on its rate of growth. 
This standard macroeconomic model implies that unemployment is station-
ary, with shocks having only a transitory impact on the level of unemployment. 
Output, in contrast, is nonstationary, therefore, while shocks may have a perma-
nent effect on the level of output, deviations from its average growth rate remain 
temporary. Both unemployment and output are affected by demand and supply 
disturbances. 
3.4. Statistical analysis 
In this section, I analyze the dynamic effect of shocks to output and the rate 
of unemployment using a bivariate structural VectorAutoRegression (VAR). 
First, the stochastic properties of output and unemployment are analyzed, in 
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presented above. Univariate unit-root tests, Granger-causality tests and tests for 
cointegration are carried out. Unit-root tests are performed in order to determine 
the order of integration of the time series [e.g. Granger and Newbold, 1986]. 
Causality tests are used to determine the causal structure of the variables 
[Granger, 1969, 1988]. Tests for cointegration are applied in order to determine, 
whether a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables exist which 
would need to be taken into account within the subsequent VAR analysis. 
Secondly, a structural VAR analysis is performed. 
The GDP data come from the OECD National Accounts, while the unem-
ployment rate data are taken from the OECD Labour Force Statistics and OECD 
Economic Outlook, 1996. The data set comprises annual data for the period 1969 
to 1994. 
3.4.1. Stochastic properties of output and unemployment 
Economic time series are usually following a trend, which often implies a non-
stationary stochastic component. As a preliminary step, for model specification, 
it is thus useful to examine the degree of integration of the time series involved. 
In this section, therefore, first, the stochastic properties of real output and unem-
ployment are examined. After a presentation of the results from univariate unit-
root tests, Granger-causality tests and, finally, tests for cointegration are carried 
out. 
3.4.1.1. Unit root tests 
Univariate tests of whether the series are integrated of order one are reported in 
Table 1. The table reports the results from Augmented-Dickey-Fuller tests, where 
the following regression has been run for each series5: 
(3.15) 
i=p 
llx, = a + Px, - , + L b.x, - ; + &, 
i=I 
The null hypothesis that the variable Xt is integrated of order one - or has a 
unit root, or a stochastic trend - amounts to the null hypothesis that 13 = 0. The 
number of lags has been determined according to the Schwartz-criterion [see 
Liitkepohl, 1991]. The first two colums in the table give the t-value of the con-
stant a and the slope 13 in the regression, respectively. The Dickey-Fuller test sta-
tistic reported is the t-ratio of the slope but, since the distribution is non-standard, 
rather than the standard t-distribution statistics, the critical values tabulated in 
Fuller ( 1976) are valid. 
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The test results indicate that output series in all countries except for Greece 
are nonstationary, integrated of order one. 
Table 3.1.: Unit root tests 
Country Variable Constant ex Slope J3 Number of 
lags 
Austria y 0,16 -1,37 I 
u 0,11 -0,91 I 
Belgium y 0,32• -2,07 I 
u 0,21• -2,13 1 
Canada y 0,42• -1,83 I 
u 0,33· -2,21 I 
Denmark y 0,13 -0,8 I 
u 0,37• -2,35 I 
Finland y 0,39• -2, 11 I 
u 0,21 -1,3 I 
France y 0,31• -2,02 1 
u 0 15• -1,45 1 
Germany y 0,15 -0,76 I 
u 008• -0,14 2 
Greece y 0,48 -3, 18 • I 
u 0,13 -1,64 I 
Ireland y 0,21 -1,29 I 
u 0,07 -0,46 I 
Italy y 0,33 -1,84 I 
u 0 17 -1,16 I 
Luxembourg y 0,01• 0,14 2 
u 0,Q3 0,07 2 
Netherlands y 0,11 -0,78 I 
u 0,32• -2,77 I 
Portugal y 0,21 -1,56 I 
u 0,36• -1,89 I 
Spain y 0,19 -1,45 I 
u 0,15 -1,26 I 
Sweden y 0,21 -1,22 I 
u 0 51* -3,07 • I 
UK y 0,28• -1,92 I 
u 0,17 -0,55 I 
USA y 0,12 -0,47 I 
u 0,86 -2,97 I 
• indicates simificance at 5 oer cent siimificance level. Critical values from Fuller (1976). 
Source: Own calculations 
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For the unemployment rate series the results tend to accept the hypothesis of 
a unit root in all countries except for the United States and Sweden, where the 
tests reject the unit-root hypothesis. 
3.4.1.2. Granger-causality tests 
To examine the causal structure between output and unemployment, I test for 
Granger-causality between output growth and the rate of change of the unem-
ployment rate6. To test for Granger-causality, Ay1 is regressed on two lags of it-
self and two lags of Au1. An F-test is used to assess the validity of the causal 
structure. Granger-causality of output growth on unemployment growth involves 
the combined hypothesis that the lags of the unemployment growth rate are not 
significant in the output equation and the lags of output growth are significant in 
the unemployment equation. Unemployment is said to cause output, if the lags of 
output growth are insignificant in the unemployment equation and the lags of the 
unemployment growth rate turn out to be significant in the output equation. 
Table 3.2.: Granger-causality tests 
Country Unemployment does not cause Output does not cause unem-
output plovment 
Austria F(2,24)=0.48 F(2,24)=10.73*** 
Belgium F(2,24 )= I. 95 F(2,24 )=2,81 * 
Canada F(2,24)=5,73*"' F(2,24)=2,47 
Denmark F(2,24 )=2,23 F(2,24 )=2, 10 
Finland F(2,24)=4,81 *"' F(2,24 )= 12,39*** 
France F(2,24 )= 1,34 F(2,24 )=2,68* 
Germany F(2,24 )= 1,96 F(2,24)=3,82** 
Greece F(2,24)=1,12 F(2,24)=5,99*** 
Ireland F(2,24)=1,48 F(2,24)=0,42 
Italy F(2,24)=3,72** F(2,24)=2,48 
Luxembourg F(2,17)=4.00** F(2, 17)=2,46 
Netherlands F(2,24)=0.29 F(2,24)=1,43 
Portugal F(2,24)=1.0I F(2,24)=6,37*** 
Spain F(2,24)=4,44** F(2,24)=3,13* 
Sweden F(2,24)=4,62** F(2,24 )= 1 ,81 
United Kingdom F(2,24 )=5,61 ** F(2,24)=10,22*** 
USA F(2,24)=4,91 ** F(2,24)=5.38** 
Estimation is by ordinary least squares. * denotes significance at IO per cent level; 
•• denotes significance at 5 per cent level; ••• denotes significance at l per cent level. 
Numbers in oarantheses refer to the degrees of freedom in the regression. 
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The test results given in Table 2 are quite unambiguous. In most countries in 
either one or both directions the hypothesis of no causality can be rejected at a 5 
per cent significant level. The exceptions are Denmark, Ireland and the Nether-
lands, where the null hypothesis of no causality is accepted in both cases. In gen-
eral, however, there tends to be a feedback and instantaneous causality relation 
between output growth and unemployment growth. 
3.4.1.3. Tests for cointegration 
The cointegration concept introduced by Granger (1983) and formalized by Engle 
and Granger (1987) influenced the analysis ofnonstationary time series. Theim-
portance for econometric modelling became evident when Granger showed that a 
time series model with cointegration has a representation as an error-correction 
model (ECM) and vice versa. In an ECM the changes in the variable depend on 
the deviation from some equilibrium relation. Cointegration concepts could be 
given then a meaningful economic interpretation in terms of sluggish adjustment 
to some long-run equilibrium described by economic theory. 
Here, the main motivation for an analysis of cointegration is a purely concep-
tual one: two cointegrated variables, being modelled wrongly as first differences 
(or levels) of both variables, can be shown to have a noninvertible Moving Aver-
age (MA)-part. Therefore, the impulse response functions of the data could not 
be obtained or, correspondingly, an impulse response function derived from a 
wrongly specified VAR process would give misleading results [ see Ltitkepohl, 
1991, Chapter 11]. 
I employed the cointegration-test procedure developed by Johansen ( 1988) 
and Johansen and Juselius ( 1990)7. The procedure involves estimating the follow-
ing Vector Error Correction Model (VECM): 
i=p 
(3.16) AZ,= AoD,+ LALZ1-;+IlZ,-1+ &t 
i=l 
where Zt is a 2xl vector Zt = [Yt, ut]'and D1 =[intercept]. The cointegration 
tests determine the number of cointegrating vectors. That is, they are used to de-
cide on the order and elements of the matrix 1t. If the rank of the matrix is equal 
to two, that is equal to the total number of variables in the model, the vector 
process Zi is stationary. If the rank of the matrix is equal to r < 2, there exists a 
representation of 7t such that 7t =aP'. The matrix p is the cointegrating matrix 
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and has the property that P'Z1 is integrated of order zero, while Zr. is integrated of 
order one. 
Table 3.3.: Tests for cointegration 
Country Eigenvalue Likelihood- 5 per cent 1 per cent Hypothesized 
Ratio critical value•> critical value No. coint. 
vectors 
Austria 0.09 2.42 15.41 20.04 None 
0.02 0.15 3,76 6.65 At most 1 
Belgium 0.21 8.62 15.41 20.04 None 
0.13 3.16 3,76 6.65 At most 1 
Canada 0.40 15.75* 15.41 20.04 None 
0.15 3.84• 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Denmark 0.13 3.92 15.41 20.04 None 
0.04 0.83 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Finland 0.19 8.41 15.41 20.04 None 
0.15 3.71 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
France 0.16 6.05 15.41 20.04 None 
0.08 1.93 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Gennany 0.15 4.46 15.41 20.04 None 
0.03 0.63 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Greece 0.31 12.24 15.41 20.04 None 
0.15 3.74 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Italy 0.31 9.95 15.41 20.04 None 
0.06 1.39 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Ireland 0.19 7.77 15.41 20.04 None 
0.11 2.85 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Luxemb. ... ... ... . .. . .. 
Holland 0.29 7.78 15.41 20.04 None 
0.01 0.01 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Portugal 0.32 10.74 15.41 20.04 None 
0.07 1.79 3,76 6.65 At most 1 
Spain 0.41 12.34 15.41 20.04 None 
0.01 0.05 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
Sweden 0.17 4.40 15.41 20.04 None 
0.01 0.02 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
UK 0.35 12.65 15.41 20.04 None 
0.10 2.55 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
USA 0.22 6.01 15.41 20.04 None 
0.01 0.20 3.76 6.65 At most 1 
a) Critical values are from Osterwald-Lenum (1992). 
Source: Own calculations. 
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The results of applying the Johansen procedure for testing the order of the 
matrix n are given in Table 3. Two eigenvalues are printed in the second column 
of this table. Likelihood Ratio-statistics for testing the hypothesis that there are at 
most r cointegrating vectors are given in the third column. The critical values for 
a 5 per cent and l per cent significance test are obtained from Osterwald-Lenum 
(1992). The tests indicate, that in all countries except for Canada, cointegration is 
strongly rejected. Therefore, we conclude that there is no long-run equilibrium 
relationship between output and unemployment to be found. 
Overall, the analysis of the stochastic properties indicates that output and un-
employment are nonstationary time series, containing a unit-root. There exists in 
general a causal relationship between the two variables although a cointegrating 
relationship could not be detected. While the test results hint to a unit-root in un-
employment, I stick to the assumption of stationary unemployment within the 
subsequent VAR analysis, for two reasons. First, a nonstationary unemployment 
rate seems economically rather implausible in the long-run. With the unemploy-
ment rate increasing along a stochastic trend, policy measures will most probably 
be adopted at one stage to reduce unemployment. Secondly, the low power of 
unit-root tests is well-known [Charemza and Deadman, 1992]. They sometimes 
tend to fail to discriminate between a stationaiy alternative with a structural break 
and a stochastic trend [Campbell and Mankiw, 1991). In particular, as for the 
limited number of observations due to yearly data, the test results may be seri-
ously flawed [see also Bonjour and Kugler, 1993]. As for the large number of 
countries, and since a common solution for all countries in order to be compara-
ble had to be taken, I decided to maintain the assumption of stationaiy unem-
ployment rates. 
3.4.2. Structural VAR analysis 
In this section, a bivariate structural VAR-analysis is carried out8• First, the meth-
odological background is discussed and second, impulse response functions are 
used to analyze the dynamic behavior of goods and labor markets in the seven-
teen industrialized countries. 
3.4.2.1. Methodology 
A VAR system may be considered as a specified reduced form of a set of dy-
namic simultaneous equations describing the economy [Genberg and Swoboda, 
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1985]9. The bivarate VAR is characterized by the following autoregressive equa-
tion system 10: 
(3.17) [ A11(L) A12(L)]·[L\y,] = [&•,] A21(L) A22(L) u, &2, 
L refers to the lag operator which transforms a time series as Li Zt = Zt-i and 
A(L) is an autoregressive polynomial of order p. An error term &it is also present 
and represents those influences which cannot be accounted for otherwise by the 
model. Thus, for example, Eu can be thought of as the current innovation to .iiyt, 
that is, that part of .iiyt that could not have been predicted based on the informa-
tion set available at time t. In the equation system (17) each of the two variables 
depends on its own lagged values as well as on the other variables' lagged values. 
The equation system determines the joint reaction of the endogenous variables 
output growth and unemployment to the innovations E1t and E21. The Wald mov-
ing average (MA)-representation is obtained by inverting equation (17) to get: 
(3.18) [L\yt] = [B11(L) B12(L )] . [&"] = B Etll ut B21(L) B22(L) e2, (L) 
The MA-representation will be used for the computation of impulse re-
sponses over time in a variable due to a shock in itself or in the other variable. 
We assume that innovations to each variable are linear combinations of the con-
tamporaneous "fundamental shocks", i.e. Et= Sv1, for a unique non-singular ma-
trix S, with SS '= }:, where }: denotes the variance-covariance matrix of E. Given 
the Waid moving average representation, it follows that the dynamic behavior of 
/J..y and u is described by the following model: 
(3.19) [L\y,] = [C11(L) C12(L)]·[v1,] 
Ut C21(L) C22(L) vu with C(L )=B(L) S 
It is assumed that the vector Zi = [.iiyi, Ui]' is a stationary stochastic process, 
which is, in line with the macroeconomic model of section two, driven by two 
types of exogenous forces: (i) demand shocks, represented by a sequence 
{v1,};:~, and (ii) supply shocks, represented by {v2,};:;. Both v 11 and v2t are 
assumed to have zero mean and to be serially and mutually uncorrelated at all 
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to unity. Two additional identifying restrictions are needed. I assume that B(0)=l. 
In addition, it is assumed that C12(0)=0. This implies that the matrix S is lower 
triangular, and can thus be uniquely determined from the Choleski factorization 
of I:. Since an estimate of B(L) can be obained from the OLS estimation of 
equation system (17), the knowledge ofS allows to recover an estimate ofC(L). 
The economic interpretation of these identifying restrictions is that supply 
shocks are restricted not to have a contamporaneous effect on output. In other 
words, firms are assumed to maintain a fixed stock of capital in the short-run 
which is adjustable with a lag of one period only. The cost structure of the finns 
may, however, still affect production in period t+ l. On the other hand, demand 
shocks by definition affect the level of output contemporaneously. Demand 
shocks affect output through their influence on the level of aggregate demand 
immediately. These identifying restrictions are essentially in line with the stylized 
model presented in section two of this chapter. While demand shocks affect out-
put directly and contamporaneously, supply shocks are transmitted through their 
immediate impact on labor markets and affect goods markets only indirectly with 
a lag. 
3.4.2.2. Impulse response functions 
The impulse response functions and the corresponding 5% confidence intervals 
are given in Figures 1 to 17. The responses over 15 years to a one-standard de-
viation shock are simulated. For Luxembourg the response over 8 years is dis-
played, since data are available only from 1976. The confidence intervals are ob-
tained using a method described in Doan (1992), which is based on a Monte 
Carlo procedure suggested by Kloek and Van Dijk (1978). This procedure uses 
the fact that the theoretical distribution of the VAR coefficients can be derived 
[Zellner, 1971]. Repeated random draws from this distribution are made, and for 
each draw the implied moving average coefficients are calculated. In this way a 
number (equal to the number of draws) of values is obtained for each moving 
average coefficient, which allows the calculation of means and standard errors of 
the latter. The number of draws was 100012. 
For the USA and Canada, the peak of the response of output to a shock to the 
output equation is reached within approximately l to 2 years. Whereas the de-
mand shock levels off with practically no effect after about 4 years, the supply 
shock raises unemployment in Canada and the USA after 15 years still by about 
half a percentage point. 
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The response of unemployment to a demand shock is a mirror-image to the 
shape of the response of output to a demand shock. Both demand and supply 
shocks do affect unemployment in the short-run to medium-run, for about 3 to 4 
years, while leaving the natural rate of unemployment unaffected. The shape of 
the responses in the European countries turns out to be similar. The dynamic re-
sponse of output to a demand shock is hump-shaped, in general, although the 
inital positive effect on output is less visible than in the North-American coun-
tries. In the long-run, demand shocks do not affect output in the European coun-
tries. 
The unemployment rate is reduced in the short-run by about one percentage 
point in response to a demand shock in Europe. In the medium-run, after about 4 
years, the effect of the shock is vanished. In the long-run, the unemployment rate 
is affected neither by demand nor by supply shocks. Thus, overall, the dynamic 
response of output and unemployment to demand and supply shocks turns out to 
be quite similar in Europe and North-America. 
Figure 1: Austria 
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Figure 2: Belgium 
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Figure 4: Denmark 
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Figure 6: France 
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Figure 8: Greece 
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Figure 1 O: Italy 
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Figure 12: Netherlands 
a) Outpul re sponse lo ditmand ahock .. ,.------- ------~ 
0. 15 ,,, • •• 




.......... ________ _ ... .. 
-O, i 5 I 2 ) • 5 I 7 I I 10 11 12 13 t • 15 
c) outpul reapc>Me to •uppty atiocl .... ,---------------, 
o.m •• 
'·" .... -· .......... ........................................... --
0.o, 
-0,01 ••••• ............ _________ _ 
-0.02 -. •• 





:'. . ···········--...... . 
·0,1 
-0,II 2 3 ' $ I 7 I I 10 11 12 13 14 15 
0,15,---------------, 
o., 1;::••-............ ___ •••·••·-•-............  
0,051 \, ............... 
µ..._.....:::::::::~=---! 
..... 
... , ... ··-·········· 
-0.,s ~,~,-,-, -,-,-,~,~,~,.~,,~,,-,~,-,~,~,. 
Figure 13: Portugal 
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Figure 14: Spain 
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Figure 16: UK 
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It must be emphasized that the results must be interpreted with particular 
caution, as for the high degree of uncertainty associated with the impulse re-
sponses, documented by the confidence bands in the figures, which may be due 
to the limited number of observations available. 
3.5. Economic interpretation 
In this section, an economic interpretation to the results obtained in the statistical 
anyalsis is provided. I first attempt to justify the interpretation in terms of de-
mand and supply shocks. In addition, I examine the degree of symmetry of 
shocks in the EU and in North-America. 
3.5.1. Demand and supply shocks 
In order to analyze the interpretation of the random shocks in terms of de-
mand and supply disturbances, in Figure 18, the estimated demand and supply 
shocks are displayed for the case of Germany13. Are these "demand" and 
"supply" shocks in line with conventional wisdom? First, the supply shock turns 
out to be much more volatile than the demand shock. This seems to be in line 
with the frequently stated argument that supply shocks have been most important 
for business cycles in industrialized countries since the 1970's [e.g. Bruno and 
Sachs, 1985]. Demand side management may indeed be expected to be more 
stable, as monetary and fiscal policies are directed to stabilize the economy, and 
as structural changes in economic policies tend to be anticipated without having a 
major effect on the economies. Looking at the figure in more detail, we may 
identify the first oil price shock in the l 970's, which seems to be captured by the 
model, however, with a lag of about two years. The rebound, due to demand side 
policies implemented by the Social Democratic Party at that time did not affect 
the economy significantly. Apparently, it had in the mid 70's a small, though 
transitory, impact on the economy. Next, we may clearly and accurately identify 
the impact of the second oil price shock in 1978 and 1979. The participation in 
the European Monetary System and tight monetary policies conducted by the 
German central bank, on top of a change of government in 1982, provided a 
negative demand side impulse in the early l 980's, which is also captured by the 
model. 
At the same time, the improved cost situation of firms due to lower inflation 
and a more conducive policy environment provided a positive supply side im-
pulse on the economy. In the mid 80's, the third oil shock occcured with oil 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
78 
prices falling by about 40% within two years, thereby the cost situation of firms 
being improved significantly. German unification provided a positive demand-
side impulse to the economy in the end of the l 980's until about 1992, as the de-
mand by the eastern part of Germany raised aggregate demand and improved 
sales of firms. 
Figure 3.18: 
Demand and Supply shocks in 
Germany 
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In the beginning of the 1990's, however, increasing competitive forces and a 
rising tax burden on individuals and firms induced a negative supply-side im-
pulse and finally dampened the unification boom, as is captured by the model, 
although the positive spike of the supply shock in 1993 is difficult to interpret. 
Overall, the "demand" and "supply" shocks seem to describe the macro-
economic development in Germany quite accurately. While this analysis refers 
only to a single country, the interpretation fits quite well to economic activity in 
Germany so that this should, arguably, be similar in the other countries. 
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3.5.2. Symmetry and asymmetry of shocks in Europe and North-
America 
With respect to European monetary integration, the correlation of shocks between 
countries is of interest. The correlation of demand and supply shocks across 
countries is taken as indicator for the distribution of shocks across countries. In a 
monetary union, sharing a common currency, national central banks can neither 
conduct independent monetary policies nor depreciate/appreciate their currencies 
in response to shocks affecting the economies. As far as shocks are hitting the 
economies evenly, this does not imply a problem for the national economies. 
However, if shocks are affecting only a specific country or region in the union, 
alternative adjustment instruments like relative wage movements or fiscal trans-
fers have to be used. Therefore, it is of interest to analyze the degree of symmetry 
between the shocks having affected the economies in the past. 
In assessing the magnitude of disturbances to the European economies, a 
standard of comparison is needed. I used the symmetry of shocks affecting the 
United States and Canada as reference point. The United States and Canada are 
known to be closely integrated econrnies with historical trade connections and 
close monetary ties with the Canadian DoUar·being pegged to the US-Dollar. 
Additionally, both countries have participatee, together with Mexico, in a North 
American Free Trade Union (NAFTA). Thus the comparison can be taken to in-
dicate whether the European countries would be better suited to form a common 
currency area than a hypothetical common currency area between the United 
States and Canada14. Although the introduction of a common currency is both 
likely to induce major structural changes and to change the underlying economic 
model of rational agents forming their expectations, so that the evidence is sub-
ject to the Lucas-critique [Lucas, 1976), the relation of shocks in the past may 
provide an indication for the probability of European economies being affected 
by asymmetric shocks in the future monetary union. In the upper-diagonal of 
Table 4, the correlation of supply shocks and in the lower-diagonal the correla-
tion of demand shocks across countries are given. The results are in general 
plausible. Demand shocks are more symmetric than supply shocks. Brandner and 
Neusser (1992) suggest the rule of thumb that cross-correlation coefficients be-
tween detrended series exceeding Yrr = y J2s = 0.4 in absolute value are signifi-
cant at the five per cent level 15. Based on this rule of thumb, the cross-correlation 
coefficients between Germany and the other EU-countries, for example, are in 
more than half of the cases statistically significant. Having in mind the discus 
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sion on a multi-speed EMU, we compared regions in Europe with the United 
States and Canada, given in Table 5. Shocks across sub-groups of countries are 
found to be more symmetric than for the whole group of countries. 
Table 3.5: Average correlation of shocks by regions 
Rel!ion Demand shocks Suoolv shocks 
All countries 0.34 0.2 
EU-15 0.32 0.16 
Central-European EU-countries 0.4 0.35 
(Austria, Belgium, France, Gennany, Ireland, Lux-
embourn, Netherlands, UK) 
Southern-European countries 0.23 0.04 
<Greece, Italv, Portuiral, Soain) 
North (Denmark, Finland, Sweden) 0.44 0.32 
Source: Own calculations. 
Demand and supply shocks affecting a group of Central-European EU-
countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, UK) are found to be more symmetric than for the whole group of coun-
tries, although still less symmetic than for a group of North-European (Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden) countries or for North-America (Canada, USA). 
As for the higher symmetry of shocks in smaller country-groups, we consider 
a multi-speed monetary union, around a Central-European core group, as a fea-
sible alternative. The relatively high symmetry of shocks affecting the Southern-
European countries may suggest a "Southern-European monetary union" as well, 
i.e. a common currency for those countries. Theoretically, if these countries are 
taken to form an optimum currency area, efficiency gains from sharing a com-
mon currency are exploited. Through the efficiency gains from introducing a 
common currency in the peripheral group, further losses of competitiveness could 
be avoided so that this would be a preferable situation compared to a postponed 
third stage. Thus, the implementation of a North-European and a Central Europe 
currency, or, more generally, the implementation of regional currency blocks, 
could potentially be a preferrable path to an overall common currency in Europe. 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, we have analyzed output and unemployment fluctuations of l 7 
countries. The results can be summarized as follows: first, the dynamic behavior 
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of output and unemployment are found to be relatively similar in the European 
and in the North-American countries, although demand and supply shocks in 
Europe tend to have somewhat more persistent effects on output and unemploy-
ment. Second, demand and supply shocks affecting the North-American coun-
tries are more evenly distributed than those affecting the European countries. 
Third, the degree of symmetry of shocks is higher among sub-groups of countries 
than for the whole group of European countries. Fourth, the 15 EU member 
countries do not form an optimal currency area as a whole, as shocks affect 
economies relatively unevenly. 
The results point to the problem of adjustment to asymmetric shocks with 
rigid labor markets in a monetary union. The evidence indicates that the speed of 
adjustment to shocks in the European economies examined seems slightly slower 
than in the North-American economies and that the United States and Canada, at 
least if based on the symmetry of shocks affecting both economies, would be 
better suited to form a common currency area than the European countries16. 
However, of those European countries in the sample, a central European group, 
as well as a North-European group, were affected relatively similarly by shocks, 
so that the adjustment costs of sharing a common currency within these countries 
would be lower than for all European countries together. 
We conclude, therefore, that a multi-speed European Monetary Union would 
be more sensible than a full monetary union consisting of all EU-member coun-
tries. We suggest the implementation of currency blocks, i.e. monetary unions 
within sub-groups of European countries. The economic costs to adopt a com-
mon currency for these smaller country groups are smaller than for the European 
countries as a whole. Additionally, it could avoid further losses of competitive-
ness of these countries and thus help for the later entry into the third stage of 
EMU. 
Endnotes 
1 For a critical discussion of the theory of optimum currency areas, see Melitz ( 1995). 
2 A number of studies have analyzed the importance of demand and supply shocks. As these 
studies use other variables, they are not referred to here. For an extensive overview on this 
line of research, see Tichy (1994). 
3For a similar interpretation of the evidence on optimum currency areas, see De Grauwe 
(1995). 
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4For additional empirical evidence, see, e.g., Bayoumi and Prasad (1995), who similarly em-
phasize differences in labor market adjustment between U.S.regions and European countries. 
See, e.g., Charelll7.ll and Deadman (1992), for a review of unit-root tests. 
6See Granger (1969). Textbook discussions of this type oftest can be found, for example, in 
Hansen (1993), or Maddala (1992). 
7 For reviews, see Charemza and Deadman (1992), Hansen (1993), Dickey and Rossana 
(1994). 
8 See, for instance, Sims ( 1980), Sargent ( 1979). Cooley and LeRoy ( 1985) contains a critique 
of VAR methods. Early contributions to the literature on structural VAR' s are Bemanke 
(1986) and Blanchard and Watson (1986). As in all these references, here it is relied on short-
run identifying restrictions. The restrictions used here resemble those of Gali and Hammour 
(1991). Blanchard and Quah (1989), in contrast, use long-run identifying restrictions. Gali 
(1992) applies both types of restrictions. For a survey on structural VAR's, see Giannini 
(1992), Tichy (1994). 
9 The Vector Error Correction model used in the previous section is a special form of a VAR 
model that allows for long-run relationships between nonstationary variables. 
10 Here, as in the other empirical analysis in Chapter 4, it is relied on reduced form specifica-
tions. One disadvantage of reduced form specifications is that policy instruments, which 
could in principle be used to support the convergence process, are not modelled explicitly. 
Thereby, the natural rate of unemployment in this case ends up being determined by stocha-
stic innovations, which would in practice be hardly convincing for a policymaker. An alterna-
tive approach, that is more appropriate to take into account of policy instruments, would be to 
apply structural econometric models [for a detailed analysis of different econometric model-
ling approaches, see Uebe and Fischer, 1992]. As here the emphasis is on the dynamic re-
sponse to different shocks, and due to the simplicity of the approach, I decided in both empi-
rical analyses to stick to reduced form specifications. I am thankful to Prof. G.Uebe for ma-
king me aware of this point. 
11 [B11(L) B12(L)] [A11(L) A12(L)]·1 
Where = 
B21(L) B12(L) A21(L) A12(L) 
12 Note that the scale in the graphs varies, which makes the comparison of them in terms of 
the height difficult. 
13 See Funke (1994), for a similar analysis. 
14Bayoumi and Eichengreen (I 993) use a similar approach comparing regions of the United 
States with countries of Europe. Funke ( 1995) compares regions in Germany with countries of 
the European Union. 
15 In contrast, Harvey and Jaeger (1993) have suggested that for T=25 cross-correlations have 
to exceed at least 0.5 to reduce the chance of finding spurious cross-correlations. 
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4. Technology, convergence and growth in the European Union 
4.1. Introduction 
Disparities of income per capita across regions and countries have been a matter 
of concern for the European Community since its inception 1• The objective of 
reducing disparities across regions in the Community is laid down already in the 
preamble of the Treaty of Rome. In 1987, the Community received in the Single 
European Act an explicit competence for undertaking a regional policy aimed at 
reducing disparities. The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, moreover, in its 
Article 2, includes economic and social cohesion as a fundamental principle the 
Community seeks to respect. Moreover, Article 130a states that the Community 
shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of the various 
regions. 
There has been a renewed interest in the economic analysis of growth and 
convergence, which has been associated with both the objective of convergence 
across countries and regions becoming politically acceptable and with new 
developments in theories of economic growth. Theories of economic growth 
were, up to very recently, regarded as optimistic with respect to the distribution 
of income. They tended to suggest that the distribution of income would become 
more similar over time, so that poor countries converged to the income level of 
rich countries. In contrast, the literature on endogenous growth proposed that the 
gap between rich and poor countries would remain persistent over time, so that 
poor countries always remained poor and rich countries remained rich. 
From an economic policy point of view, the issue of growth and convergence 
in Europe is indeed particularly interesting and relevant, for two reasons: frrst, 
regional convergence or divergence determines the usefulness of regional 
economic policies attempting to equalize the distribution of income [Sala-i-
Martin, 1995]. Second, European monetary integration might contribute to 
convergence - or divergence - itself by increasing factor mobility or trade among 
participating countries. Economic integration may indeed have an effect on 
aggregate growth of GDP in the Community economy. To the extent that this is 
favourable, higher growth can be expected to improve welfare. There is, 
however, the fear that a full-fledged European Monetary Union (EMU) will 
widen the existing regional inequality in per capita income within the European 
Union (EU). Monetary integration, and its implicit obligation to assure 
convergence of nominal indicators such as inflation and interest rates, will entail 
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restncttons on macroeconomic policy that are more onerous for the less-
prosperous countries of the Union [Begg and Mayes, 1993]. Together with 
unemployment problems, these concerns have already given rise to a doubling in 
real tenns of European Community (EC) structural funds devoted to regional and 
social policy in the period 1988-1992 [ Abraham and Von Rompuy, 1992]. These 
kind of arguments indeed lie at the heart of the real convergence debate in the 
context of European Monetary Union. 
The present chapter deals with these issues within the framework of an 
empirical analysis of the relation between technological differences, convergence 
and growth across EU countries. Three main goals are associated with this 
chapter. For one, it aims to provide a review of empirical analyses and of the 
relevant theoretical background. In addition, the stability of the convergence 
processes across time and across countries is examined. Finally, we analyze the 
reason for the apparent instability of the growth and convergence process in 
Europe. Based on endogenous growth theories (and on technological catch-up 
approaches), a possible explanation is the presence of technological differences, 
which are tested for within a structural econometric framework. Thereby, the 
chapter contributes to analyze convergence of living standards in the EU member 
states, thus focusing on long-run aspects of real economic convergence. 
We may first ask if technological differences, as for the high degree of 
integration and economic cooperation among EU countries, are really plausibly 
relevant for economic development in Europe. Several kind of theoretical and 
empirical considerations suggest that they might indeed be relevant, even in such 
an integrated area like the EU. Already on a national level, fonnal comparisons 
of productivity levels frequently uncover wide variation among finns in the same 
manufacturing industry. Even in a service industry such as retailing, finns like K-
Mart and Wal-Mart use very different technologies to provide their service, with 
very different outcomes in tenns of profitability and returns on equity [Romer, 
1995]. These persistent differences are difficult to explain if the technology that 
each uses is a public good. Empirical evidence on the effect of innovation on 
output and productivity tends to support this skepticism. Here, a consensus has 
emerged that innovation has a significant effect on productivity at the level of the 
finn and industry [Cameron, 1996]. Griliches (1988), for example, suggests that 
the elasticity of output with respect to R&D is generally found to be much lower 
than the social rate of return to R&D. Recent work on the effect of geography on 
spillovers, moreover, indicates that technologically-intensive industries tend to be 
more localized than other industries, and that infonnation flows locally more 
easily than at a distance [Jaffe et.al., 1993; Audretch and Feldman, 1994]. 
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Technological differences across economies are even more relevant than on 
the national leve~ in particular, if we think of technology in a broad sense, that is, 
representing resource endowment, climate and institutions, which supposedly 
vary across countries [Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995]. Technological differences 
would imply that convergence and growth processes differ across economies and 
would thereby contribute to explain the apparent instability of growth and 
convergence across time and across countries in Europe [e.g. Larch, 1994; 
Armstrong, 1995]. To test for the hypothesis of technological differences, I use 
cross-country data, which allows to apply a prolongued data set (1950 - 1992), 
and which enables to analyze the principal determinants of growth and 
convergence suggested by modem theories of economic growth. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, the 
theoretical background is reviewed and the main implications for convergence 
are summarized. Three modem theories of economic growth are discussed in this 
section. Theories of technological catch-up argue that inefficient use of 
technology may lead to a process of convergence, depending on the degree of 
economic development in the economy. Neoclassical growth theories predict 
convergence due to decreasing returns to scale. Endogenous growth theories, in 
contrast, maintain that economic growth may be influenced by factors like 
market size, economies of scale and institutional structure, so that differences in 
living standards would possibly persist. Some controversy has also arisen with 
respect to the empirical assessment of convergence. A correct assessment of 
convergence is important, because whether convergence actually occurs across 
regions and countries may indeed shed some light on the relevance of new 
growth models. In view of this controversy, several empirical concepts of 
convergence have been developed recently, which are reviewed in Section 3. In 
addition, formal, mathematical concepts of convergence are contrasted with 
empirical convergence concepts. Section 4 provides a review of the empirical 
literature, concentrating first on papers dealing with the evolution of growth and 
convergence among world economies and then turning to empirical work using 
data from European regions. Section 5 analyzes the stability of the growth and 
convergence processes in Europe using descriptive statistical methods. The 
purpose of this analysis is to underline the argument that convergence has not 
been stable, neither across time nor across countries. In order to compare the 
performance of both measures, income per capita and labor productivity are used. 
In Section 6 a descriptive growth model is developed and used to derive a 
convergence regression equation. Section 7 contains an econometric analysis of 
technology, convergence and growth in the EU. The econometric model is based 
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on the stylized growth model developed above and concentrates on output per 
capita as measure for living standards. Section 8 summarizes the chapter, relates 
the empirical evidence to the European integration process, and provides 
conclusions. 
4.2. Theoretical background 
In this section, three modern theories of economic growth are reviewed and their 
implications for economic convergence are summarized. Theories of 
technological catch-up argue that inefficient use of technology may lead to a 
process of convergence, depending on the degree of economic development in 
the economy. Neoclassical growth theories predict convergence due to decreasing 
returns to scale. Endogenous growth theories, in contrast, maintain that economic 
growth may be influenced by factors like market size, economies of scale and 
institutional structure, so that differences in living standards would possibly 
persist. 
4.2.1. Catching-up and falling behind 
The notion of a catching-up effect can be traced back at least to Gerschenkron 
(1952) [cited in Hansson and Henrekson, 1994a,b], who maintained that, where 
a country's growth prospects are concerned, an advantage may lie in relative 
backwardness in terms of productivity2• The general idea of the catching-up 
hypothesis is that in terms of productivity backward countries will have an 
opportunity to embark on a catching-up process by imitating and borrowing 
superior production techniques from the more advanced economies cheaper and 
faster than the original discovery and testing. By imitating production techniques 
from the more advanced economies, the lagging ones may reduce the distance to 
their own technological frontier. The growth potential of lagging countries is not 
solely because of the possibility of replacing obsolete capital with best practice 
equipment. In addition, there is a chance to adopt advanced management 
practices, better marketing strategies etc. As a result, we ought to expect 
technologically less developed countries to experience faster productivity growth 
than the technologically leading ones. In the literature on the catching-up 
hypothesis, however, this possibility is not regarded as necessarily realisable. 
Another necessary condition for the catching-up factor to be operative is a 
sufficient degree of "social capability", as has been emphasized by Abramovitz 
(1986, p.388). Abramovitz distinguishes between potential and realized catching-
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up. The former is due to the gap between the leader countries and the backward 
countries, which are thus able, through imitation, to increase productivity. 
Realized catching-up is the rate of exploitation of potential catching-up, which is 
caused by diffusion of knowledge, the rate of structural change, the accumulation 
of capital and the expansion of demand. He points out that a country has to have 
the "social capability" and "technological congruence" to catch up to the leader. 
Institutional commitments might also act as a constraint on convergence. 
However, once countries have reached a threshold level of development in terms 
of "social capability", the process of catching-up will be driven by interactions 
between leaders and followers via flows of capital, final goods and applied 
knowledge. Accordingly, the catching-up effect may be expected to be strongest 
in technologically backward but socially advanced countries. A major problem 
with the concept of social capability is its imprecision. Abramovitz ( 1986) 
enumerates a number of factors that are important determinants of a country's 
social capability: the level of education, the organisation of firms, openness to 
foreign competition, the ease by which new fl1lllS can be established, the power 
of vested interests in opposing change, the functioning of the labor market and 
the degree of competitiveness in domestic product markets. Stem (l 991) has 
identified a number of other factors that are potentially important, notably 
managerial competence and the quality of infrastructrures including features of 
the social infrastructure such as honesty, benevolence of bureaucracy, and how 
clearly property rights are defined. 
In sum, two implications of these ideas emerge [Baumol et.al., 1989]: first, it 
means that those countries that lag somewhat behind the leaders, once they have 
reached a particular threshold level of development, can be expected 
systematically to move toward the level of achievement of the leaders. Second, 
the mechanism undermines itself automatically as follower contries gradually 
eliminate the difference between their own performance and that of the countries 
that were ahead of them. 
4.2.2. The neoclassical approach 
Neoclassical growth models have profoundly affected the way in which 
macroeconomists think of long-run interrelationships between economies. These 
models predict, based on the assumptions of decreasing returns to capital and free 
access by all countries to a common technology, on the one hand, that growth 
cannot be sustained permanently and, on the other hand, that countries converge 
to a steady state [De la Fuente, 1995a]. In the absence of technical progress, 
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decreasing returns imply that the marginal product of capital will fall with the 
accumulated capital stock, reducing both the incentive to save and the 
contribution of a given volume of investment to output growth. The same 
mechanism explains the convergence prediction: poorer countries will have a 
greater incentive to save and a higher rate of growth for a given rate of 
investment. It follows that if we have two identical economies in all respects, 
except of their initial capital stocks, the one with the lower capital stock will 
grow faster until the steady state output per capita levels of both countries have 
been equalized. 
Figure 4.1.: Absolute convergence 
k • 
k • 
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Source: Sala-i-Martin (1990). 
This prediction will be reinforced by open-economy considerations, as labor 
flows and trade will both contribute to factor price equalization. Introducing 
technical progress does not change the qualitative results of the neoclassical 
model as long as one assumes that technology remains a public good such that 
economies do have access to common technical knowledge in the long-run3• 
Suppose two countries that are characterized by equal consumption ratios, 
technology levels, labor force growth rates and capital depreciation rates [ see 
Figure I]. Both countries are at a lower income level than in the steady state and 
will therefore experience a period of economic growth. Country P is poor and 
country R is rich, which means that the capital intensity and productivity are 
higher in the rich country than in the poor one, kR > kp. Since the return of an 
additional unit of capital is negatively related to the stock of capital, the marginal 
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productivity of capital is higher in the poor country. This means that the capital 
intensity and production per capita grow faster there. This has been described as 
absolute convergence [Sala-i-Martin, 1990]. 
If the countries also differ in some other aspect, they will not move towards 
the same steady state [see Figure 2]. Assume, for example, that the poor country 
has a lower savings ratio, so that the steady state capital stock per capita is less in 
the poor country than it is in the rich country. In this example it is assumed that 
the rich country grows faster than the poor one so there is no convergence in the 
absolute sense. In contrast, each country is converging with a decreasing rate of 
growth in capital intensity and production per capita towards its own steady state, 
which means that the steady state production per capita, Yi*, varies between 
countries. This has been described as conditional convergence [Sala-i-Martin, 
1990; Mankiw et.al. 1992]. 
Figure 4.2. : Conditional convergence 
k ' 
n + g +6 
Source: Sala-i-Martin (1990). 
4.2.3. Endogenous growth 
An important motivation for research on endogenous growth, noted by both 
Romer ( 1986) and Lucas ( 1988), is the apparent failure of traditional models to 
explain the persistence of income differences across countries4• In these models, 
because of an assumed increasing marginal productivity of knowledge, both the 
growth rates and the per capita income level depend on the economy's initial 
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physical and/or human capital endowments, thus on history. The existence of a 
region of capital values over which the production function is convex leads to 
different long-run steady states for different initial conditions. Whereas early 
models are based on economies of scale as a mechanical instrument to obtain 
endogenous growth, Romer (1990) develops a model that relies on a combination 
of economies of scale and imperfect competition in which technological change 
arises when self-interested people have the opportunity to benefit from a 
monopoly rent. Technology is a non-rival input which is only partially 
excludable; its use by one firm explains knowledge spillovers and denies a 
constant returns to scale production function, since it is not necessary to replicate 
the non-rival inputs. The decentralized equilibrium is sub-optimal because of 
maximization of entrepreneurial benefits, which involve elements of imperfect 
competition. These endogenous growth models suggest, firstly, that social returns 
on R&D or education are larger than private returns. Thus, in the absence of a 
planner that closes the gap between social and private returns, a competitive 
equilibrium implies a sub-optimal accumulation of human capital and suggests a 
possible role for governments in subsidizing research, being effective in 
influencing the rate of growth of an economy in the long-run. Public intervention 
may thus in principle be used to coordinate domestic and international policies. 
Secondly, permanent differences in growth rates may arise as a result of 
differences across countries in economic policies, market size, or factor 
endowments. Thirdly, the existence of multiple long-run equilibria in the sense 
that the economies converge to different steady states (i.e. even for similar 
savings and population growth rates). The difference between these predictions 
and those of older models is not that significant, as has been emphasized by De la 
Fuente ( 1995b ). In particular, neoclassical models suggest that income 
differences across countries will tend to disappear only under the assumption of 
identical economies except of the initial capital-labor ratio. In Solow's ( 1956) 
model, for example, long-run income levels are a function of investment rates 
and the rate of population growth, and may, therefore, differ across economies. 
Similarly, Abramovitz (1986) emphasizes social capability as condition for 
convergence. As has been emphasized by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and 
Mankiw et. al. (1992), and has been shown graphically before, traditional models 
only suggest convergence conditional on factors like investment rates, population 
growth rates or social capability, and are in this sense compatible with high and 
even rising international inequality. The lack of fundamental difference in their 
predictions makes it, however, difficult, if not impossible, to discriminate 
between the theories based on convergence. 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
93 
In essence, the predictions of theoretical models concerning the prospects for 
income convergence across countries depend crucially on two assumptions [De la 
Fuente, 1995b]: the existence, or non-existence, of increasing returns to 
reproducible factors, including the stock of technological knowledge, and the 
degree to which useful knowledge is a public good across countries. 
4.3. Convergence concepts 
In this section, alternative convergence concepts are reviewed. First, I concentrate 
of formal, mathematical definitions of convergence and turn thereafter to 
empirical convergence concepts applied in the literature. 
4.3.1. Definitions of convergence 
Intuitively, convergence is given when the difference between two or more time 
series is reduced over time, or, more formally, becomes arbitrarily small as time 
elapses. For random series, such as most of economic variables, this can be 
extended by introducing the concept of stochastic convergence, according to 
which the expected value of the difference of two or more series should be 
constant, or, more strongly, zero [Bernard, 1991; Hall et.al, 1992]. Formally, we 
can express this by the relation: 
( 4.1) E,{Iim, • ~(Xt - 'PY,)} = a 
where Xt and Yt are arbitrary time series. The probability that the two series 
differ by a specified amount a is required to become arbitrarily small. However, 
if nonstationary time series are present, a drawback of this definition is that the 
two series may still behave quite differently even after convergence. An 
alternative, more restrictive definition of convergence is stated in terms of 
probability limits [Hall et.al., 1993): 
(4.2) plim, • ~(Xt- 'PY,)= a 
Two sufficient, but not necessary, conditions for this are 
(4.3a) Jim, • ~(X, - 'Pf,)= 0 
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(4.3b) Jim, • .,Var(X, - 'PY,)= 0 
This definition restricts asymptotically the ability of the series to move away 
from each other. Another definition that is sometimes appropriate, and on which 
some empirical work is focused, is conditional convergence. This would be 
useful as a predictive tool, i.e. when seeking an answer to the question whether, 
given existing information, future convergence is likely. The modified definition 
of convergence in probability is 
(4.4a) Jim, • .,E(X, .. - 'PY, +,-ala)= 0 
and 
(4.4b) lim, • .,Var(Xi .. - 'PY,+ ,-ala)= 0 
where !lt is the information set available at time t. Thus, most importantly, 
the formal definitions of convergence relate to the long-term reduction of 
differences of economic variables. In addition, they take into account of the 
randomness of time series. 
4.3.2. Empirical concepts of convergence 
The convergence hypothesis has recently been subject of growing research 
interest and has led to the development of a number of different empirical 
concepts. Several empirical concepts of convergence have received special 
attention recently5. One concept, referred to as a-convergence by Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1991, 1992), considers the cross-sectional dispersion in per capita 
earnings. a-convergence occurs if the cross-sectional dispersion in per capita 
earnings, typically measured by either the standard deviation or the coefficient of 
variation, declines through time. It is, however, only a crude measure of 
dispersion, since the estimated variance of income across countries is influenced 
by shocks hitting the economy at any particular point in time. Hence, even if the 
economies were truly getting closer in the long-run, this statistic would have a 
lower bound by the variance of these shocks [Andres et.al.1995]. 
Another concept, used among others by Baumol (1986), DeLong (1988), 
Barro (1991) and Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), and referred to as absolute ft-
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convergence by Sala-i-Martin (1990), occurs when poor countries tend to grow 
faster than rich ones, such that poor countries catch up to rich ones in terms of 
the level of per capita output through time. The concept is generally implemented 
through a regression of the form 
(4.5) Ay, =a+ {Jyo+ v, 
where Liyt refers to an average growth rate. A negative coefficient of the 
initial level of per capita output is equated with convergence. In the long-run, 
expected per capita income is the same for all economies in the group, 
independently of its initial value. While this does not mean that inequality will 
disappear completely, for there will be random shocks with uneven effects on the 
different economies, such disturbances will only have transitory effects, implying 
that, in the long-run, we should observe a distribution in which the relative 
positions of the different countries change rapidly. Barro (1991), Barro and Sala-
i-Martin (1992), and Mankiw et.al. (1992) emphasized, as noted before, that the 
neoclassical growth model implies only convergence after it has been controlled 
for differences in the economy's steady-states. They have called this concept 
conditional convergence, which is implemented through a regression of the form 
( 4.6) Ay, =a+ {Jyo + 1rX;, + v, 
where the Xi refer to country-specific determinants of the steady state income 
per capita. Though the implementation of conditional convergence is similar to 
absolute 13-convergence, its interpretation is fundamentally different. With 
conditional convergence, each country (may) converge to its own steady state, 
which could be very different from each other. Hence, a high degree of inequality 
among economies could persist, even in the long-run, and one could observe high 
persistence in the relative positions of the different economies. In other words, 
with conditional convergence, rich countries will tend to remain rich, and the 
poor will continue to lag behind. 
The fourth concept is referred to as stochastic convergence [Carlino and 
Mills, 1993]. This line of empirical research, employed by Bernard (1991), 
Bernard and Durlauf (1995), and Jones (1995), relies on the time series 
properties of output series. Cross-country growth behavior is studied in the sense 
that convergence means that all per capita output discrepancies are transitory. 
Output in each country is realized to be subject to stochastic shocks, like 
technological or monetary disturbances, which render the level of output per 
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capita in each country nonstationary. Intuitively, cointegration is given if the 
shocks affecting the individual countries have a common stochastic component, 
so that the relative output series, Yit - Y;1, is stationary. In addition, economic 
convergence requires that the difference between output in country i and country 
j, Yi,- Y;,, becomes smaller over time. Formally, cointegration concepts assume 
that the level of output per capita in each economy i is integrated of order one, 
thus, its growth rate follows a stationary stochastic process. Economic 
convergence, in this interpretation, then implies that output differences between 
countries i and j, Yii-Y;1, obey a zero mean stationary stochastic process. 
Recently, a method based on income distribution dynamics has become 
increasingly popular in empirical research. As argued by Quah (1993 a,b), 
analyzing an average or representative economy in a cross-section of economies 
may give a misleading picture for the behavior of that entire cross-section. The 
economic basis of the concept is that economies in an integrated world tend to be 
increasingly interdependent units, which would make it necessary to drop the 
neoclassical "representative economy" assumption [Quah, 1994b]. Therefore, he 
proposes to study the probability distribution of transition over time. The 
concept, in its discrete form, involves categorizing the sample of countries into 
income classes and developing the law of motion for the probability distribution 
of being in income class i at time t+k conditional on being in income class j at 
time t. Convergence can then be found in two ways: on the one hand, 
convergence is given when the steady state probability distribution has a 
unimodal shape. That is, intuitively, the probability for a country i in the 
distribution of ending up, in the long-run, at the mean income value should tend 
to one. To calculate the long-run probability distribution requires that the 
conditional probability is time invariant. Alternatively, by fixing the probability 
vectors to be uniform and identical for every point in time, one can define a time-
variant grid (quantiles) and associated to that a sequence of fraction transition 
probability matrices. The change in the grid describes the evolution of the cross-
section distribution for one period to the next one. Convergence is taking place 
when the sequence of quantiles degenerates to the mean value of the distribution 
[ Andres and Lamo, 1994]. 
4.4. Review of the empirical literature 
In this section I discuss the empirical literature on growth and convergence6• I 
will focus on a review without a critical evaluation, as it is the purpose of this 
section to give an impression of the results obtained from similar analyses as the 
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subsequent one in the following sections. The section is structured based on the 
alternative empirical concepts of convergence discussed before. In sub-section 
one, I discuss some of the main contributions being motivated by the catching-up 
hypothesis. In sub-section two, empirical work using the concept of conditional 
convergence is reviewed. Sub-section three then contains empirical work on 
stochastic convergence, while sub-section four is related to empirical work on 
income distribution dynamics. In sub-section five I focus explicitly on empirical 
work using data from the EU. 
4.4.1. Catching up and falling behind 
The original empirical work on economic convergence is concerned about a 
negative relation between the average growth rate and its initial level and, thus, 
with unconditional convergence. Productivity growth rates are expected to be 
inversely related to their initial levels for three reasons: first, learning and 
imitating an existing technology should be easier than inventing and testing a 
new one. Second, countries with lower levels of industrialization may have 
greater returns relative to the most advanced economies in training labor and then 
reallocating it between agriculture and industry. Third, countries with lower 
levels of industrialization might have greater opportunities to exploit the 
possibilities of advanced scale-dependent technologies. An inverse relation 
between productivity growth rates and their initial levels is consistent with the 
neoclassical growth model, once you assume that all economies in the sample are 
structurally identical and differ only in their initial capital-labor ratios. 
Abramovitz (1986) and Baumol (1986), using data compiled in Maddison 
(1982), support the convergence hypothesis for a set of sixteen presently 
industrialized countries over the time period 1870 - 1979. Abramovitz uses rank 
correlation coefficients and finds an inverse correlation between average 
productivity growth rates and their initial level, which confirms the potential to 
catch up for technologically backward countries. In addition, he finds that the 
estimated coefficient is higher, the longer the length of the sub-period under 
study, suggesting that the higher a country's productivity level in 1870, the more 
slowly that level grows in the following century. Baumol performs a regression of 
the average productivity growth rate and the initial level and obtains the 
following results: 
A In Yt = 5.25 - 0.75 ln Yl870 R2 = 0.88 
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He obtains a coefficient of determination, R2, of 0.88, thus indicating that 
88% of average growth is explained by the initial level. De Long ( 1988) criticizes 
the findings of Baumol on grounds of his results suffering from both sample 
selection bias and measurement error. That is to say, De Long argues that the 
results of Baumol do not provide conclusive information on convergence, 
because all countries are presently industrialized economies which have 
successfully performed during the 20th century. He argues that only a regression 
run on an ex-ante sample, a sample not of nations that have converged but of 
nations that seemed likely to converge, could tell whether growth since 1870 
exhibits convergence. Based on this kind of reasoning, he then constructs and 
analyzes an alternative sample, excluding Japan and adding data for Argentina, 
Chile, East Germany, Ireland, New Zealand, Portugal and Spain, which 
represents more accurately a sample of ex-ante probable "winners". De Long 
performs a similar regression as Baumol, allowing, however, for measurement 
errors, and rejects convergence in the central case, when the variance of the 
unobservable measurement error equals the error term in the regression. He 
concludes that evidence in favor of convergence is no greater than evidence 
against it. Baumol and Wolff (1988), in reply to the comment by De Long, 
contribute to the discussion by examining additional data sets and by using 
additional methods for analyzing convergence. Firstly, the authors use a data set 
of 19 European countries over the period 1830 - 1919. The authors rank the 
countries in descending order of GNP per capita in 1870, successively construct 
samples consisting of the top 8, top 9, top 10, ... , top 14 countries, and plot the 
corresponding time-series of the coefficients of variation. They find that only the 
top-8-country-sample support the convergence hypothesis, whereas all the other 
groups consisting of larger samples display a widening of income dispersion over 
time, thus indicating economic divergence. Secondly, Baumol and Wolff analyze 
post-World War II growth performance for 72 countries. Applying a similar 
ranking procedure as before, they find that per capita incomes among ex ante 
selected LDC's had diverged while the opposite had been true among initially 
industrialized countries. They supplement and confirm these initial results by 
formal nonlinear and piecewise linear regressions and conclude that there is 
evidence in favor of "convergence clubs". The richest 15 countries are described 
unambiguously by economic convergence, a result that holds also for larger sets 
of countries, once LDC's are excluded. However, for larger samples including 
LDC's cross-country differences are persistent, with little indication for 
convergence7. Dowrick and Nguyen (1989), using the data set by Summers and 
Heston (1988), extensively tested the convergence hypothesis among 24 OECD 
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countries in the post-World War II period. First, coefficients of variation and 
standard deviations of log output are calculated, supporting the convergence 
hypothesis as they both decline continuously from 1950 to 1985. Nonparametric 
tests show that the poorer half of the sample has grown faster than the richer over 
the entire period and over three sub periods (1950-60, 1960-1973, 1973-1985). 
Second, a regression analysis of average growth rates of output per capita on the 
initial real GDP per capita is performed, indicating a negative sign of the 
coefficient and reaching an R2 of over 0.50. As in previous papers, the negative 
sign is interpreted as support for the convergence hypothesis, since countries with 
initially lower incomes tend to grow faster than initially rich countries. Dowrick 
and Gemmel ( 1991) extend the previous analysis to include 78 countries across 
the world. They analyze four alternative explanations for the existence of 
convergence clubs within a growth-accounting framework: technological 
spillovers, intersectoral disequilibrium in factor markets, sectoral differences in 
technical progress, and capital deepening. They find that, whereas agricultural 
productivity levels of poor countries relative to rich countries are catching-up, 
industrial productivity levels are diverging both within a group of poor countries 
and relative to the group of rich countries8. The authors conclude that, for the 
industrial productivity sector, technological spillovers assist productivity growth 
in countries at a medium level of development, but are unavailable to the least 
developed countries. They interpret their results as being indicative for a 
structural proverty threshold in world development. Hansson and Henrekson 
(1994a,b) analyze technological catch-up within a disaggregated study for 14 
OECD countries. They derive a testable model and find that after 1970 there is 
no catching up effect in the tradables sector, while catching up is found for 
industries in the nontradables sector. 
These papers do not provide an unambiguous picture as to whether the world 
is described by economic convergence or divergence. However, they suggest 
three things: first, among the richest countries, a catch-up process is to be 
observed. Second, the world's poorest countries do not seem to catch up. Relative 
differences to the rich economies do persist, or possibly, they even increase over 
time. And third, they suggest what Baumol et.al.(1989) call "convergence clubs", 
that is, within a specific group of countries convergence is to be observed, 
whereas across groups income differences do persist. 
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4.4.2. Conditional convergence 
As is the catching-up literature, the empirical work on conditional convergence is 
concerned with the relation between the average growth rate and its initial 
income. However, the interpretation is strikingly different. Whereas the literature 
on catching-up expects an inverse relation between the average growth rate and 
its initial level, because of factors like imitation and learning, returns from 
training, or opportunities of exploiting scale economies for backward countries, 
within the neoclassical framework, initial income per capita provides a measure 
of how far removed each country is from its specific steady state value. 
The origin of the empirical literature on conditional convergence is the work 
by Romer (1987a). He uses a conditional convergence regression of the form as 
in (8) with the investment rate as conditioning variable. His results are presented 
in Table 1. 
Romer finds a negative coefficient of initial income. There are two additional 
striking aspects of his results: first, he obtains a positive effect of the investment 
rate on the average growth rate in all regressions. Second, the capital's share 
coefficients are very high. In the third regression the capital share is estimated to 
be74%. 
Table 4.1: Conditional convergence regression 
a a, b a, C (1 Log Likelihood 
I -.27 .51 12.0 .77 .01 1.5 538.6 
II -.24 .51 11.5 .77 1.5 538.5 
III .35 .74 10.2 1,5 537.7 
Source: Romer (1987a) [Table 4] 
This stands in contrast to the predictions of the neoclassical growth model, 
according to which the estimate of a should be on the order of 0.25 to 0.33. 
These results have received special attention [Romer, 1994]. On the one hand, 
they indicate that the capital's factor share is higher than previously perceived to 
be and that diminishing returns to capital are setting in more slowly than previous 
estimates suggested. On the other hand, they may be interpreted in a way that 
convergence would have taken place if the investment rate had been held 
constant, or, more generally, if other variables had been held constant. Barro 
( 1991) extends this latter line of reasoning, analyzing average growth rates for a 
set of 98 countries in the period 1960 - 1985. He tests whether the average 
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growth rate across economies is inversely related to the initial level of per capita 
GDP, which he interprets, as usual, as indicator for economic convergence. At 
first, without additional explanatory variables he finds no significant relationship 
between the initial level of GDP per capita and its average growth rate. However, 
as in the work by Romer, Barro obtains an inverse relationship by adding 
additional explanatory variables in the regression. First, he adds school-
enrollment observed at the beginning of the period, as a proxy for human capital, 
then he adds fertility and investment and obtains, in each case, an inverse relation 
between the average growth rate and its initial level. 
Table 4.2.: Estimated rates of convergence. Regions in a country 
Author Sample Rate of Additional Variables 
convergence 
(in% p.a.) 
Barro and Sala-i- 4 7 Japanese prefectures 2.3 - regional dummies 
Martin (1993) 1930 - 1987 
Barro and Sala-i- 48 U.S. States 1.8 - regional dummies 
Martin ( 1992) 1880 - 1988 
Coulombe and Lee 10 Provinces in Canada 1.05 no 
(1993) 1960 - 1991 
Coulombe and Lee IO Provinces in Canada 1.26 no 
(1994) 1968 - 1992 
Dolado et.al. 50 regions in Spain 1.81 yes 
(1995) 1955 - 1989 - savings rate 
Di Liberto 20 regions in Italy 7.47 - enrollment rate 
(1994) 1960- 1991 - public investment 
Herz and Roger 75 regions in West 4.4 - schooling 
(1995) Germany - regional dummies 
1955 - 1988 
Holtz-Eakin 48 U.S. States 1.91 - state endowment 
(1992) 1973 - 86 variables 
Keller 26 regions in Germany 2.11 - fixed effects 
(1995) (East and West) 
1955 - 1988 
Source: Own compilation. 
Mankiw et. al. (1992) construct a human capital augmented version of the 
Solow model and test for convergence, using data for 98 countries over 1960 -
1985. Unconditional convergence, i.e. without conditioning on determinants of 
the steady state, is rejected. Then, by conditioning for the rates of investment or 
alternatively of saving, population growth and human capital, a significant 
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inverse relation between the average growth rate and the initial level - conditional 
convergence - is found. In contrast to other similar studies, however, the 
conditioning variables are derived from their augmented Solow-model. Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (1992) analyze convergence across 48 U.S. States using both 
personal income data for the period 1840 - 1988 and gross state product data 
between 1963 and 1988. The authors use a regression of a form like equation ( 4 ), 
which they derive from a neoclassical growth model and which is estimated 
using nonlinear least squares. Initally, additional explanatory variables are 
excluded, so that the regression is an estimation of the average growth rate of the 
48 states on their initial average level in 1840. They estimate the equation over 
sub-periods and over the whole period and obtain, in general, a significant 
inverse relation, thus convergence. However, tests for parameter stability of ~ 
indicate unstable coefficients, which lead the authors to include an additional 
explanatory variable, viz. a sectoral decomposition variable. 
Table 4.3: Estimated rates of convergence. Multi-country analyses 
Author Sample Rate of Additional Variables 
convergence 
(in% p.a.) 
Barro (1991) 98 countries 1.84 - enrollment rate 
1960- 1985 - fertility rate 
- investment rate 
Islam (1995) 96 countries 3.75 - investment rate 
1960 - 1985 - enrollment rate 
- fixed effects 
Knight et.al. (1993) 98 countries 3.91 - investment rate 
1960 - 1985 - enrollment rate 
- fixed effects 
Mankiw et. al. (1992) 98 countries 1.37 - investment rate 
1960-1985 - enrollment rate 
Sala-i-Martin (1995) 110 countries 1.3 - enrollment rates 
1960 - 1990 - savings rate 
- political variables 
Wolf(l994) 98 countries 0.9 -investment rate 
1960 - 1985 - labor growth rate 
- mortality 
- revolutions & coups 
- continent dummies 
Source: Own compilation. 
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The authors argue that the unstable pattern of the 13 coefficients across 
subperiods reflect aggregate disturbances that have differential effects on state 
incomes. Adding the sectoral decomposition variable, they are indeed able to 
accept the hypothesis of parameter stability across sub-periods. The authors 
obtain a coefficient J3 = - 2.49% for the period 1840 - 1988 which suggests that 
the time needed to eliminate half of an initial gap between the states is about 35 
years. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1993) apply a similar framework to Japanese 
prefectures and obtain similar rates of convergence. 
Subsequently, conditional convergence regressions have been applied by 
several authors for different data sets. Table 4.2. summarizes recent estimates of 
the convergence coefficient obtained by various other studies using data from 
regions within one country. Table 4.3. summarizes estimates using data from 
multi-country regressions. In these tables papers published after 1991 are 
summarized9. In general, conditional convergence is found by empirical studies. 
Convergence rates for regions within a single country tend to be slightly higher, 
due probably to increased factor mobility on regional levels, than those obtained 
in cross-country studies. 
4.4.3. Stochastic and local convergence 
One way to interpret the implications of endogenous growth theories is in terms 
of multiple equilibria. Indeed, even if a set of control variables, meant to control 
for microeconomic heterogeneity, seems to support the convergence hypothesis, 
this may be in line with the existence of stable multiple equilibria in long-run 
output per capita. That is to say, differences in aggregate production functions 
and, correspondingly, technology may lead economies to converge to different 
steady states in output per capita. Durlauf and Johnson ( 1992) labeled this "local 
convergence", which, as they show, is consistent with several theories of 
endogenous growth and which stands in contrast to Solow-kind "global 
convergence", where all countries converge to the same steady state. They test the 
local convergence proposition for 98 countries over 1960 - 1985, the same data 
set that had been used by Mankiw et.al. (1992). First, based on the same 
convergence equation as in Mankiw et.al ( 1992), the authors use misspecification 
tests to test the hypothesis that the data can be described by a single production 
technology. They split the data set ad hoc into sub-groups, taking literacy rates 
and initial income levels as splitting criteria, and reject the null hypothesis of 
equal production technologies, which indicates local convergence. In a second 
step, the authors use regression trees, a nonparametric method, to split the overall 
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sample endogenously into sub-groups. They test for differences in technology 
and find evidence in favor of the local convergence proposition. In addition, the 
authors find that the speed of convergence in the sub-samples is faster than in the 
overall sample. They interpret their results as being in favor of Baumol's ( 1986) 
convergence clubs. Andres and Bosca (1993) subsequently test the local 
convergence proposition for 24 OECD countries, using data from the OECD 
National Accounts for the period 1960 - 1991. The authors use an alternative 
sample-splitting method, which is directed towards revealing differences in initial 
conditions. They test sequentially, removing a priori reasonable countries at a 
time, for significant individual differences in the initial level of technology. They 
obtain three technological levels, which they label lagged, intermediate, and 
leading. They find that the rate of convergence in the sub-samples is greater than 
in the overall sample, with the rate of convergence among advanced economies 
being twice as large as that among the backwards ones. Tests for common 
technology point to the presence of two different technologies inside the OECD, 
thus confirming the local convergence proposition. Ben-David (1993, 1994, 
1995) uses an alternative framework in his paper. He analyzes how the empirical 
convergence results change, on the one hand, with variations in the convergence 
group membership i.e. the relative wealth of the countries in the group and, on 
the other hand, with variations in the convergence group size. He analyzes data 
by Summers and Heston (1988) for 113 market economies between 1960 and 
1985. Ben-David tests for convergence by pooling each country's annual 
discrepancy from the group average and estimating the following equation: 
where Y;, is country i's GDP per capita at time t and y1 is the group average at 
time t. The author interprets cl> as an indicator for economic convergence. A 
value of cl> below 1 is supposed to indicate convergence and a value greater than I 
economic divergence. He ranks the countries with respect to income per capita, 
divides the total sample into different groups, with the number of groups ranging 
between 1 and 8, and runs equation (7) for each group. He finds that the 
wealthiest countries converge upwards and poorest countries downwards, thus 
that rich countries are getting richer and poor countries poorer. He shows that 
this result is robust for variations in group size and for other partitions of the 
world. Bernard and Durlauf ( 1995) test convergence in a stochastic growth 
framework, using data from 15 industrialized countries over the period 1900 to 
198?1°. The authors apply cointegration concepts, i.e. convergence requires that 
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the permanent components of output per capita are the same across countries. 
The authors tend to accept the hypothesis of no convergence. They conclude that 
per capita output differences appear to persist over time. Carlino and Mills 
(l 993) study convergence of per capita income and per capita earnings in the 
regions of the U.S for the period 1929 - 1990, applying the stochastic 
convergence concept. After allowing for a break in 1946, they find evidence in 
favor of the neoclassical model's prediction of convergence. They find that 
shocks to per capita earnings are more persistent than shocks to per capita 
income, which leads the authors to conclude that the regional distribution of 
transfer payments tends to smooth the effects of deviations on relative regional 
per capita earnings and to reinforce trends in per capita income convergence. 
Crafts and Mills (1995) analyze stochastic growth in output per capita in I 7 
OECD countries from the late nineteenth century to 1989. They find that output 
per capita behavior in all countries is subject to structural breaks. The period 
1951 to 1973 is argued to be an epoch of exceptionally rapid economic growth in 
Western Europe, due to catch-up and reconstruction. 
4.4.4. Income distribution dynamics 
Quah (1993 a,b) is directed towards focusing on the long-run distribution of 
incomes over time. The author analyzes the distribution of incomes across 
countries, using the Summers and Heston (1988) data set for 115 market 
economies. Quah discretizes the set of possible values of income relative to the 
world average at time t into intervals at ¼ , ½ , I, and 2 and estimates the 
probability that an economy at time t in one of these intervals remains or transits 
to another state. For the 23-year transition from 1962 to 1985, he obtains a 
probability of the richest countries to remain richest of 95%. In contrast, the 
probability of the poorest countries to remain poorest is 76%, both entries being 
by far the greatest in the transition matrix. His results suggest economic 
divergence, the world becomes partitioned into rich countries, whose share in 
total world income increase, and poor countries, whose share decrease further. 
Desdoigts (1994) extends the analysis of the world income distribution in various 
ways. First he confirms Quah's results of the distribution of income in the world 
becoming more unequal over time. He finds that, while the density estimate of 
income per capita and income per worker initially, in 1960, exhibits an unimodal 
structure, after 25 years, it exhibits a fourth or fifth modes structure. He 
interprets this evidence in terms of local convergence. In addition, applying non-
parametric smoothing techniques, he analyzes the relation of income and various 
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variables of interest, viz. investment, public consumption, private consumption, 
and education. He finds that human capital accumulation functions as a main 
source of economic growth, in line with recent theoretical suggestions. The mean 
response of growth rates is strong for low investment shares, flattens, however, 
out among the highest shares of income devoted to investment. Quah ( 1994c) 
performs an analysis of the distribution of income for the US States, using data 
from 1948 - 1989. Here, intra-distributional mobility turns out to be high. 
Convergence is uniform towards a long-run distribution with only a single peak. 
Andres and Lamo (1994) study cross-section growth dynamics of 24 OECD 
countries. Using raw data, i.e. income per capita relative to the mean value, they 
find polarization in the growth process. The results show a bimodal- distribution 
of income per capita across OECD economies. In a second step, in order to make 
their analysis comparable to conventional parametric regressions, they examine 
the distributional dynamics of the residuals from a conditioning regression. The 
authors condition on accumulation rates of physical capital and population. At 
first, they impose a common technology restriction across countries on the 
conditioning regression. Most interestingly, and quite surprisingly, the estimated 
density functions of the residuals do still evolve into a bimodal distribution. 
There is little change in the results after conditioning on physical capital and 
population. The authors interpret these results as evidence against conditional 
convergence. The authors repeat the analysis, following Durlauf and Johnson 
(1992), by allowing for time-invariant and country-specific effects. Here the 
results show higher intra-distributional mobility; the estimated density function 
evolves into an uniform distribution. However, only after relaxing the main 
assumptions of conventional cross-section regressions, evidence in favor of 
convergence is found. This line of literature indicates not only that the 
distribution of income in the world becomes more unequal over time, but even 
within industrialized countries with similar economic structures income 
differences seem to persist. The results are in line with Baumol's suggestion of 
existing convergence clubs. 
Overall, the empirical evidence with respect to the evolution of the world 
distribution of income, or, in other words, with respect to convergence in the 
world economy, is mixed. However, there exists a broad consensus in the more 
recent literature suggesting an absence of convergence to a single steady state 
[Ben-David, 1994]. The absence of convergence to a single steady state may be 
explained either in the neoclassical tradition in terms of conditional convergence, 
that is, the rate of growth falls as the economy approaches its own long-run level, 
or in terms of local convergence and multiple equilibria. 
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4.4.5. Growth and convergence across Europe 
In this sub-section I review contributions made within the context of growth and 
convergence using data from the European Union. Barro and Sala-i-Martin 
(1991) analyze 73 regions of? European countries, using data from 1950 - 1985. 
They start from the basic regression of the average growth rate on its initial level, 
dividing the total time period into sub-periods, and testing for parameter stability. 
As parameter stability is rejected using the basic regression, they continue to 
include regional dummies. The authors interpret regional dummies as proxies for 
country specific steady state values and for countrywide effects in the error term. 
They proceed by adding shares of agriculture and industry in total employment 
and fmd that the average growth rate is inversely related to the initial level, 
indicating convergence, with the coefficient b being stable over all sub-periods. 
The value of 13 for all sub-periods is around 2% per year. Subsequently, the 
authors turn to the behavior of the standard deviation of log output per capita 
over time (a-convergence). They find that the dispersion of income has declined 
continuously, falling from 28% in 1950 to 18% in 1985. Neven and Gouyette 
(1995) apply three methods to analyze economic convergence in a sample of up 
tol42 European regions for the period 1975 - 1990. First, they analyze cr-
convergence, the behavior of the standard deviation of log income per capita over 
time. They assess convergence for the total sample of regions and for sub-
samples, namely North- and South-European regions. The results are weakly in 
favor of a reduction of income dispersion. Second, the authors turn to analyze 
unconditional and conditional convergence. They fmd that there is no evidence 
for convergence, when country effects are not controlled for. The authors 
proceed, following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), by including a sectoral 
composition variable, which measures the extent to which output was distributed 
in the initial period in growing sectors, and human capital. Testing for parameter 
stability over sub-periods, the authors find that the process of convergence is not 
stable, and that it slows down in the later part of the 1980s. Third, they use a 
markov chains approach to analyze the distribution of income over time in 
Europe. They fmd evidence in favor of a limited poverty trap; poorest and richest 
countries do not seem to modify their relative standing over time. The authors 
conclude that southern regions seem to catch up in the early 1980s but stagnate 
thereafter, while northern regions first stagnate and then converge towards the 
steady state. Pagano (1995) analyzes convergence of member states of the EC 
using cross-country data for the period 1950 to 1988. Using a cross-section 
approach he fmds that since 1950 there has been Total Factor Productivity (TFP) 
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catching-up. However, he finds that the process was far from being stable, as the 
rate of convergence reached its peak during the I 960's but dropped virtually to 
zero during the 1980's. He continued using the stochastic convergence 
framework and strongly rejects the hypothesis of convergence in this dynamic 
framework. Grahl and Simms (1994) analyze regional data of the EC for the 
period from 1960 to 1990. While they find evidence in favor of conditional and 
unconditional convergence for the whole period, they note that in the second half 
of the three decades, thus from 1975 to 1990, the convergence coefficients are 
always less than half their value for the period 1960 - 1975. Thus, the 
convergence process has slowed down in recent years. Thomas (1995) examines 
12 countries and 166 regions of Europe over the period 1975 - 1991. First, 
following Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991, 1992), he tests for unconditional and 
conditional convergence. The author finds both unconditional and conditional 
convergence both on country and regional level. Conditioning on country-
dummies and club-dummies 11, for example, he obtains a rate of convergence of 
2.5% on regional level for 1981 - 1991. Subsequently, the author looks at the 
behavior of coefficients of variation of output per capita over time, which 
confirms his convergence findings. The variation of output per capita both across 
countries and regions in Europe falls within the 80s. Armstrong (1995) tests for 
conditional convergence using data of 85 regions in 12 European countries 
(1950-1990). He finds that EU regions exhibit a clear pattern of convergence. 
The rate of convergence, however, has slowed down in the past 20 years. 
Whereas between 1950 and 1970 the rate of convergence is about 2%, being in 
line with the results by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991), for the period 1970 to 
1990 a rate of convergence of only 1 % per year is found. Button and Pentecoast 
(1995) analyze the impact of the membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM) on convergence, using data from 51 regions in 9 countries. They find that 
membership assisted GDP convergence in the 1980's. Larch (1994) studies cross-
section growth dynamics of 107 regions in 9 European countries over the period 
1970 - 1990. He estimates transition probabilities, grouping the spectrum of 
relative output per capita levels into three and five states. In both cases, he finds 
that the probability to retain in the initial position is high. Whereas intra-
distributional mobility is high for middle-income countries, both towards the 
upper and lower end of the distribution, the probability for high income countries 
to descent is relatively low. The author tests and finds that the transition behavior 
has changed in the 80s compared to the 70s. In the 70s the low output regions 
moved comparatively fast, attaining a better possibility to improve in relative 
output terms. The very rich regions, on the other hand, moved slowly maintaining 
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their position for an extended period of time. In the 1980s transitions occur less 
frequently, especially at the lower end of the distribution, leading to a higher 
degree of persistence. Higher persistence, however, implies that the position of 
the rich countries is enforced and that the poor countries tended to be stuck in 
their positions. 
Table 4.4. summarizes regression results obtained for data for the European 
Union being based on the concept of conditional convergence. 
Table 4.4.: Estimated rates of convergence. Regions in EU 
Author Sample Rate of Additional Variables 
convergence 
(in% p.a.) 
Armstrong ( 1995) 85 regions in 12 0.83 - country dummies 
countries - structural variable 
1980 - 1990 
Barro and Sala-i 73 regions in 7 1.78 -country dummies 
Martin countries - structural variable 
(1991) 
Button and 51 regions in 9 1.7 -ERM dummy 
Pentecoast countries - structural variable 
(1995) - country dummies 
Grahl and Simms 51 regions 2.52 - country dummies 
(1994) 1960 - 1990 
Nevenand 108 regions 1.61 - country dummies 
Gouvette (1995) 1975 - 1989 
Pagano ( I 995) 12 countries in the EC 1.3 - investment rate 
1950-1988 - emolovment share 
Thomas (1995) 166 regions in 12 2.5 - country dummies 
countries 1981 - 1991 - club dummies 
Source: Own compilation. 
As can be seen, the rates of convergence are within a similar range as with 
other data sets, although the speed is slightly higher than in multi-country 
regressions using world economic data. In sum, empirical studies for Europe tend 
to support the convergence hypothesis. At the same time, however, the existing 
evidence indicates that the convergence process has not been stable, neither 
across time nor across countries. In recent years, convergence seems to have 
slowed down and may have become reversed. 
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4.5. On stability of growth and convergence in the European Union 
In this section, descriptive statistical methods are used to analyze the convergence 
process. The purpose of this analysis is to underline the argument that 
convergence has not been stable, neither across time nor across countries. In 
doing so, as for the controversy on the righ measure of convergence, a number of 
alternative concepts are applied. In order to compare the performance of both 
measures, income per capita and labor productivity are used. The main data 
source is the Penn World Table 5.6., an updated version of Summers and Heston 
(1991). Output per capita data [RGDPCH] and Investment rates [I] cover the 
period 1950 - 1992 while output per worker data cover the period 1950 to 1990. 
Data used as proxy for human capital accumulation comes from the World 
Tables and the World Development Report, various issues. Secondary and 
tertiary school enrollment rates are available for the period 1960 to 1991, in 
general with a five-year frequency. Azariadis and Drazen ( 1990) provide data on 
literacy rates and output-to-literacy ratios, which are their proxies for human 
capital accumulation, for 1940 and 1960. Data for 10 EU-countries are provided 
in their Table II12. Assuming that enrollment rates behave proportionally to 
output-to-literacy ratios, I constructed enrollment rates for 1950 and 1955 for 
those countries. For the remaining countries, the values assigned to the missing 
observations is the average of the values for adjacent years or, if this is not 
possible, that of the closest available year. 
4.5.l. Stylized facts 
In Table 5 basic information on growth rates in per capita (per worker) output is 
presented. The average growth rate of GDP per capita (per worker) between 1950 
and 1990 was 3 .18(3.16) for the European Union. The rate of growth has slowed 
down considerably in recent years. Whereas the average growth rate of GDP per 
capita (per worker) was 4,02 ( 4.29) during the period 1950 - 1973, it was only 
2,06 (1.63) during the 1973 - 1990 period, thus being reduced by about 50%13. 
The steady economic growth in terms of GDP per capita (per worker) is based, 
on the one hand, on low population growth (0.57% p.a.) and, on the other one, on 
high investment rates. Interestingly, the average investment rate has remained 
basically unchanged in both sub-periods. Average growth has been far from 
homogeneous. Differences in accumulation rates explain part but not the whole 
of the heterogeneity in average growth. Some countries' relative success can be 
explained by relatively high savings rates; this 
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Table 4.5 : Stylized facts on growth and convergence in the European Union 
GDP per capita (GDPpc) and GDP per worker (GDPpw) Investment School enrollment Gov. 
1950 - 1990 1950-1973 1973 - 1990 rate rates Size 
GDP pc IGDP pwlPo~~ati GDP pc I GDPpw GDP pc IGDP pw 1950- I 1950- I 1973- Second. I Tertiary G/Y 
1990 1973 1990 
Austria 3,67 3,79 0,27 4,72 5,40 2,24 1,61 25,90 23,45 25,76 66,78 18,12 15,19 
Belgium 2,73 2,66 0,36 3,31 3,56 1,96 1,45 22,50 24,05 22,39 74,31 20,04 11,62 
Denmark 2,43 2,09 0,46 3,05 2,96 1,59 0,91 24,20 25,18 23,85 79,32 21.48 18,43 
Finland 3,47 3,41 0,55 4,24 4,39 2,43 2,07 33,32 35,23 33,22 84,78 21,54 13,86 
France 3,09 3,10 0,77 4,07 4,38 1,76 1,38 26,77 25,50 26,56 67,89 21,11 15,85 
Germany 3,58 3,48 0,59 4,80 5,14 1,94 1,23 25,86 30,16 25,58 59,08 19,12 15,22 
Greece 3,92 4,09 0,73 5,68 5,93 1,54 1,60 23,61 22,32 23,21 60,72 12,94 13,01 
Italy 3,06 3,34 0,41 3,12 3,71 2,97 2,85 25,68 21,37 25,53 65,05 17,00 14,67 
Ireland 3,79 3,97 0,52 4,80 5,30 2,42 2,18 25,53 30,23 25,36 53,50 18,81 13,19 
Luxembourg 2,28 2,46 0,64 2,35 3,03 2,19 1,69 26,86 36,37 26,52 50,11 ... 10,04 
Netherlands 2,64 2,52 0,98 3,47 3,78 1,52 0,80 22,57 25,95 22,33 72,85 23,34 14,03 
Portugal 4,56 4,34 0,40 5,68 5,73 3,04 2,46 22,17 21,40 21,83 46,44 9,94 14,94 
Spain 4,03 4,16 0,84 5,60 5,99 1,90 1,69 25,23 23,14 25,08 57,30 16,61 10,32 
Sweden 2,33 1,91 0,50 2,92 2,57 1,54 1,00 22,12 23,75 21,98 69,35 22,91 20,05 
UK 2,24 2,08 0,32 2,51 2,48 1,88 1,53 17,76 16,71 17,72 70,82 16,24 19,68 
EU-15 3,18 3,16 0,57 4,02 4,29 2,06 1,63 25,26 26,11 25,07 65,22 18,51 14,67 
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is the case for Finland (3.47 and 33.32) among the fast growers and the United 
Kingdom (2.24 and 17.76) among the slow growers. Variations in enrollment 
rates are even sharper and at first glance its correlation with growth rates is less 
clear; Denmark, for example, with a very high enrollment rate has grown less 
than countries with much less human capital investment (Portugal or Italy). 
4.5.2. The stability of relative output 
Following Blanchard and Katz (1992), Ben-David (1994), and Neven and 
Gouyette (l 995), I characterize the stochastic behavior of GDP per capita (per 
worker) in country i relative to the EU average. 
Table 4.6.: Estimates of relative output per capita (per worker) 
Output per worker Output per capita 
Coefficient AR(l) AR(2) AR(I) AR(2) 
YI 0.974 1.199 0.978 1.201 
Y2 -0.218 -0.216 
Unit root testd) -7.549**b) -5.4** -6.603** -7_3 .. 
Impulse 
resoonses 
t = I 1 1 I I 
2 0.974 1.199 0.978 1.201 
3 0.948 1.221 0.958 1.225 
4 0.924 1.202 0.937 1.211 
5 0.900 1.176 0.918 1.190 
10 0.789 1.041 0.824 1.077 
20 0.607 0.815 0.666 0.882 
30 0.467 0.639 0.538 0.722 
60 0.213 0.307 0.283 0.396 
a) • indicates significance at 5 per cent level; •• indicates significance at I per cent 
level. Critical values -2.12 and-3.19, respectively, taken from Quah (1994b) for (N,T) = 
(25,50) 
b) • indicates significance at 5 per cent level; •• indicates signficance at I per cent 
level. Critical values -2.14 and-3.13, taken from Quah (1994b) for (N,T) = (25,25) 
c) The regression results are based on the regressions: 
AR(l):y,=y,y,-1 +1:1 
AR(2):y, = y,y,-, + y2y1-2+ i:, 
where y, denotes GDP per capita (per worker) in country i relative to the EU average. 
d) The unit-root test involves the null hypothesis that (y1 -1) equals zero. The values for 
(y-1) are obtained from a regression in differenced form. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Pooling the data, I apply an autoregressive model and test for stationarity of 
relative output. The number of lags in the regressions is assumed to be either one 
or two. The results of the unit-root tests and the corresponding impulse response 
values are given in Table 6. The estimates suggest that relative output per capita 
(per worker) in the EU are characterized by mean reversion, so that they return to 
their mean after a shock, but they do so only at a slow rate. In the EU, relative 
output per worker is observed to adjust more quickly than output per capita. 
Whereas, after 30 years, 54 per cent of a shock to relative output per worker has 
been absorbed, the corresponding percentage of relative output per capita is only 
4 7 %. These patterns can be compared to those observed in the US and in 
disaggregated regional data of Europe. Blanchard and Katz (1992) report that 43 
per cent of the shock is absorbed after l 0 years and about 80 per cent after 20 
years. Neven and Gouyette (1995), analyzing 107 EC-Nuts Il regions, find that 
after 30 years, only 25 per cent of a shock has been absorbed. Thus, whereas the 
process of mean reversion across European countries seems to be much slower 
than across regions of the United States, it is faster than on the regional level in 
Europe. 
4.5.3. a-convergence 
Fig. 4.3.: Sigma-convergence of output 
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cr-convergence considers the cross-sectional dispersion in per capita earnings 
[Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1991, 1992]. 
cr-convergence occurs if the cross-sectional dispersion in per capita earnings, 
typically measured by either the standard deviation or the coefficient of variation, 
declines through time. The evolution of the standard deviation of (the log of) 
output per capita and productivity in the EU is displayed in Figure 3. cr-
convergence in the EU in terms of output per capita has been less remarkable 
than in terms of labor productivity. This is due to relatively slower convergence 
in the demographic structure and in participation rates than in terms of 
employment. This point can be seen differently, and more clearly, by looking at 
employment rates. 
The employment rate is defined as employment over population, hence its 
variance reflects the impact of both participation and unemployment rates. In 
Figure 4, the evolution over time of the employment rate in the EU is displayed. 
This statistic displays a smooth and rising trend until the beginning of the 1980's 
and a sharp increase thereafter. 
Figure 4.4: 
Sigma-convergence of employment 
rate 
64 68 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Time 
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This divergence in terms of the employment rate stands in contrast to the 
behavior of the dispersion of both output per capita and labor 
productivity.Figures 3 and 4 together indicate that productivity growth in Europe 
has converged over the post World-War II period, probably due to increased 
integration of goods and financial markets. However, the lagging countries have 
managed to close the gap with the more advanced ones in productivity terms only 
at the cost of low employment rates, thus output gains have been achieved with 
very low employment creation 14. In Figure 5 er-convergence of output per worker 
in the EU is displayed, this time together with the implicit er-convergence that 
one would expect if the P-coefficient was stable along the sample period 15• The 
implicit er-convergence, which is derived by adding log(yi1_1) on both sides of 
equation (4.5), computing the variance, and using the condition that the 
covariance between ui1 and log(yi1_1) is zero, is computed using the following 
difference equation 16: 
Assuming that the variance of the disturbance, a2 ut' is constant over time, ( a 
2 ut = a2 ), which implies homoskedasticity of residuals, the solution of the 
difference equation (8) is given by 
2 2 2 
(4.9) o-2, = ~+[°" o-o- "]e-2,tt 
l-e-ip l-e-ip 
Substituting the actual values of a2 in 1990 and 1950, a2 u is approximated 
by 
(4.10) 
Empirical a-convergence is less smooth than predicted by the theoretical 
concept of implicit a-convergence. Since 1974, empirically, a-convergence is 
above implicit a-convergence, thus the theoretical a-convergence permanently 
underpredicts income dispersion in the EU. Indeed, the figure suggests that 
convergence in the EU has virtually stopped in the mid l 970's and partly been 
reversed since then. Two explanations seem plausible: first, the variance of 
shocks affecting the economies might have increased, the economies thus having 
increasingly been subject to large asymmetric shocks. Second, the P-coefficient 
has not been stable all along the observation period. 
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4.5.4. Income distribution dynamics 
cr-convergence is, however, only a crude measure of dispersion, since the 
estimated variance of income across countries is influenced by shocks hitting the 
economy at any particular point in time. Hence, even if the economies were truly 
getting closer in the long-run, this statistic would have a lower bound by the 
variance of these shocks [Andres et.al.,1995]. As argued by Quah (1993a,b), 
analyzing an average or representative economy in a cross-section of economies 
may give a misleading picture for the behavior of that entire cross-section. 
Therefore, he proposes to study the probability distribution of the evolution of 
income over time. We will make use of some descriptive techniques proposed by 
this author. The purpose is to obtain more detailed information as to which 
countries converge and which do not. We define the grid in such a way that the 
set of quantiles determines the sequence of cross-section distributions. The 
change in the grid describes the evolution of the cross-section distribution from 
one period to the next one. Convergence in this context is taking place if the 
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Figure 4.6. : 
Income distribution in the European 
Union 
a) Fractiles GDP per worker 
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sequence of quantiles degenerates to the mean. Figures 6 a) and b) show the 
sequence of fractiles of income per capita and labor productivity relative to the 
average value in the EU. The 25 per cent of countries with lowest productivity of 
labor in 1950 fell in a range of 0.35 to 0.72 of the EU average. The upper limit of 
this interval rose steadily until 1975 and has stayed around 0. 95 times the average 
since then. The evolution of the lower limit was similar, so that the range 
remained about the same over the whole time period. The second and third 
quantile tend to concentrate around the mean. The 25 per cent of countries with 
highest productivity fell in a range of 1. 3 3 to 1. 69 of EU average. The lower limit 
evolved until 1.11, the upper limit until 1.38 times the average, where again it is 
to be noted that this is about the same as in the mid 70's. Indeed, the upper limit 
has been increasing slightly since the mid 70's. The behavior of income per capita 
over time is similar, though the degeneration process towards the mean is clearly 
less pronounced. As with labor productivity, since the mid 70's, the convergence 
process seems to be stagnating. 
Figures 7 a) and b) provide additional information on the evolution of the 
income distribution in Europe. It ranks the countries according to the relative 
income per capita (labor productivity) in the first year of the sample and shows 
the evolution of the ranking over time17• Each line represents, for a single year 
(1950, 1973, 1990), the relative income of the EU countries ordered by their 
initial ranking. By construction, the larger the income differences, the steeper the 
lines are. Income per capita differentials among middle income countries and 
high-income countries have been reduced slightly over recent years, as the slope 
remains about the same. However, differences between, on the one hand, rich 
and middle income countries, and a group of poor economies on the other one, 
notably Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland, have widened over the post World-
War II period, as the slope in this range becomes steeper over time. While the 
ranking of productivity evolves similarly, the changes in ranking are realized to 
be much more pronounced than changes in income per capita. 
At this stage, I may review the main impressions obtained from the 
descriptive statistical analysis. First, the adjustment process of goods markets 
across regions in Europe is slower than across countries. This is in line with other 
empirical evidence concerning goods- or labor market-adjustment in the EU and 
implies that lagging economic regions in the EU have greater difficulties to cope 
with region-specific structural adjustment problems than countries with country-
specifc ones. Second, economic convergence of output per worker in the EU over 
the post World-War II period is confirmed. Convergence is found by applying cr-
convergence. The summed deviation from the mean across EU countries has 
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decreased over time. However, first, a-convergence is seen to be empirically less 
smooth than theoretically predicted and, second, the process of convergence 
seems to have been reversed since 1974. Third, while income differentials have 
been reduced among middle- and high-income economies, differentials to a 
group of poor economies remain persistent. Thus, while on average European 
economies seem to converge, this process is far from common to all economies. 
The descriptive analysis in this section, thus, confirms the impression obtained 
from other empirical studies that the EU is characterized empirically by 
economic convergence. However, the process of convergence has not been 
stable, neither across time nor across countries. 
4.6. A stylized growth model 
In this section, a stylized growth model is developed that conveniently 
incorporates the alternative theoretical approaches presented in section two of 
this chapter. The model will be used as the theoretical basis for the subsequent 
econometric analysis. The model is in the neoclassical tradition of Solow (1956) 
and, more recently, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Mankiw et.al. (1992). 
The formulation of the production function follows Ethier (1982) and Romer 
(1987). The treatment of the technological gap is based originally on Nelson and 
Phelps (1966) and follows De la Fuente (1995a,b) and Hansson and Henrekson 
(1994a). The aggregate production function is assumed to be given by 
(4.11) Y = AKa+µ NI-a 
where Y is GDP, K is the capital stock and N is total employment. A denotes 
an index for the level of technology. µ denotes an extemality and describes the 
substitutability between different intermediate capital goods. Taking logs of 
equation ( 1) and differentiating with respect to time, we obtain the rate of growth 
of aggregate GDP, gy, as the weighted sum of three components, reflecting, 
respectively, the rate of technical progress gA, the accumulation of reproducible 
factors~. and population growth ~ 18• 
(4.12) gr = gA + agx + /JgN 
In order to describe economic growth in the economy, we need to specify the 
determinants of the three growth rates, gA, ~and~-~. the rate of population 
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growth, is exogenous. Let ~ equal n. Let's tum to the second factor, the rate of 
growth of the capital stock, which is given by 
(4.13) gK = AKa+µ NI-a - C - 0 
Let k = Kl AN and y = Y / AN denote the capital-labor ratio and production in 
efficiency units, respectively. The growth rate of the stock of capital per 
efficiency unit of labor, ~. is the difference between the growth rate of the 
aggregate stock of capital and the sum of the rates of technical progress and 
population growth. 
(4.14) gt=gK-g_.-n=se+µ-l_(n+g.<+O) 
The rate of savings s is assumed to be constant. n and o denote the 
ul . wth d th d . . . l [ ] k< + -Il · pop at1on gro rate an e eprec1at1on rate, respective y n = ~ . a. "' 1s 
the average product of capital talcing into account of the externality. The rate of 
factor accumulation, gk, is given by the difference between the average product 
of capital and the rate of consumption, which amounts, for a constant 
consumption rate, to equal the investment rate, and the effective depreciation rate 
(n+ga+o). The time path of capital depends crucially on its factor share a+µ. If a 
+µ is less than one, then the marginal product of capital, and hence the rate of 
return on investment, falls with the accumulated capital stock, reducing the 
incentive to save and the contribution of a given volume of investment to output 
growth. The system then returns to the steady state level of capital, which is 
given by 
(4.15) k*= lnAo+ 1 Ins- ln(n+o+g,) 1-a-µ -a-µ 1-a-µ 
In contrast, if a+µ equals one, so that returns to reproducible factor inputs 
are constant, the rate of return on investment remains constant and the incentive 
to save is not reduced with an increasing capital stock. Initial deviations from the 
steady state are persistent and remain constant. If a+µ is greater than one, since 
the return on investment is an increasing function of the stock of capital per 
efficiency unit of labor, the rate of accumulation of g increases with k. Thus, k 
grows when it is larger than k* and falls when it is smaller, moving farther and 
farther away from the steady state. Finally, we specify the determinants of the 
rate of technical progress, gA Here we partly endogenize technical progress by 
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technological differences, which in turn is associated with the social capability of 
the economy. As discussed before, the general idea is that backward countries 
will have an opportunity to embark on a catching-up process by imitating and 
borrowing superior production techniques from the more advanced economies 
cheaper and faster than the original discovery and testing. The difference 
between potential technological spillover and the actual spillover may be captured 
by assuming that in every period the relative change in the technological level is 
proportional to the technological gap b. The technological gap b is measured by 
the log difference between a "technological frontier" denoted by X and the 
country's own technological index, A: 
(4.16) 
X-A 
~ = <l>(s)-A- = <l>(sXlnX -In A)= <l>(s)b 
s denotes the social capability. <l>(s) measures the speed of diffusion of new 
technologies and is assumed to be positively related to the social capability of the 
country, i.e., <l>'(s) > 0. Assuming that X grows at the constant rate gx and 
solving the resultant differential equation, we obtain the time path of the 
technology index A 19 . 
(4.17) ( <l>(s) ) _ <l>t <l>(s) gJ A,= Ao---'-'-- e +--'-'---e 
<l>(s) + gx <l>(s) + gx 
The second term on the right hand side denotes the evolution of A in the 
steady state (A*), while the first term captures the part of the evolution that is 




It follows that increased social capability reduces the steady state 
technological gap in a country. Two cases, displayed in Figure 8 illustrate the 
diffusion mechanism inherent in equations (16) to (18)2°. For one, consider two 
countries with different social capabilities, SH and SL, but with the same initial 
technological gap. In this case the country with the higher level of social 
capability will have a faster rate of productivity growth. Eventually, the steady 
state growth rate gx is reached in both countries, and the technological gaps 
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converge to the steady state values corresponding to the respective levels of social 
capability. Put differently, conditional on different initial levels of social 
capability, countries move to the same steady state technological gap. 
Alternatively, consider two countries with the same social capability level, but 
with initially differing technological gaps b1 and b2. The country with the larger 
technological gap will grow faster than the country with the smaller gap, but both 
countries eventually converge to the same equilibrium gap b*. The differences in 
productivity growth rates thus remain temporary, dependent on the technological 
distance prevailing in the economy. 
In sum, the model provides a formal synthesis of the three alternative 
theoretical approaches discussed in section two. The model incorporates two 
convergence mechanisms, the neoclassical convergence one due to decreasing 
returns to scale to reproducible factors, and a technological diffusion 
convergence one due to differences across countries to the respective steady state 
technological gaps. The model predicts, under plausible assumptions, what Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (1991,1992) labeled conditional convergence21• There is 
convergence in the sense that each country approaches its long-run equilibrium in 
which its income per capita remains constant over time at a level determined by 
its investment effort [De la Fuente, 1995a]. During the transition process, growth 
rates may differ across countries. Growth rates may differ due to differences in 
initial capital intensities. In addition, they may vary due to technological 
differences. 








Source: Own calculations. 
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4.7. Econometric analysis 
In this section a structural econometric model is estimated applying the concept 
of conditional convergence. The econometric analysis allows to obtain a deeper 
view of the causes of economic convergence. The econometric model is based on 
the stylized growth model developed above and concentrates on output per capita 
as a measure for living standards. 
4.7.1. Model specification 
The neoclassical growth model suggests that economies are converging to a 
common rate of technical change. The conditional convergence equation that has 
been applied by, for instance, by Mankiw et.al. (1992), and that has been used 
frequently in subsequent empirical research on convergence, is of the following 
form (all values in logs): 
(4.19) 
;,, a+µ ;,, lny, - Inyo= (1-e- )Inyo +---(l-e- )si • 
1-a-µ 
+(1-e-;,,)lnAo- a+µ (l-e-;,,)(n+g,+8)+A*eg,t +~ 
1-a-µ 
with 'A.= (I-a-µ) (n + g + 8). 
According to equation (19), the growth rate of income per capita is a 
function of the determinants of the ultimate steady state and the initial level of 
income. Mankiw et.al. (1992) approximate equation (19) with a regression of the 
form 
~y, = const.+p1y,1+m(1/r),+m(n+0.05)+ 11 
Ayt lny1-lnYO 
const. (1-e-J. t) Ao + g(t2-e-J. it 1) 
131 (1-e-'A. t) 
1tl 
I/Y 
+ 1 a+µ (1-e-,,) 
-a-µ 
- a+µ (1-e-,,) 
1-a-µ 
S*k 
Christian Schmidt - 978-3-631-75005-6
Downloaded from PubFactory at 01/11/2019 09:22:43AM
via free access
125 
Mankiw et.al. (1992) hold differences in the countries' steady states constant 
by the country-specific savings rates of reproducible capital, and by the average 
growth rate of working-age population. Their approximation relies on the 
assumption of equal initial levels of technology across economies. Since the 
technology parameter Ao is defined in a broad sense, which includes resource 
endowments, institutions etc., it is not convincing that these factors should not 
vary across economies. In addition, the rate of technical change is assumed to be 
equal across economies. As Keller (I 995) points out, in order to evaluate 
neoclassical and endogenous growth models, it is important to allow for 
technological differences in rates of technical change as they, presumably, in 
models with endogenous technical change, vary across economies. From equation 
( 19), solving for In Yt yields 
(4.20) 
lny, = e_,,, Inyo+ a+µ (1-e-;,, )st* +(I- e_,,,)ln Ao 
I-a-µ 
-1 a+µ (l-e-AIXn+g,+o)+A*eg,t +~ 
-a-µ 
Here, equation (20) is approximated as follows: 
(4.21) ~y, = ,r+ /J1y,- 1+m(½),+ m(n+0.05) + µ,+rp,+ ~ 
where Yt ln(yt) 
Yt-1 ln(YO) 
~I e-A.t 
1tl + 1 a+µ (1-e-") -a-µ 
7t2 - a+µ (1-e-") 1-a-µ 
(IIY)t = S*k 
x+µi f(Aoi) 
<pt f(gt) 
The Appendix contains a formal derivation of this equation from the model 
specified before. Note a few things about this specification: first, following Islam 
(1995), initial levels of technology may vary across economies (µ=µi)- µj refers 
to an economy-specific random shock which is constant over time. It measures 
the initial levels of technology Ao in the economies. Differences in initial levels 
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of technology may lead to a technological catch-up process, which this 
specification thus incorporates implicitly. Second, (pt is a time-specific random 
shock common to all economies. It is supposed to capture time-specific 
technological shocks, which presumably affect the economies similarly. Third, 
the equation conditions for differences in savings rates of reproducible capital, 
and for country-specific population growth rates. Physical capital's savings rate, 
s*k, is proxied by the average share of real investment in real GDP. Fourth, as in 
Mankiw et.al. (1992), (g+o) is assumed to be equal to 0.05 and to be the same for 
all countries and all years. 
This specification is a more general version of the model estimated by 
Mankiw et.al. (1992). In contrast to their approach, and based on the theoretical 
model developed before, technological differences are allowed for [Islam, 1995; 
Keller, 1994, 1995]. Initial levels of technology may vary across economies, 
thereby allowing for differences in employed technologies. I deviate from the 
model presented above in that "social capability" is not attempted to measure, 
being taken exogenously. 
4.7.2. Econometric methodology 
Equation (21) is a dynamic panel regression model. Panel data econometric 
methods are thus applied. Panel data analysis has several advantages [Keller, 
1995): first, by breaking up the period of observation into subperiods, the number 
of data points is increased. More data improves the fit of the estimation, as 
measured by the coefficient of determination, R 2. In addition, statistical 
inference is facilitated in a panel context. If N is the size of the cross-section, and 
T the number of time periods the cross-section is observed, then switching from 
cross-sectional to panel analysis increases the number of degrees of freedom 
from N to NT. Secondly, a panel approach exploits the time dimension of the 
data in a way cross-sectional analysis does not, as the latter does preclude any 
analysis into the time dimension of the convergence phenomenon. Thirdly, and 
most importantly, panel data analysis controls for economy-specific effects 
which, if present and not orthogonal to the other regressors, will bias the 
estimated coefficients. This bias is the standard omission-of-variable bias: if 
there is unobserved heterogeneity across economies, failing to control for this 
will bias the coefficients of the remaining variables according to their "true" 
correlation with the unobserved heterogeneity. Following Islam (1995) and Keller 
(1995), the individual effects are thought of as deterministic. In contrast, treating 
the individual effects as random would imply an assumption that the exogenous 
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regressors be uncorrelated with the fixed effects. This, however, would not be 
suitable in the present case, because it is against the argument of the economic 
model, as the individual-specific effects capture technological differences, which 
are correlated with the exogenous variables. In the present case, the Least 
Squares Dummy Variable (LSDV) may be applied. This amounts to introducing 
a dummy for each economy, and subperiod, and estimate the equation by OLS. 
As has been shown by Anderson and Hsiao (I 982) and Hsiao (1986), the 
estimator of 13 is inconsistent when asymptotics are considered in the direction of 
N • oo. However, in the direction of T • oo, the LSDV estimator is consistent 
and asymptotically equivalent to the Maximum Likelihood Estimator [ Amemiya, 
1967]. A consistent estimate of 13 can be obtained by using instrumental-variable 
methods. The instrumental-variable method proposed by Anderson and Hsiao 
(1982) involves estimating equation (8) in differenced form, with the fixed 
effects being swept out22• Therefore, I proceed by estimating equation (8) using 
the LSDV-estimator in order to obtain the fixed effects. Indeed, Islam (1992) 
applied Monte-Carlo methods and showed that the LSDV-estimator performs 
very well in comparison to other estimators. 
4.7.3. Estimation results 
The observation period spans 42 years from 1950 to 1992 using data from 15 
countries. The whole period is divided into eight sub-periods, thus seven sub-
periods over a length of five years and one over seven years. At first, the 
observations are treated as if they were 120 independent draws from a given 
population. That is, regressions abstract from the fact that every 15th observation 
comes from the same region, and that every 8th observation belongs to the same 
subperiod. I then add, sequentially, country-specific and time-specific effects to 
allow for a less restrictive version of the econometric model, which takes into 
account of differences across economies and across time23 . 
The results from estimating equation (21) are given in Table 7. In the upper 
part of the table results from unrestricted regressions are displayed. In the lower 
part of the table, results from restricted regressions, imposing the (neoclassical) 
restriction that the coefficients of the investment and population growth rates are 
equal in magnitude but opposite in sign (1q = - 1t2), are given. 
The first column gives the results from estimating equation (21) with pooled 
ordinary least squares [regression (I)]. The signs of the coefficients are as to be 
expected from economic theory. Physical capital's investment rate has a positive 
and significant effect on output per capita. The coefficient of the rate of 
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Table 4.7: Regression results from estimating equation (21) 
Y1oLs(l) )'tLsov )'tLsov )'tLsov ytLSDV 
(2) (3) (4) (5) 
constant 0.7047 - - - -
(0.1870) 
In (y)t_ J 0.9085 0.9269 0.8780 0.9271 0.6774 
(0.0125) (0.0119) (0.0171) (0.0186) (0.0442) 
ln(I/ GDP)t 0.0767 0.2309 0.1184 -0.0234 -0.0168 
(0.0345) (0.0478) (0.0531) (0.0525) (0.0533) 
In (n + g + o)t 0.0051 0.8745 -1.4025 0.6703 2.5546 
(1.677) (1.9767) (1.9418) (1.5279) (1.5332) 
Implied 1.. 0.01827 0.0144 0.02478 0.0144 0.0548 
R2 adj. 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.98 
Durbin - Watson 1.56 1.78 1.68 1.80 
s.e.e. 0.065 0.067 0.062 0.054 
Restricted Rt!llression 
constant 0.7089 - - -
(0.1661) 
In (y)t_ 1 0.9083 0.9267 0.8811 0.7761 0.6789 
(0.0122) (0.0119) (0.0164) (0.0184) (0.0442) 
In (I/ GDP)t-ln (n+g+o)t 0.0772 0.2507 0.1045 -0.0220 0.0027 
(0.0331) (0.0326) (0.0494) (0.0510) (0.0520) 
Imolied A 0.01832 0.0145 0.024H 0.0482 0.0737 
R2 adiusted 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Durbin-Watson 1.56 1.11 1.69 1.86 1.75 
s.e.e. 0.064 0.067 0.0626 0.056 0.055 
Wald test for neoclassical 0.96 0.64 0.50 0.08 0.09 
restriction : o-value 
Test for relative fixed 0.51 0.02 
effects and neoclassical 
restriction : p-value 
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included 
Time Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
included 
LR-tests for significance 
of fixed effects 
Ho: No individual fixed 
effects x2(15): p-value 0.0013 
Ho: No time fixed effects 0.013 0.0001 
x.2(8) : o-value 
Standard errors in parantheses. P-value refers to marginal significance level. 
Heteroskedasticitv-consistent errors are used. fWhite 19801. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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population growth remains insignificant. The coefficient of the log of output 
per capita in the previous sub-period is 0.9, which implies a rate of convergence 
of 1.82 per cent p.a.24. The value is within the range of estimates obtained by 
other authors using cross-section regression analysis with regional European data. 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1991 ), for example, obtained a corresponding speed of 
1. 78 per cent p.a., while Armstrong (1995) reports rates between 1 and 2 per cent 
p.a .. The estimated coefficients from restricted regressions are similar as before. 
The restriction is accepted, with a probability of 96% that the restriction is 
correctly imposed. The second and third column [regressions 2 and 3] contain the 
results from estimating equation (21) with individual-specific fixed effects, thus 
allowing for differences in initial states of technology. A dummy for each 
economy is included, which effectively introduces a constant term for each 
country. In the second column [regression 2] the fixed effects are restricted to 
sum to zero, thus expressing initial technology relative to an EU-average. The 
rate of convergence drops to 1.44 per cent p.a. in the unrestricted and to 1.45 per 
cent p.a. in the restricted regression. In the third column [regression 3] the fixed 
effects are expressed in absolute terms. The rate of convergence now increases to 
2.47 per cent p.a., thus by inclusion of individual-specific fixed effects the rate of 
convergence is enhanced. As before, the neoclassical restriction (i.e. opposite 
signs of coefficients of population growth and investment rates) is accepted. It 
remains to test for the significance of the fixed effects, thus for the significance 
of differences in initial levels of technology. The corresponding Likelihood Ratio 
(LR)-test rejects the hypothesis of no fixed effects at the 1 % significance level. 
The fourth and fifth column [regressions 4 and 5] display the results from 
esimating equation (21) with both individual- and time-specific effects. In the 
fifth column the fixed effects are again expressed in absolute terms. The rate of 
convergence is now 5.48 per cent p.a .. Thus, conditioning on time-specific 
shocks does contribute to a more than double of the rate of convergence 
indicating that time-specific factors, like the oil-crises, are very relevant for 
differences across economies. The LR-test for significance of time-specific 
effects confirms that they are statistically significant for convergence and growth 
in the EU. 
Next I turn to the issue of human capital. Human capital has been assigned 
several roles in the literature on economic growth [Hansson and Henrekson, 
1994a]. First, it is seen as a separate factor of production, e.g., Mankiw et.al. 
(1992). Second, it is a source of innovative activity, and therefore an important 
input in the production of basic knowledge [Romer, 1990]. Third, a larger stock 
of human capital makes it easier for a country to absorb the new products or 
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of human capital makes it easier for a country to absorb the new products or 
ideas that have been discovered elsewhere, and hence the catching-up potential 
may be exploited (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Easterlin, 1981; Abramovitz, 1986). 
Fourth, there may be an external effect of human capital, i.e. human capital 
embodied in a worker may raise the productivity of colleagues [Lucas, 1988). 
The regression equation including human capital then becomes 
(4.22) 
The savings rate of human capital is approximated by the tertiary school 
enrollment rate. For the present sample of EU economies the use of the tertiary 
school enrollment rate seems to more appropriate than secondary school 
enrollment rates, as the latter show relatively little variation across the countries. 
Table 8 contains the results from estimating equation (22). In the upper part 
of the table results from unrestricted regression estimates are given, while in the 
lower part of the table restricted estimates, imposing the neoclassical restriction 
that the coefficients on the investment rate, the human capital accumulation rate 
and the population growth rate sum to zero, are provided. 
In the first column the results from pooled regression estimates are displayed 
[regression 6). The value of the coefficient of lagged ouput per capita is 0.9, 
which is similar as before in the pooled regression without human capital. 
Indeed, the coefficient of human capital accumulation turns out to be 
insignificant. Imposing the neoclassical restriction, which is accepted, does not 
affect the estimated coefficients. Next economy-specific fixed effects are 
included [regressions 7 and 8). The coefficient of lagged output per capita drops 
to 0. 75, thus the rate of convergence rises to 5. 72 per cent p.a .. The value of the 
coefficient of human capital accumulation now rises and becomes clearly 
significant. One interpretation for this finding may be that the initial level of 
technology is correlated with the rate of human capital accumulation, as proposed 
by some endogenous growth models [Lucas 1988). The LR-test indicates that the 
individual-specific fixed effects are statistically significant. Finally, in 
regressions 9 and I 0, the full two-way fixed effects structure is included. The 
coefficient of human capital becomes insignificant, which may suggest the 
partial correlation between human capital and output per capita is time-sensitive. 
A possible interpretation, noted by Andres et.al. (1995), is that the human capital 
influence upon output takes time to show up, and hence it might be the case that 
changes in the tertiary school enrollment rate are weakly correlated with current 
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Table 4.8.: Regression results from estimating equation (22) 
Regressors I Estimators Y1n," (6) Yt, om,(7) Yt. om,(8) Yt, onv(9) Yt«m,(l) 
constant 0.7278 - - - -
(0.2173) 
ln(y)t-1 0.9055 0.8827 0.7507 0.6700 
(0.0156) (0.0149) (0.0312) (0.043) 
In (I/ GDP)t 0.0724 0.2802 0.0523 -0.0174 
(0.0456) (0.0450) (0.0654) (0_053) 
In (sk)t 0.0035 0.0469 0.0897 0.0180 
(0.0122) (0.0127) (0.0155) (0.0209) 
In (n + g + 6)t 0.1350 2.4583 1.3972 2.8522 
(1.7960) (2.1768) (2.1880) (1.6222) 
Implied A. 0.0189 0.0237 0.0546 0.0762 
R2 adj. 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 
Durbin - Watson 1.56 1.80 1.94 1.81 
s.e.e. 0.0654 0.0737 0.0572 0.0551 
Restricted Rellression 
constant 0.7318 - - - -
(0.2147) 
In (y)t_ 1 0.9054 0.8886 0.7515 0.7460 0.6731 
(0.0156) (0.0142) (0.0312) (0.0266) (0.0434) 
In (I/ GDP)t-ln (n+g+6)t 0.07524 0.3206 0.0703 -0.0105 0.0032 
(0.0390) (0.0325) (0.0603) (0.0519) (0.0523) 
In (sk)t-ln (n + g + 6)t 0.0032 0.0382 0.0857 0.0267 0.0091 
(0.0120) (0.0108) (0.0145) (0.0185) (0.0203) 
Implied A. 0.0189 0.0224 0.0544 0.0558 0.0754 
RLadi. 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.98 
Durbin-Watson 1.56 1.75 1.89 1.86 1.75 
s.e.e. 0.0650 0.0740 0.0572 0.057 0.056 
Test for neoclassical 0.905 0.47 0.098 0.077 
restriction: p-value 
Test for rel. Fixed. Eff. 0.0001 0.022 -
And neoclassical rest. : p-
value 
Individual Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Included 
Time Fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
included 
LR - tests for significance 
of fixed effects 
Ho: No individual fixed 0.0001 
effects y2(15) : p-value 
Ho: No time fixed effects 0.0001 0.0001 
y2(8) : p-value 
Standard errors in parantheses. P-value refers to marginal significance level. 
Heteroskedasticitv-consistent errors are used. [White 19801-
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taking into account of time-specific shocks the speed of convergence is 
increased. Time-specific effects are significant, as indicated by the LR-test. The 
neoclassical restriction is, as before, accepted. 
In sum, while, on the one hand, the results tend to accept the restrictions 
suggested by the neoclassical growth model, differences, on the other hand, in 
initial states of technology are found to play an important role for the post-World 
War II growth experience in the EU. Thus, the process of convergence is 
influenced by differences in technology levels. By taking into account of these 
differences, the rates of convergence are increased. In other words, with respect 
to the hypotheses formulated above, the estimation results are essentially in line 
with a model of decreasing returns to scale and opportunities for technological 
catch-up. 
4. 7.4. Economic interpretation 
In this section I attempt to deepen the economic interpretation of the estimation 
results discussed in the previous section and to derive some of their economic 
implications. 
0,06 ., r o.04 
0,02 s 
,I: 0 





Estimated fixed effects 
-0,08 ~-~~~~-~~~~-~~~~-~~ 
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Figure 9 displays the estimated economy-specific fixed effects obtained from 
regression 10, which included the full two-way fixed effects structure25. The 
coefficients are presented relative to their average values. Apart from the strongly 
negative deviation of the initial level of technology in Denmark, for which I do 
not find a plausible explanation, the estimated values seem reasonable. The 
estimated levels of technology are clearly below the average in Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, and deviate positively, in particular, in Italy and Belgium from the 
average. 
In Table 9 the correlation coefficients between the estimated fixed effects 
and the levels of GDP per capita in different years are given. Since Ao is part of 
the production function, it should be correlated with per capita income at 
different points of time. As expected, the correlation is strongly positive, 
indicating that a higher initial level of technology implies a higher living standard 
in the future. Interestingly, the correlation seems to become stronger, the longer 
the period to the observed income per capita is. 
Table 4.9. Analysis of estimated fixed effects. Correlation coefficients 
Variable Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect Fixed effect (10)8) 
(3)8) (5)a) (8)8) 
lny,;o 0.39 0.25 0.28 0.25 
lnv~n 0.49 0.35 0.34 0.35 
lnyT~ 0.47 0.43 0.39 0.42 
lnYQl 0.57 0.46 0.42 0.45 
.1. In VfQ 1 _,;rn -0.19 -0.05 -0.13 -0.05 
.1. In Y'71-'im -0.22 - 0.01 - 0.11 - 0.01 
Sk Tertiary 0.23 0.28 0.29 0.28 
enrollment rate 
(average) 
Sk Secondary 0.02 -0.08 0.09 -0.07 
enrollment rate 
(average) 
In (IJY)rQn.,;rn 0.05 0.11 0.24 0.12 
In DfQn.,;rn -0.06 0.18 0.03 0.17 
In (G/Y)rQn.,;rn - 0.12 - 0.31 - 0.26 -0.32 
a) Estimated fixed effects obtained from the regression in parantheses, referring to Tables 7 
and 8. 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Turning to the relation between the initial level of technology and the 
subsequent rate of growth, one needs to think first about what to expect from 
economic theory26. With no technological diffusion, a technologically leading 
economy always has a higher rate of productivity growth. The distance between 
the technological leader and its follower grows without bound. This would be the 
case in endogenous growth models, where differences in initial levels of 
technology are allowed for and which remain persistently different. 
With technological diffusion, on the other hand, the initial technological gap 
between two economies is reduced over time and the rate of productivity growth 
is equalized. Though I do not have a measure for the rate of productivity growth, 
the rate of growth of GDP per capita may serve as a proxy. In addition, Table 9 
contains the correlation coefficients between the rate of growth and the estimated 
initial levels of technology are given, which tum out be negative. Thus a higher 
initial level of technology is associated with a relatively lower subsequent growth 
rate. This result confirms the impression of the estimation results in the sense that 
initially, in terms of technology, backward economies tended to catch-up to 
technologically advanced ones27. 
An interesting question relates to the determinants of technological 
differences. According to endogenous growth theories, factors like market size, 
economic policies, or factor endowments may affect technology and growth. To 
obtain an impression, I calculate correlation coefficients between several 
explanatory variables and the estimated technology parameters. In addition to the 
variables used in the regressions (physical and human capital, population growth 
rates}, I put the initial levels of technology in relation to the size of the 
government (G/Y), which may be thought of as proxy for institutional 
differences. The results are displayed in the lower part of Table 9. Tertiary school 
enrollment rates show the strongest positive partial correlation with the estimated 
fixed effects. While both investment rates and population growth rates are 
positively correlated, the relation to the size of the government is negative. Barro 
( 1991) and Landau ( 1983, 1986) report negative coefficients in cross-sectional 
analyses between the average growth rate and the size of the government, which 
is in line with the negative correlation coefficients. The results here, suggest, 
interpreted with all necessary caution, that the mechanism may work through the 
effect on technological parameters. More research, however, on the determinants 
of technological differences is needed to obtain more reliable empirical evidence. 
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4.8. Concluding remarks 
This chapter contains an empirical analysis on growth and convergence in the 
European Union. The chapter starts from a discussion of the relevant theoretical 
background. Three modern theories of economic growth are discussed. Theories 
of technological catch-up argue that inefficient use of technology may lead to a 
process of convergence, depending on the degree of economic development in 
the economy. Neoclassical growth theories predict convergence due to decreasing 
returns to scale. Endogenous growth theories, in contrast, maintain that economic 
growth may be influenced by factors like market size, economies of scale and 
institutional structure, so that differences in living standards would possibly 
persist. It is argued that the predictions of theoretical models concerning the 
prospects for income convergence across countries depend crucially on two 
assumptions: the existence, or non-existence, of increasing returns to 
reproducible factors, including the stock of technological knowledge, and the 
degree to which useful knowledge is a public good across countries. 
As for the controversy on the right measure of convergence, theoretical and 
empirical concepts of convergence are reviewed. First, a-convergence considers 
the cross-sectional dispersion in per capita earnings. a-convergence occurs if the 
cross-sectional dispersion in per capita earnings, typically measured by either the 
standard deviation or the coefficient of variation, declines through time. Second, 
absolute P-convergence occurs when poor countries tend to grow faster than rich 
ones, such that poor countries catch up to rich ones in terms of the level of per 
capita output through time. Third, conditional convergence refers to convergence 
after it has been controlled for differences in the economy's steady states. With 
conditional convergence, each country may converge to its own steady state, 
which could be very different from each other. Hence, a high degree of inequality 
among economies could persist, even in the long-run, and one could observe high 
persistence in the relative positions of the different economies. Finally, a concept 
that analyses the evolution of the distribution of income over time has been 
applied. The economic basis of the concept is that economies in an integrated 
world tend to be increasingly interdependent units, which would make it 
necessary to drop the "representative economy" assumption inherent in 
neoclassical approaches. 
The empirical evidence with respect to convergence in the world economy is 
mixed. However, there exists a broad consensus in the more recent literature 
suggesting an absence of convergence to a single steady state. The absence of 
convergence to a single steady state may be explained either in the neoclassical 
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tradition in tenns of conditional convergence, that is, the rate of growth falls as 
the economy approaches its own Jong-run level, or in tenns of local convergence 
and multiple equilibria. Empirical studies for Europe tend to support the 
convergence hypothesis. 
The chapter continues with an analysis of the stability of growth and 
convergence processes in Europe, using descriptive statistical techniques and 
alternative methods to measure convergence. The results obtained may be 
summarized as follows: first, the adjustment process of goods markets in Europe, 
on a regional level, is slower than across countries. This is in line with other 
empirical evidence concerning goods- or labor market-adjustment in the EU and 
implies that lagging economic regions in the EU have greater difficulties to cope 
with region-specific structural adjustment problems than countries with country-
specifc ones. Second, economic convergence of output per worker in the EU over 
the post World-War II period is confinned. Convergence is found by applying cr-
convergence. The summed deviation from the mean across EU countries has 
decreased over time. However, first, er-convergence is seen to be empirically less 
smooth than theoretically predicted and, second, the process of convergence 
seems to have been reversed since 1974. Third, while income differentials have 
been reduced among middle- and high-income economies, differentials to a 
group of poor economies remain persistent. Thus, while on average European 
economies seem to converge, this process no common to all economies. The 
descriptive analysis in this section, thus, confrrms the impression obtained from 
other empirical studies that the EU is characterized empirically by economic 
convergence. However, the process of convergence has not been stable, neither 
across time nor across countries. 
The subsequent econometric analysis of the relation between technological 
differences, convergence, and growth suggests that over the post World-War II 
period European economies have been converging in tenns of output per capita 
in a conditional sense. Other things equal, poor countries in Europe tend to grow 
faster than richer ones. Conditional on equal investment, enrollment rates and 
technologies, economies in Europe do seem to converge to the same level of 
income per capita. The finding of conditional convergence, however, does imply 
that at present economies living standards in Europe diverge. In other words, 
since investment rates, enrollment rates, and employed technologies differ across 
EU countries, economies converge, dependent on these detenninants, to 
individual levels of output per capita. It follows that poor economies, like 
Portugal, Greece, Spain and Ireland, presumably converge to a lower steady state 
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level of income per capita, which implies persistent differences in income per 
capita. 
Technological differences are found to be an important factor for our 
understanding of growth and convergence in the European Union. The empirical 
evidence seems to support a model with technological diffusion, in which 
technologically lagging economies manage to catch-up to technological leaders 
by innovating and imitating at a lower cost. The exhaustion of catch-up 
opportunities, associated with initial technical backwardness, in addition, may be 
a factor that helps to explain the slowdown of growth and convergence in more 
recent years. 
The estimation results tend to suggest that living standards in Europe are 
unlikely to equalize over time, as there will remain a group of about four 
countries that converges to a relatively lower steady state. If we think of the 
responsibility of policymakers to reduce disparities in Europe, based on Article 
130a of the Maastricht Treaty, the estimates indicate that extended fiscal 
transfers may be needed to secure this policy goal. However, at the same time it 
needs to be emphasized that cohesion does not require that incomes or social 
conditions should be equalized. Nevertheless, if gaps are too large, it is plain 
clear that it will be difficult for the Community to be cohesive. Therefore, 
plausible targets for reductions in disparities, which pass the test of being 
politically acceptable, would be helpful28. 
Appendix to Chapter 4 
1. Derivation of convergence equation 
In this appendix the convergence regression equation, which is given in the main 
text as equation (21 ), is derived. The derivation is based on the stylized growth 
model presented in the main text. An alternative derivation may be found in De 
la Fuente (1995a). A derivation of the convergence equation from the 
neoclassical growth model is, for instance, in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995a). 
We start from the dynamic equation describing the evolution of the capital stock 
per efficiency unit. 
(Al) gk=Ska+µ-1 -(n+gA+o) 
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where s is the constant savings rate in the economy. The rate of technical 
progress, gA, is given by 
(A.2) gA = <l>(sX(X - A) I A= <l>(sXlnX - In A)= <l>(s)b 
where b = In X - In A denotes the technological gap between the actual 
technology level in economy i and its technological frontier. We assume that the 
technological frontier X grows at a constant exogenous rate, gx, which is 
identical across countries. The rate of change of the technological gap, ~, is then 
given by the difference of the growth rate of the best-practice technology and the 
rate of technical progress. 
(A.3) gb = gx - g,4 = gx - <l>(s)b 
Equations (2) and (3) are both linear, first-order differential equations 
describing the dynamic behavior of the rate of technical progress and the 
technological gap, respectively. By solving equation (2), we obtain the time path 
of the technology index. 
(A.4) A,= [Ao- <l>(s) I (<l>(s) + g,))e - <l>t + [<l>(s) I (<l>(s) + g,)]eg.J 
The second term on the right hand side denotes the evolution of A in the 
steady state (A*, the particular solution), while the first term captures the part of 
the evolution that is attributable to the out-of-steady-state effect (complementary 
solution). From equation (3), we obtain the time path of the technological gap. 
(A.5) b,=[bo-;:)}-~(•l• 
Asymptotically, the technological gap converges to a steady state value, 
h* = <l>ts) , which depends negatively on the speed of technological diffusion and 
on the social capability of the economy. From equation (l), we obtain the steady 
state value of the stock of capital per efficiency unit. 
(A.6) 
1 1 1 
k*=l lnAo+ 1 lns- 1 ln(n+o+g,) -a-µ -a-µ -a-µ 
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Substituting (2) into (1 ), and dividing by k, we obtain 
(A. 7) gk = ska+µ-I - (n + <l>(s)h + o) 
We may rewrite equation (7) as follows. 
(A.8) lng1=sek""'' -(n+<l>(s)b+o) 
Evaluating the partial derivatives of equation (8) at the steady state, we get 
(A.9) Ft= -(I-a- µ)·(n+ gx+o) = -,t h = -<l>(s) 
Equation (8) can thus be approximated by the log-linear equation 
(A.10) gk = -(k- k *)- <l>(s}(b-b *) 
From equation (10), and using (5), we obtain the time path for the capital 
stock per efficiency unit. 
(A.1 ]) k, = k * +e-u (ko - k *) + e-<1><•>1 (bo - b *) 
We may rewrite equation ( 11) as in 
(A.12) 
The time path of (the log of) output per capita is given by 
(A.13) y,=A,+(a+µ)k. 
Substituting equation (12) into equation (13), we obtain 
(A.14) 
We may rewrite equation (14), using (13), as follows: 
(A.15) 
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Substituting equation (4), the expression for the time path of the technology 
index, into equation (15) we see that 
(A.16) 
y, = (Ao-A*)e-<J>,.,,, + A*eg" +(a+ µX1-e-,i,}k* 
+ e-,iJ yo -e-,iJ Ao+ (a+ µ)e-<J>'·'11 (bo -b *) 
Substituting the expression for the steady state capital stock into equation 
( 16), and rearranging, we arrive at 
(A.17) 
y, = Ao(e-<l>(s)/ - e-,iJ) +(a+ µ)e-<l>(s)lbO + A *e&'' 
- e-<J>(s)i[b *(a+µ)+ A*]+ e-,iJ yo+ (1-e-.,)( a+µ )st* 
1-a-µ 
-(1-e-,i/)( a+µ )(n+ gx+o) 
l-a-µ 
We subtract YO on both sides, to obtain 
(A.18) 
y, - yo= Ao(e-<l>(s)t -e-AJ) +(a+ µ)e-<1><s>1bO+ A• e&<' 
- e-<l>(•l'[b •(a+µ)+ A*]-(l- e_,,}yo+ (1- e-,i,)( a+µ )st* 
l-a-µ 
-(1-e-.,)( a+µ )(n+g,+o) 
l-a-µ 
We may rewrite equation (17) and (18), by rearranging, as 
(A.19) 
y, = (e-<l>(s)i - e-,i,)Ao +(a+ µ)e-<l>(s)ibo- e-<l>(s),b *[(a+µ)+ A*] 
+A*eg.J +e-,i,yo+ a+µ (1-e-.,)st* a+µ (1-e_.,Xn+g,+o) 
l-a-µ l-a-µ 
The regression equation (21) of the main text, which is repeated here for 
convenience, may then be given the following interpretation: 
Yt 
where 
X + 13 Yt-1 + 7tl (VY)+ 7t2 (n+0.05) + µj + (J)t + &it 
Yt 1n Yt 
13 e-AI 
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e-<l>(s)t [b*(a+µ) +A*] 
In YO 






(e-<l>(sJi - e-;, )In Ao+ (a+ µ)e-<1><s>1bo 
This provides an alternative interpretation of the convergence equation, while 
the regression equation remains unchanged. 
2. Dynamic stability 
The dynamic stability of the model depends on the asymptotic behaviour of the 
technological gap and the capital stock. In other words, the stability of the model 
is based on equations (1) and (3). The partial derivates, evaluated at the steady 




The Trace of (19) is given by 
TR(A) = -(1-a-µ) (n+gx+8) - <l>(s) 
The Determinant of A is given by 
D(A) = [-(1-a-µ) (n+gx+8)] • (-<l>(s)) 
We distinguish 3 cases. 
I. (I-a-µ)> 0; <1> > 0 
• D(A) > O; TR(A) < 0 
<=> stable node 
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This is the case with decreasing returns to scale and a stable evolution 
towards the steady state technological gap. The model is stable. 
II. (1-a-µ) < 0; «l> > 0 
• TR(A) ~~ 0 ; D(A) < 0 
<=> saddle path stable 
With increasing returns to scale and technological catch-up, there exists a 
unique stable path towards the steady state. 
Ill. (1-a-µ) < 0; «l> < 0 
• TR(A) > O; D(A) > 0 
With increasing returns to scale and technological divergence, the model is 
unstable. Thus, we may conclude that the stability of the dynamic system 
depends on the interaction between the technological catch-up process and the 
neoclassical convergence mechanism. 
Endnotes 
1 An abbreviated version of this chapter in International Advances in Economic Research. 
2 This section draws heavily on Hansson and Henrekson ( 1994a ). 
3 See also Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995a,b) and Betis et.al. (1993) for alternative theoretical 
models of technological diffusion and growth. Eaton and Kortum (1995) provide simulation 
results for a multi-country model of technological innovation. Based on plausible assumptions 
about technology gaps that existed among five leading research economies, they can explain 
fowth experiences quite successfully. 
For policy-oriented surveys of new growth models, see Shaw (1992), Fratianni and Haug 
(1995). See also the Journal of Economic Perspectives, Winter 1994. 
5For a survey of different methods to test for convergence, see Hall et.al. (1993). For critical 
discussions of alternative empirical convergence concepts, see Friedman ( I 992), Bernard and 
Durlauf(l993), Quah (1993, 1994, 1996), Hart (1994), Lichtenberg (1994), Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1995a), Canova (1995), Cohen (1995), Sala-i-Martin (1996). 
6For other recent surveys, see Desdoigts (1994) and De la Fuente (1995b). 
7Baumol et. al. (1989) contains additional empirical analyses (moving averages, Gini-
coefficients) using the same data set as in Baumol and Wolff (1988), which confirm the 
above stated result. 
8The authors divide the sample of countries into three groups: The poor country group 
includes 29 countries, which are almost entirely African. The middle-income group includes 
27 countries and the rich-country group 22 countries, being mainly OECD countries. 
9Empirical studies usually resport several regressions based on different conditioning sets. 
Here, from each study the results from one regression are reported, usually based on the 
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largest number of conditioning variables used in the study. For a survey on earlier empirical 
evidence, see Levine and Renelt (1991). Levine and Renelt (1992) provide a sensitivity 
analysis of different variables and show that the results are very sensitive to the choice of 
variables. 
10The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, UK, USA. 
11Club dummies are two dummies: one "lower club dummy", which refers to the poorest 25 
regions in 1981 and one "upper club dummy", which refers to the richest 25 regions in 1981. 
12The countries included are: Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
13The slowdown of growth and productivity in the past 20 years is a well-documented 
phenomenon for all OECD countries. See, for recent analyses, Ben-David (1995), Crafts and 
Mills( 1995), Siebert ( 1992). 
14This point has been emphasized for the OECD countries by Andres et.al. (1995). See 
Decressin and Fatas (1994) for related empirical evidence on labor market adjustment in the 
EU economies. 
15The concept of implicit a-convergence has been used by Andres et al. ( 1995). The graph for 
output per capita looks similar; it is not included here. 
16See Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995a), Chapter 11. 
17See, for example, Dolado et.al. (1994). 
18Here, as in the rest of the chapter, I use the notation x' = dx/dt for the derivative of x with 
respect to time. The growth rate of x is denoted by gx = x' / x. 
19 See, e.g., Chiang (1984, pp.47O) for solving first-order linear differential equations. 
20 In Figure 4.8. the time paths of the technology index, based on equation (4.17), are 
displayed. The equilibrium rate of technical progress, g., is assumed to be zero. The other 
values used are: 
(a) sH: A1=0.9° 04' +0.05 
SL: At= 0.9°·04'+0.03 
(b) b1: A;= 0.9° 041+0.05 
b2: A,=0.9 OOlt+0.05 
21 See the Appendix for an analysis of the stability properties of the model. 
22The third alternative estimator would be Chamberlin's minimum-distance estimator. See, for 
example, Chamberlin ( 1984 ). 
23Different specifications of the econometric model were applied. In particular, estimating 
equation (20) in differenced form did not change the results. 
2413 = e-A.t, where t equals the average subperiod length in years. Thus, A.= - ln(l3) / t with t = 
5.25. 
25The estimates for the fixed effects obtained from other regressions are similar. 
26De la Fuente ( l 995a,b) provides a formal model for the subsequent argument. 
27This is in line with results obtained from De la Fuente (1995) and Dowrick and Nguyen 
(1989). Islam (1995) obtained, for a large sample of economies, which includes developing 
countries, a positive correlation between the estimated technology levels and the subsequent 
average growth rate. 
28 See Begg and Mayes (1993) for a similar argument. 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications 
The next couple of years may prove difficult as the European Union (EU) faces 
the eventual transition to monetary union. The Maastricht Treaty has created a 
transition-automatism towards monetary union, so that by the end of the century 
at least two countries will have adopted a common currency. While the legal en-
actment of the Maastricht Treaty represents a major step forward in the European 
integration process, at the beginning of 1996, it is as unclear as ever which 
countries will eventually join European Monetary Union (EMU). Germany may 
meet the requirments to join, but this does not mean that it will necessarily want 
to, and the same is true of England. Other countries who may wish to join, may 
not be allowed to do so. There is also much uncertainty surounding the eventual 
starting date, and the possibility still remains of postponing monetary union. 
Moreover, and probably most importantly, the real economic effects of a com-
mon currency are still difficult to evaluate. The economies in Europe currently 
exhibit immense structural differences, in terms of productivity, in wage forma-
tion mechanisms, and in living standards. 
One reason for the prevailing uncertainty towards the shape of the future 
monetary union lies in the formulation of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence 
criteria itself. The Treaty has set out a path to move towards monetary union in 
three stages. Entry into the third, final, stage is conditional upon achieving nomi-
nal convergence in tenns of inflation rate perfonnance, budget positions, ex-
change rate stability and long-tenn interest-rates. However, the Maastricht 
Treaty's convergence criteria not only neglect real economic convergence, but are 
largely economically inconsistent (as seen in Chapter Two) and are not able to 
provide credibility to the future union. 
Whilst a monetary union, by definition, requires nominal convergence, real 
economic ( or structural) convergence is not a technical necessity for its function-
ing. However, nominal convergence will be associated with restrictions on 
macroeconomic policy that will prove to be an additional burden on the union, 
particularly on the less-prosperous members. Therefore, the union itself may re-
duce its own political support and widen existing structural differences. In addi-
tion, if the union consists of countries with very different equilibrium unem-
ployment rates or productivity growth rates, its Jong-tenn stability may be threat-
ened. Such a situation may result in transfer payments from low to high level un-
employment countries or, at the least, put pressure on politicians to advocate such 
transfers. However, if the European Union was unwilling to provide any fman-
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cial support to a country or region, the cries of politicians seeking to blame any 
depression on EMU can be expected. In both cases, willingness to remain within 
EMU may be affected. As has been argued by Goodhart ( 1995), the costs of 
withdrawing from a single currency and re-establishing a separate currency are 
not, in reality, as great as is generally perceived. Once the central political insti-
tutions disintegrate, as has happened in the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslo-
vakia, the costs of moving from a common to multiple currencies are of only sec-
ondary importance. The possibility of a monetary disintegration can therefore a 
priori not be ruled out categorically. It follows that real economic convergence -
the gradual reduction of real economic differences over time - would be helpful 
for the working of monetary union as it would tend to restrict political frictions 
and thereby secure long-term macroeconomic stability. 
In view of this political and economic background, this study has analyzed 
real economic convergence in the European Union. Through this it contributes to 
the discussion on the feasability of EMU and the economic effects of monetary 
union. Using a stepwise approach the analysis concentrated, firstly, on the dy-
namics of labor and goods market adjustment processes and, secondly, on long-
run growth and convergence as indicators for real economic convergence. 
5.1. Conclusions 
The empirical evidence obtained provides an ambiguous picture as to the real 
economic convergence performance in the European Union. The results of the 
comparative analysis of the dynamics of goods and labor market adjustment 
processes are summarized below. The dynamic behavior of output and unem-
ployment are found to be relatively similar in the European and the North-
American countries, although demand and supply shocks in Europe tend to have 
somewhat more persistent effects on output and unemployment. In addition, the 
demand and supply shocks affecting the North-American countries are more 
evenly distributed than those affecting Europe. Moreover, the degree of symme-
try of shocks is higher among sub-groups of countries than for the whole group 
of European countries. Finally, the fifteen member states of the European Union 
do not form an optimum currency area as a whole, as shocks affect economies 
relatively unevenly. Therefore, from an economic point of view, a monetary un-
ion involving all EU member countries is an inefficient idea and is likely to put 
unbearable pressure on the European Central Bank. This would threaten its abil-
ity to implement a stable and predictable monetary policy. Whereas the results 
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suggest that the EU-15 should not form a monetary union, there is a strong con-
viction that a subset of EU countries could do so [see also De Grauwe, 1996]. 
The mimimum set of countries that could form a monetary union is believed to 
include Germany, the Benelux countries and France. 
The analysis of technology, growth and convergence consists of a descriptive 
statistical and an econometric analysis. In short, the descriptive statistical analysis 
confirms the impressions obtained from other empirical studies; that the EU is 
characterized empirically by economic convergence. However, the process of 
convergence has not been stable, either over time or across countries. The subse-
quent econometric analysis implies that, over the post World-War II period, 
European economies have been converging in terms of output per capita. Other 
things being equal, poor countries in Europe tend to grow faster than richer ones. 
Technological differences, however, are found to be an important factor for our 
understanding of growth and convergence in the European Union. The 
econometric analysis seems to support a model with technological diffusion, in 
which technologically lagging economies manage to catch-up to technological 
leaders by innovating and imitating at a lower cost. In addition, the exhaustion of 
catch-up opportunities, which is associated with initial technical backwardness, 
may be a factor that helps to explain the slowdown of growth and convergence in 
more recent years. With respect to the causes of the non-stable convergence proc-
esses in Europe over time and across countries, the econometric analysis does not 
give a conclusive answer, but rather points to several responsible factors. The 
distance of the economy to the technological leader differed across economies, 
which contributed to differences in convergence and growth behavior. In addi-
tion, the finding of conditional convergence implies that economies converge to 
different steady state levels of income per capita. Poor economies, like Portugal, 
Greece, Spain and Ireland presumably converge to lower steady state levels of 
income per capita, which leads to persistent differences in income per capita. It 
follows that investment efforts, from private or public sources, will be needed in 
peripheral countries to limit such disparities in the long-term. If we think of the 
responsibility of policymakers to reduce disparities in Europe, based on Article 
130a of the Maastricht Treaty, the estimates may indicate that EU-wide fiscal 
transfers would be helpful to secure this goal. However, at the same time it needs 
to be emphasized that cohesion does not require that incomes or social conditions 
should be equalized. Nevertheless, if gaps are too large, it is clear that it will be 
difficult for the union to be cohesive. Plausible targets for reductions in dispari-
ties, which pass the test of being politically acceptable, would therefore be help-
ful [Begg and Mayes, 1993]. In order to reduce the foreseeable political and eco-
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nomic tensions associated with prevailing real economic differences, the estab-
lishment of a stabilization scheme, as part of the union's federal budget could 
prove to be fruitful, even as a temporary agreement [Goodhart and Smith, 1993]. 
While fiscal transfer payments may contribute to reducing disparities, they do 
need to be handled with care with regard to the financial situation of the gov-
ernments of member states. 
5.2. Implications for European monetary integration 
In addition to those policy proposals reviewed in chapter two, the following four 
policy implications may be formulated. The first refers to an operational policy 
interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty's convergence criteria, while the others 
refer to more long-term economic policy issues. The second policy implication 
stems from the empirical analysis of optimum currency areas in Chapter Three, 
where the possibility of creating currency blocks was indicated. The other policy 
implications are based on the observation that while the transition process will 
culminate in the adoption of a common currency by at least two countries in 
Europe by the end of the century, the convergence strategy will not contribute to 
macroeconomic stability in the future union. Therefore, with respect to the goal 
of achieving a successful and stable monetary union in the presence of structural 
differences it seems particularly relevant, first, to strengthen the monetary insti-
tutions in order to be even less vulnerable to political pressure and, second, to 
improve market transparency and information flows. 
I. Broad interpretation of convergence criteria 
An important issue on the transitional path to monetary union is how the 
convergence criteria determined in the Maastricht Treaty are to be applied. Three 
alternative transition strategies have emerged [Straubhaar and Schmidt, 1996]. 
The frrst strategy is to strictly adhere to the Maastricht Treaty's convergence cri-
teria. The transition towards EMU follows gradually, although "as soon as pos-
sible". Only those countries which fulfill the monetary and fiscal convergence 
criteria are admitted into the third stage. However, hardly any country will be 
able to fulfill the convergence criteria if the numerology is taken seriously. 
"Realistically", at least, Germany and France should be members of EMU from 
the very beginning. In other words, by strict adherence to the convergence criteria 
either the number of countries would be sub-optimally low or the entry date 
would have to be postponed. Therefore, an alternative possibility is to postpone 
monetary union as a monetary union without a "critical mass" seems to be im-
plausible. A multi-speed approach would reduce the advantages of participating 
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in the union for the member states. It may then make sense not to stick to the en-
try date and instead to wait until a larger number of countries will be able to enter 
into the third stage [Ohr, 1996]. However, postponement of monetary union may 
not be the answer, as it would further reduce the credibility of the monetary inte-
gration process. The third strategy is to interpret the existing convergence criteria 
in a wider sense. In principle, each country should be able to join monetary union 
as soon as it wants to do so. Each country may evaluate the costs and benefits of 
joining the union and decide if it is in its national interest to participate. How-
ever, according to Art. I 09j, the "necessary preconditions" need to be taken into 
consideration. A broad interpretation is preferable to a strict adherence because 
some flexibility for the eventual participants is needed. Strict adherence would 
imply that only two countries will currently qualify, which is not a particularly 
realistic possibility. In this sense, a broad interpretation of the criteria is a politi-
cal necessity in order to achieve monetary union. A broad interpretation is also 
more desirable than a postponement of the union, because the latter would imply 
high political costs in terms of credibility. 
II. Monetary policy coordination among the nonparticipants 
The gradual transition approach will probably lead to a multi-speed monetary 
union. If this is the case, the risk of splitting the European Union apart should be 
taken into consideration. As suggested in Chapter Three, one solution may be the 
creation of currency blocks in Europe. Those countries not initally eligible to en-
ter the third stage might benefit from forming a seperate monetary union ( or un-
ions). The efficiency gains obtained from these currency blocks would enable the 
lagging countries to catch-up to those already in the third stage of monetary un-
ion. 
Ill. Institutional strengthening 
To strengthen the institutional arrangements of the EU, the implementation 
of incentive contracts is proposed. Incentive contracts are measures by which the 
central banker can be penalized for inflation [D.Romer, 1996]. Incentives are 
affected by such facets of institutional design as the appointment and reappoint-
ment procedures for members of the policy-making committee, the existence of 
reporting requirements, and the presence of legislated policy goals [Walsh, 
1995]. Several concrete fonns for the fonnulation of incentive contracts for the 
executive board of the ECB can be thought of. Firstly, the incomes of the mem-
bers of the executive board of the European Central Bank might be made contin-
gent on the state of the economy, thereby influencing the incentives the executive 
board faces in choosing the rate of inflation. Secondly, targeting rules might be 
enforced by making the ECB's budget depend on adherence to the rules [Rogoff, 
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1985]. Thirdly, an even stronger measure is to define a procedure for removal of 
the executive board of the ECB should it fail to maintain price stability. What-
ever its concrete form, an incentive contract would make the future ECB more 
accountable. At the same time, it would be costly for the governors of the ECB to 
follow national political pressures and would thereby contribute to price stability 
even in the future union. The contract should contain an inflation targeting pro-
cedure, which many central banks already follow successfully and such a proce-
dure would be useful within the ECB. 
JV. Public debt management 
A way to make policies more credible is to enforce a time-consistent public 
debt management scheme. One way to do this is to issue short-term maturity 
bonds. Short maturities reduce the government's incentive to produce surprise 
inflation and thereby contribute to solve the time-consistency problems of fiscal 
policies as discussed in Chapter Two. This increases the willingness of wealth 
owners to buy the debt and lowers the borrowing costs of the government 
[Missale and Blanchard, 1994; De Grauwe, 1996]. An alternative, or comple-
mentary, way is to issue inflation-indexed bonds; bonds whose interest payments 
and principal are tied to inflation. Inflation index-linked bonds have been used 
recently in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and Great Britain. The United States 
has decided to introduce them in May I 996. In Britain, 57% of marketable debt 
in 1995 consisted of outstanding index-linked bonds [The Economist, 1996]. In-
dex-linked bonds change a governments' incentives and so tend to make mone-
tary policies more credible. When debt-service payments are denominated in 
nominal tenns, higher than expected inflation rates lower the debt burden, whilst 
fully anticipated inflation does not lower the debt burden [Calvo, 1978; Persson 
and Tabellini, 1990]. By engineering these inflation surprises the government 
expects to cause a reduction in the real public debt burden, which allows a re-
duction in the tax rate whilst keeping the solvency constraint intact. In equilib-
rium, with rational private agents who take this information into account in 
fonning their inflation expectations, the public will anticipate the inflation sur-
prises and hence render them ineffective. As a consequence, the inflation rates 
will be relatively high in the long-run without a positive effect on the debt bur-
den. In short, with nominal public debt, governments have an incentive to inflate 
debts away at the bondholders' expense. If payments of interest and principal in-
crease with rising price levels, governments will be less tempted to let inflation 
rise. Index-linked bonds can help governments to estimate financial markets' ex-
pectations of inflation. This is useful for monetary policymaking, as a rise in the 
expected inflation rate may be a signal that policy should be tightened. Thereby, 
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the conduction of monetary policies could be improved. In addition, it would 
help to predict long-term interest rates as they contain inflation rate expectations 
and would thereby contribute to the more precise evaluation of risk. At the same 
time, index-linked bonds may contribute to a stabilization of the interest rate level 
as well as of the term structure, since interest rates on indexed bonds will sup-
posedly approach the level of the real interest rate in the economy [Pilchner et.al., 
1979]. In addition, index-linked bonds provide benefits in that they increase the 
supply of alternative financial instruments which leads to more competition and 
which enhances the utility of savers [Pilchner et.al., 1979]. In sum, inflation-
indexed bonds would help markets to evaluate risk both by providing estimates 
of inflationary expectations and making monetary policies more credible by 
changing governments' incentives. While in Germany the Bundesbank Act 
(Gesetz Ober die Deutsche Bundesbank) rules out, in a strict adherence to the 
nominal value principle, the use of indexation as a policy instrument, the regula-
tions of the European Central Bank does not preclude their use [Rebelo, 1994]. 
One might thus require the member states of the monetary union to issue infla-
tion-indexed bonds. To obtain a self-balancing mechanism, high-debt countries 
may be required to issue a larger share of their outstanding government bonds in 
the form of inflation-indexed bonds than low-debt countries. 
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